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ABSTRACT 
Although scholars have become increasingly interested in the black legislative 
experience, they have largely overlooked black city councilors and the 
environment in which they serve. I utilize two nation-wide surveys to address this 
gap in the literature. I sent one survey to black city councilors in 2002 and the 
other to their white counterparts in 2003. The two instruments were similar in 
content and question wording so that I could compare the two groups in terms of 
their perceptions and personal profiles. 
My data show that the two sets of councilors generally have similar 
backgrounds. and profiles. However, their perceptions of the black legislative 
experience are fundamentally different. White councilors overwhelmingly say 
that their black colleagues' experiences are positive and, only on rare occasions, 
do they identify discrimination or report that race relations are impaired. Many 
black councilors concur with this assessment, but statistically significant 
differences still remain between the two groups. Blacks tend to be more cynical 
than whites about their legislative experience, and they are more likely identify 
racial barriers that encumber their progress. Race seems to be the primary 
explanation for the perceptual gap since the differences remain when I control for 
alternate factors using bivariate crosstabulations. 
Finally, I relied on dichotomous logistic regression with robust standard 
errors to explain the variance in how the black councilors assess the quality of 
their legislative experience. My analysis shows that contextual factors are more 
meaningful than individual-level factors. Gender, ideology, and perhaps 
vi 
education, are the only two individual-level variables that seem to matter. 
However, a host of contextual variables are significantly related to at least some 
aspect of the black legislative experience. The most important of these 
contextual variables are the municipality's electoral format (at-large vs. wards) 
and the quality of race relations within the city council. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
Background 
The Voting Rights Act of 1965 began a new era of political empowerment for 
blacks by eradicating the system of intertwining barriers that effectively deprived 
them of the franchise. The Act, unlike its emasculate predecessors, was 
effective because it gave the federal government, not the states, the authority to 
enforce its provisions and it did away with the requirement that forced aggrieved 
parties to sue on a case-by-case basis to obtain relief (Davidson 1992). As a 
result, it sparked a dramatic increase in black voting in the Deep South (Albritton 
et al. 1996) and facilitated the creation of majority-minority districts that allowed 
blacks to elect representatives of their choice to legislative bodies (Lublin 1997). 
Not surprisingly, these trends produced an increase in the number of black 
lawmakers at all levels of government, which in turn, allowed them to play a more 
important role in legislative politics (Cf., Walters and Smith 1999: 29). 
These developments in the law and the political changes that ensued 
provided students of racial politics with an abundance of new research topics. 
Initially, most studies either overtly or subtly extolled the value of descriptive 
representation and focused on ways to encourage the election of black leaders. 
Thus, the first generation of studies identified aspects of a municipality's 
governmental structure that either helped or hindered the election of blacks. 
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Some scholars, for example, examined whether black representation on city 
councils was influenced by staggered terms (Bullock and MacManus 1987) the 
number of available seats (Alozie and Manganaro 1993; Brouthers and McClure 
1985; Taebel 1978), and the percentage of blacks in the electorate (Burns 2003). 
More frequently, however, they debated whether at-large districting formats in 
local elections were a subtle, discriminatory barrier that thwarted black 
representation that would have been achieved under a ward system (MacManus 
1978; Robinson and Dye 1978; Taebel 1978; Vedlitz and Johnson 1982; Welch 
1990; Zax 1990). 
The second generation of research was no longer preoccupied with these 
questions because Voting Rights Act litigation (or the threat of it) prompted many 
municipalities to abandon their at-large formats in favor of ward-based or mixed 
systems. Thus, researchers turned their attention to different questions as they 
came to realize that studying the link between districting systems and descriptive 
representation was a moot point. As an alternative, they began inquiring about 
the goals that the new officials hoped to accomplish (Hamm, Harmel, and 
Thompson 1983 ), and whether black lawmakers in Congress and state 
legislatures could deliver policy benefits to their constituents (Cameron, Epstein, 
O'Halloran 1996; Combs, Hibbing, and Welch 1984; Epstein and O'Halloran 
1999; Sharpe and Garand 2001; Whitby 1987). In  short, the recent literature 
assumes that the descriptive representation of black lawmakers is assured, but it 
questions whether the mere presence of black lawmakers within legislative 
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bodies yields substantive representation. In other words, scholars have realized 
that it is a empty accomplishment for black lawmakers to win a seat at the table if 
they cannot translate their electoral victories into policy benefits for their black 
constituents. 
Despite the groundbreaking nature of these works, we still know relatively 
little about the about extent to which black lawmakers have been accepted by 
their white counterparts and whether they are satisfied with their new careers 
(Hedge, Button, and Spear 1996). Similarly, scholars have yet to adequately 
assess the role blacks play in legislatures, the barriers they face, and their ability 
to accomplish important policy objectives (Button and Hedge 1996). In sum, 
researchers have just begun to document the progress that these individuals 
have made within legislative bodies, and this gap is especially pronounced when 
the legislature at issue is a city council. Unlike the first generation of research, 
the newer scholarship narrowly focuses on either Congress or state legislatures 
while largely ignoring these issues in the local context. 
Overview of My Research 
Although my study falls squarely within the second generation of research, it 
makes a unique contribution by examining the experiences of local black 
lawmakers. My work is clearly exploratory and it has a strong descriptive 
element to it because virtually nothing is known about this topic. This noticeable 
gap in the literature enhances my study's value; however, it also prevented me 
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from formulating a testable theory that explains the legislative experiences of 
local black lawmakers. I did not borrow a theory from a more developed body of 
literature because none was a good analytical fit. The only relevant framework is 
what Lani Guinier (1994: 43) labels the "Black Electoral Success Theory," which, 
despite its name, does not qualify as a theory in the scientific sense.1 This 
framework, discussed in Chapter Two, is the conventional wisdom that civil rights 
activists use to explain how and why the election of black officials is 
advantageous for black citizens and their interests. Therefore, I use my findings 
to critique this conventional wisdom, but doing so should not be mistaken for the 
rigorous falsification process described by philosophers of science (e.g., Popper 
1968). 
Most practitioners agree that explanation and prediction are the 
paramount goals of the social sciences. Rather than focusing on thick 
description, social scientists try to develop theories that systematically account 
for events and relationships in the social world-i.e., they try to make causal 
inferences that apply in many settings. Accordingly, the absence of theory in my 
work is a recognizable limitation, but this does not imply that my research is 
inconsequential or unscientific. Description remains important because it 
1 According to Harry Eckstein (1975: 86), "hard" theory described by philosophers 
of science has four defining characteristics. First, the theory's concepts must be 
precisely defined. Second, researchers must use these concepts to formulate a 
deductive set of propositions. Third, the propositions must be logically consistent 
and correspond to empirical observations. Finally, the propositions must be 
falsefiable. 
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facilitates the development of testable theories (Hult, Walcott, and Weko 1999), 
especially when information on a topic is scarce. As one well-known source put 
it, "Description often comes first; it is hard to develop explanations before we 
know something about the world and what needs to be explained on the basis of 
what characteristics" (King, Keohane, and Verba 1994: 34 ). 
My primary objective is to describe the quality of legislative life 
experienced by black lawmakers who serve on mixed-race city councils. The 
concept "quality of black legislative life," broadly defined, refers to how satisfied 
and successful black lawmakers are within their respective councils. My thesis is 
that individual and contextual differences explain the variance in the black 
councilors' perceptions. 
I utilized two nation-wide surveys (discussed in Chapter Four) to generate 
data for my study. I sent one survey to black city councilors and the other to their 
white counterparts. The two instruments were similar in content and question 
wording so that I could compare the two groups in terms of their perceptions and 
personal profiles. The national coverage of the surveys was especially desirable 
because it allowed me to make broad generalizations that were not limited to 
particular municipalities. Likewise, ,I found a comparative approach to be 
advantageous because it allowed me to look at the black legislative experience 
from two very different perspectives-a black one and white one. In the end, this 
approach yielded two large datasets that greatly enh�nce our understanding of 
black legislative life at the local level of government. 
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The Importance of My Research 
Why Study the Black Legislative Experience? 
My research is relevant to current policy discussions involving civil rights 
and minority empowerment. To date, policymakers have ensured minority 
representation by creating legislative districts with sufficiently large minority 
populations so as to virtually guarantee the election of a minority candidate. 
However, both courts and scholars have criticized this approach on a number of 
different grounds. The Supreme Court has been suspicious of majority-minority 
districts with unusual shapes (Shaw v. Reno 1993), and it is now applying strict 
scrutiny to any districting arrangement where race was predominant factor in its 
creation (Miller v. Johnson 1995). In contrast, some scholars denounce majority­
minority districts because they are poorly suited for delivering substantive 
benefits to minority groups. Some critics point out that concentrating minority 
populations in minority-majority districts only dilutes the minority group's 
influence in the adjacent d istricts (Cameron, Epstein, and O'Halloran 1996; 
Overby and Cosgrove 1996). Similarly, Swain (1993) questions whether 
majority-minority d istricts encourage lawmakers to be more responsive to 
minority concerns. Relying on Richard Fenno's famous "soaking and poking" 
strategy, she observed that black members of Congress from majority-minority 
districts were no more inclined to represent black interests than their 
counterparts from majority-white districts with sizeable black populations. 
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Aside from issues surrounding majority-minority districts, the study of the 
black legislative experience is important because it is linked to the substantive 
representation of minority interests. Guinier (1994) makes a powerful argument 
that civil rights activists place too much emphasis on black electoral success and 
have forgotten the more pressing objective of securing policy benefits for black 
citizens. · In her opinion, it is a superficial achievement for blacks to win 
descriptive representation, but fail to achieve substantive representation because 
the individuals they elect were unable to place issues on the agenda or influence 
policy outcomes. For this to happen, blacks must be fully integrated into the 
legislative process and be viewed as equals by their white counterparts 
(Browning, Marshall, and Tabb 1984 ). Therefore, a direct relationship may exist 
between the quality of black legislative life and the delivery of helpful policies 
intended to improve the lives of black citizens. 
An indirect relationship may also exist between the quality of black 
legislative life and the substantive representation of black interests. A hostile 
legislative environment (signified by a poor legislative experience) may prompt 
black lawmakers to leave office sooner because it makes public service less 
desirable. Granted, there is very little empirical evidence directly on point, but 
there is still good reason to believe that this argument holds true. For one thing, 
it is based on powerful intuitive logic. Likewise, we do know that political conflict 
is related to psychological burnout and the voluntary turnover among city 
managers (Kaatz, French, and Prentiss-Cooper 1999). Hence, it seems 
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plausible that the unpleasantness associated with racial tensions might also 
prompt city councilors to leave office sooner. In fact, councilors have even less 
incentive to remain in such an environment since they receive only modest 
compensation for their services and they general ly hold their jobs on a part-time 
basis (MacManus 1999; Lascher 1993). 
If a hostile environment encourages black councilors to leave office 
sooner, these individuals may never realize their full potential as lawmakers. 
Turnover may prevent black lawmakers from becoming experts in a narrow policy 
area (Nelson 1991) and undermine their ability to secure important committee 
assignments that are based on seniority. It may also prevent them from forging 
friendships that may enhance their effectiveness. For instance, the length of 
tenure in office has been l inked to the formation of interpersonal friendships 
among legislators (Patterson 1959). These interpersonal ties translate into 
support for policies since pairs of lawmakers who consider themselves to be 
friends tend to have a higher level of agreement in their roll-cal l voting (Arnold ,  
Deen, and Patterson 2000). 
Hidden Aspects of Legislative Life 
Most scholars study substantive representation by analyzing how 
lawmakers cast their roll-cal l votes at the state and national levels of government. 
This strategy is practical because the data is readily available and researchers 
can use quantitative statistics in their analyses. Even so, Richard L. Hall makes 
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a compelling argument that studying roll-call votes overlooks important aspects 
of the legislative process. He reasons that "floor voting is only one and probably 
not the most important form of participation in the legislative process" (1996: 2). 
Instead, he points out that members influence policy by building coalitions, 
drafting amendments, planning strategy, and persuading colleagues to adopt 
legislation ( See also, Bratton and Haynie 1999: 660-61 ). 
My study follows Hall's lead �nd has the potential to reveal events that 
take place behind the scenes in city councils. The barriers that black city 
councilors face are likely to be subtle and their career satisfaction is probably 
related to their informal interactions with white lawmakers. Thus, open-ended 
items in my questionnaire expose what is occurring in the less visible aspects of 
the local legislative process by inviting respondents to describe discrimination 
that they had experienced or observed. Therefore, I make a unique contribution 
by illuminating how councilors interact in intimate legislative settings. 
Why Study City Councils and Local Lawmakers? 
In 1957, Lawrence J.R. Herson authored a provocative piece in the 
American Political Science Review titled ''The Lost World of Municipal 
Government." In his article, he lamented the state of the local politics literature 
and challenged political scientists to conduct systematic studies of municipal 
government rather than emphasizing its administrative aspects. Many scholars 
rose to the task and the local literature, as a whole, is now empirically rich. 
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Regrettably, the same cannot be said for the city council literature, where · 
scholars have concentrated on a few key issues (e.g., whether at-large districting 
arrangements thwart minority representation) while largely ignoring others. 
Scholars may d isregard city councils because they are less powerful than 
other legislative bodies such as Congress. However, doing so is 
counterproductive because local governments and their institutional subparts are 
important in their own right! Local governments are primarily responsible for 
financing and delivering vital services-police, fire, garbage, streets, and parks­
that have a substantial impact on the daily lives of citizens (Hofferbert and 
Sharkansky 1971; MacManus 1999). Moreover, in recent years, municipal 
governments "have been elevated to a new status in the American federal 
system due to devolution of federal and state responsibilities to the local level 
and the widespread recognition that they are the governments most capable of 
innovative behavior'' (Ihrke, Proctor, and Gabris 2003: 79). Local governments 
are considered "laboratories" where reforms are tested and improved before they 
are put into practice at the state and national levels of government (Gabris et al. 
2000). Therefore, by implication, city councils and the lawmakers who serve on 
them play an integral role in American politics because they make critical 
decisions about local policies. 
Scholars also neglect city councils because studying them is d ifficult. 
Data availability is a perennial problem. Archival sources specifying each 
municipality's governmental structure are outdated and incomplete; and, in many 
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places, it is difficult to obtain meticulous records of roll-call votes or minutes from 
council meetings. This problem is compounded by the fact that city councils, on 
average, have only six members serving on them (Krebs and Pelissero 2003 ; 
MacManus and Bullock 2003). Thus, even when data is available, researchers 
have difficulty using quantitative statistics to analyze roll-call votes because the N 
is too small. 
Pragmatic researchers (although few would candidly admit it) have 
responded by focusing their inquiries on Congress or state legislatures. Here, 
data availability is seldom an issue and the N is sufficiently large so they do not 
need to sacrifice their technique or adopt a different research design to 
compensate for the aforementioned problems. Kaplan (1998: 28) labels this "the 
law of instrument" and explains: 
Give a small boy a hammer, and he finds that everything he 
encounters needs pounding. It comes as no particular surprise to 
discover that a scientist formulates problems in a way which 
requires for their solution just those techniques in which he himself 
is especially skilled. 
This strategy is understandable because it increases the likelihood of publication 
and the professional accolades that come with it . Unfortunately, it limits the 
accumulation of knowledge in areas that are more difficult to study and it 
undermines attempts to formulate broad generalizations that extend to all 
legislative institutions. 
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This is not to say that the state and congressional research is misguided 
or unimportant, but only that its findings are not automatically generalizeable to 
the local context. Differences are likely to exist since city councils and the 
lawmakers who serve on them generally do not share the same attributes as 
their counterparts at the state and national levels of government. City councils 
are less powerful, they typically have fewer members, many lack standing 
committees (Krebs and Pelissero 2003), and they are all unicameral bodies 
(MacManus 1999). Likewise, city councilors tend to be political amateurs who 
receive only modest compensation for their services (Lasch er 1993) and many 
hold their positions on a part-time basis (MacManus 1999).2 About two-thirds of 
them are elected in non-partisan contests (Cassel 1985) while partisanship is a 
defining characteristic of state and national elections. 
Given the paucity of literature on city councils, it comes as no surprise that 
very few scholars have written about black councilors or the environment in 
which they serve. This gap in is especial ly troubling since the number of black 
councilors has been growing in recent years such that they are becoming an 
even more important subgroup within local legislative bodies. For example, 
3,468 blacks were serving on municipal governing bodies in 1998, and this 
number climbed to 3,538 in 2001 (Bositis 2001; Joint Center for Political and 
Economic Studies 1998). This absence of literature is also troubling because we 
2 Haas (1995) disputes the dominant view and argues that councils are often full­
time and well-paid bodies. 
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do not know what elements of a city's governmental structure affect the quality of 
the black councilors' experiences once they assume office. In fact, a host of 
structural variables could potentially be relevant such as the form of city 
government (mayor-council vs. council-manager), the electoral format (at-large 
vs. wards), and the level of professionalism on the council (salary, number of 
staff, frequency of meetings). Hence, I break new ground by not only describing 
the experiences of local black lawmakers, but also by establishing which 
structural variables are affect their experience. 
What Follows 
In Chapter Two, I review two distinct strands of literature that are relevant to my 
research. The first strand focuses on black legislative life, while the second 
strand concerns structural variables that are unique to the study of local politics. 
I review each strand in turn, then concentrate on a small number of studies that 
come close to bridging the gap between these two bodies of literature. Toward 
the end of the chapter, I state a series of hypotheses (or assumptions) that I will 
test with my data. 
I present my methodology in Chapter Three. I devote the most of the 
chapter to my data collection procedures and the survey instruments that I used 
to tap the perceptions of the black and white city councilors. Moreover, I explain 
how I measured and operationalized the "quality of black legislative life," the 
central concept in my study. 
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In  Chapter Four, I present and d iscuss some of my key findings. My main 
objective is to compare and contrast the black and white city councilors in terms 
of their personal profiles, constituencies, · and perceptions about the black 
legislative experience. My results demonstrate that the two groups have much in 
common, but these similarities are overshadowed by differences in the 
councilors' constituencies and in how they perceive the black legislative 
experience. Next, I examine a series of independent variables that potentially 
explain this perceptual gap between the two groups. Lastly, I d iscuss the 
implications of these findings and connect them with the literature. 
In  Chapter Five, my goal is to determine which individual and contextual 
factors account for the variance in the quality of black legislative life. To 
accomplish this objective; I rely on a series of logistic regression models using 
data supplied by the black councilors. I made no attempt to apply this technique 
to my white dataset because there was hardly any d ifferentiation in the white 
councilors' perceptions.  
Chapter Six is my summary and conclusion. Here, I restate my major 
findings and reiterate the broad implications of my research. Specifically, I 
describe how this study has contributed to our knowledge about local black 
lawmakers and the environment in which they serve. I close with a d iscussion of 
the pitfalls that I encountered, and I make suggestions for how the study of black 
city councilors should proceed. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
Two strands of Literature are relevant to my research. The first concerns black 
legislative l ife and the second deals with local politics. In this chapter , I review 
each strand in turn. In the first part of the chapter (devoted to black legislative 
l ife) ,  I discuss the Black Electoral Success Theory and Lani Guinier's reasoning 
for why it fa ils. Next , I move beyond this theoretical debate and examine 
empirical studies that pertain to the black legislative experience. In the second 
part of the chapter (devoted to the local pol it ics literature), I discuss the relevance 
of the municipal ity's electoral format, governmental structure, and the way 
communities organize their city councils. Finally, I examine works that come 
close to bridging the gap between the two strands of literature, and I offer some 
hypotheses or assumptions that I wi ll test in subsequent chapters. 
The Black Legislative Experience 
The Black Electoral Success Theory 
The civil rights community is striving to make legislative bodies responsive 
to minorities , but it has not identified the most prudent way to accomplish this 
objective. Most civ il rights activists embrace an approach that Lani Guinier labels 
the Black Electoral Success Theory (BEST). As she explains (p. 42), " it has not 
been expl icitly endorsed as a strategy or articulated as a coherent conceptual 
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model. "  Hence, I base my description of this strategy largely on her framework 
because other sources do not describe it in its entirety (pp. 54-69). 
Activists who embrace the BEST believe that their primary objective is to 
elect "authentic" black lawmakers who are neither co-opted by the white 
establishment nor indebted to white voters (Guinier 1994: 55). This goal can be 
accomplished by mobilizing the black electorate and, if necessary, through 
litigation under the Voting Rights Act (See Figure 1. ) .  Once in office, these black 
legislators are thought to deliver substantive policy benefits to the black 
community in the form of protective civil rights legislation, helpful economic 
policies, and beneficial social policies (See generally, Black 1978; Hanks 1987; 
Herring 1990; Karnig 1979; Lublin 1997; Whitby 1997). Black lawmakers can 
The VRA 
of 1 965 -------. Election of an ___. Integration into 
Mobilization of 
legislator and legislative / 
authentic black the legislature 
� 
i coal itions the black _ ___, � community Increased • Increased / 
political efficacy black voter 
in the black 
community 
turnout 
Figure 1 
The Black Electoral Success Theory 
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Substantive 
policy benefits 
ostensibly accomplish these objectives by adding items to the agenda, improving 
the quality of the debate, and utilizing their influence to encourage the passage of 
helpful legislation (Mansbridge 1999). 
The BEST also maintains that descriptive representation is important in its 
own right because black legislators become symbols of equality and 
achievement. The presence of black officials demonstrates that blacks are 
dignified, they can excel at demanding tasks, and they play an integral role in 
American politics (Guinier 1994). More importantly, the BEST assumes that the 
presence of black lawmakers wil l  enhance the value of communications with the 
black citizens they represent. This evidently occurs because these individuals 
are more skilled at understanding their constituent's "signals" and "shorthand 
communications" due to their shared set of experiences (Mansbridge 1999: 
641 ). These common experiences qualify black legislators to be spokespersons 
for the black community because they are cloaked in legitimacy and apparently 
share "the original civil rights vision" (Guinier 1994: 66). As a result, they 
become role models for aspiring black youth and black citizens derive 
psychological benefits by electing representatives who share their background 
and race (Lawson 1991. See also, Mindiola and Gutierrez 1988: 351 ). 
Ultimately, these psychological benefits mobilize the black electorate so that 
additional political gains can be achieved (Lawson 1991 ). 
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Although research concerning the symbolic value of black lawmakers is 
relatively scarce, advocates of the BEST can point to some empirical findings 
that bolster their contentions. Survey data shows that black citizens believe that 
it is important for black representatives to hold office (Cole 1976), and they feel a 
stronger sense of political efficacy once they obtain representation (Bledsoe 
1 986). Furthermore, black constituents represented by black congressmen are 
more likely to contact their representative than blacks represented by white 
congressmen (Gay 2002). Finally, some black congressmen claim to represent 
blacks who live outside of the geographic confines of their district (Swain 1993: 
218 ). If so, these constituents probably derive symbolic benefits from the black 
congressmen because it is unlikely that they would have access to the policy 
benefits that these representatives steer to their home districts. 
The BEST is especially relevant to my research because it predicts that 
black lawmakers will have no difficulty assimilating into legislative bodies once 
they are elected. I t  maintains that prejudice is the result of ignorance and 
differences, but that these impediments can be surmounted in the intimate, 
collegial settings found in legislative bodies (Guinier 1994 ). I n  this context, 
continuous voting opportunities foster accommodation and lawmakers have 
ample time to build bridges because they have an ongoing relationships. 
Legislative bodies also provide a level playing field for minority lawmakers 
because the institutional rules give them the same ability to participate in 
debates, the amendment process, and hearings (Karlan 1989 ). Hence, white 
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legislators hear black representatives articulate the black community's interests 
(Abrams 1 988), which in turn, may sensitize them to the these concerns (Dennis 
1 990: 25). 
In the end, the BEST anticipates that black lawmakers will be successful 
in shaping legislation and delivering substantive benefits to their constituents. 
Although it is probably too early to draw definitive conclusions about this 
. supposition, it does enjoy empirical support. For example, anecdotal evidence 
has revealed M ississippi's black legislators, . voting as a group, could cast the 
decisive votes when white lawmakers were divided on important issues and 
when a supermajority was needed to pass a particular piece of legislation. In this 
context, one white lawmaker commented, "when it gets down to suspension bills 
that take a two-thirds vote or revenue bills, their bloc vote definitely is a 
determining factor then" (Parker 1 990: 1 34  ). 
Lani Guinier's Critique 
The most important criticism of the BEST concerns the quality of the 
black lawmakers' experiences once they win election and assume office. This 
critique was primarily developed by Guinier (1994) although other scholars like 
Bullock (1 989) clearly espouse similar views. Guinier argues that the BEST is 
defective because it does not guarantee that blacks will have meaningful 
influence once they are elected to legislative bodies. She argues that black 
electoral victories do not resolve discrimination and racially polarized voting, 
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but merely shift these problems from society at-large to the legislature. As a 
numerical minority, black lawmakers must garner support from their white 
colleagues to be successful. However, they will be ineffective if they fail to 
forge crucial alliances and "infiltrate the decisionmaking process" (p. 61 ). 
Such failures are likely when whites harbor racial prejudice or remain 
indifferent to the needs of blacks. 
Guinier's critique is based largely on anecdotal evidence excerpted from 
a redistricting lawsuit in the 1980s that exposed many of these problems in the 
Arkansas Legislature. During this litigation, white legislators admitted that they 
used racial slurs when discussing prominent black leaders. They also testified 
that they had no black staff members and they told their black constituents to 
bring their concerns to black legislators who represented different districts 
(Guinier 1994: 62). In  short, Arkansas's black legislators testified that they 
were an ineffective minority in the predominantly white assembly. 
Guinier develops her argument in greater detail and eventually concludes 
that the health of race relations within a legislative body determines the quality 
and extent of minority empowerment. She predicts that minority issues will only 
receive a fair hearing if whites are willing to engage in an ongoing dialogue as 
equals, consider relevant information, and compromise. This requires them to 
act in good-faith when sharing information, exchanging views, and debating the 
issues. Black legislators, according to Guinier, encounter formidable barriers 
because they do not operate in an environment where good-faith and 
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cooperation are the norm. First, they may have difficulty finding col leagues to co­
sponsor bills. Second, they may feel a need to modify their stance on issues in 
response to stress inflicted by white lawmakers. Third, whites may exclude them 
from debates that occur in private, informal settings. Fourth, chamber rules place 
them at a disadvantage because many decisions must be made with the support 
of numerical majorities, and motions typically cannot pass unless another 
legislator seconds them {See, e.g. , Walton 1985). Finally, the presence of 
minority lawmakers may exaggerate the solidarity among white lawmakers 
{Guinier 1994: 62-64 ). 
Guinier also argues that black legislators have difficulty forming and 
entering coalitions that expand their political influence. In a prejudicial 
environment, a white majority can exclude them from existing coalitions so blacks 
remain strategically weak in the legislature. Indeed, the presence of black 
lawmakers may increase the value of white membership in the winning coalition 
because legislative spoils can be divided among a smaller number of white 
lawmakers {See generally, Baron and Ferejohn 1989; Ferejohn, Fiorina, and 
McKelvey 1987; Riker 1962; Wilson 1973). Thus, the dominant coalition is 
careful not to raise divisive issues for fear that whites who loose these battles wil l 
join forces with the marginalized black leaders (Riker 1962: 179-80). Therefore, 
coalition-building-absent institutional incentives for cooperation-wil l  serve the 
temporary interests of the white majority who will only cooperate when doing so 
enhances its dominant position. This, of course, means that black legislators will 
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have difficulty delivering substantive benefits to their constituents unless whites 
are receptive to good-faith bargaining and deliberation. 
In short, Guinier argues that the effects of prejudice and minority status 
preclude blacks from effectively participating in important deliberations; so, in her 
view, they become token representatives who have symbolic value, but lack the 
ability to influence policy outcomes. Charles Bullock echoes these sentiments in 
an earlier work. As he put it, "there may be a black . . . elected to the council, but 
if that person is unable to join the coalition-typically dominated by Anglos-that 
controls council decisions, the minority member may be a voice crying in the 
wilderness" (1989: 97). This critique may have far-reaching implications for 
minority empowerment and the quality of democracy enjoyed by black citizens. 
It may mean that black citizens will feel less efficacious if they believe their 
representatives are failing to accomplish important policy objectives (Cf. , 
Rodgers 197 4 :  273-277; Weissberg 1975: 4 77-4 78, 481 ). I f  so, voter turnout 
may suffer in the black community thereby preventing blacks from real izing 
addition gains that could have been achieved if they had been mobilized. For 
example, some evidence suggests that black turnout decreases once a black 
wins a seat on a previously all-white council (Neddenriep 1996), but it is unknown 
whether this decrease is linked to the quality of black legislative life. 
22 
Moving From the Theoretical Debate to Empirical Research 
A small yet growing body of empirical literature examines the experiences 
of black lawmakers and evaluates whether they .are successful ,  content with their 
legislative career, and ful ly included in the legislative process. Almost all of these 
studies focus on blacks serving in state legislatures while overlooking the 
experiences of those who serve on city councils. Many studies rely on indicators 
that are found in the visible aspects of the legislative process (Clemons and 
Jones 2000; Hamm, Harmel, and Thompson 1983; Menifield 2000;  Perry 1976) ,  
but they generally disregard conduct that occurs behind the scenes in informal 
settings where discrimination is more likely to occur. Thus, in most cases, this 
body of literature is poorly suited for exposing the subtle instances of 
discrimination that may be occurring within legislative bodies. 
Some researchers have examined the quality of black legislative life by 
looking at the bil l passage rate of black state legislators (Clemons and Jones 
2000; Menifield 2000; Orey 2000 ; Perry 1976). This measure assumes that the 
greater the passage rate, the more support blacks have garnered from their white 
colleagues. Conversely, low bill passage rates imply that blacks are operating in 
a hostile environment where whites remain unsupportive of their agenda and 
policies. Most of these works are descriptive case studies and they generally 
show that black lawmakers have lower bil l passage rates than their white 
col leagues (See Table 1.) . Differences were most pronounced in the Missouri 
Senate in 1987 and in the Georgia House in its 1987 -1988 session where white 
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Table 1 
Bi l l  Passage Rates in Selected State Legislatures 
Study Legislature Session White Bill Black Bill Difference 
or Chamber or Year Passage Passage Rate by % 
Rate by % by % 
Menifield 2000 MO Senate 1 987 77 8 69 
Holmes 2000 GA House 1 987-88 68.7 32.5 36.2 
Clemons & VA Legislature 1 987 54.3 25.6 28.7 
Jones 2000 
Perry 1 976 MO House 1 969 37 9 28 
Orey 2000 MS Legislature 1 987 28.5 1 2.0 1 6.5 
1 988 21 . 1  5.0 1 6 . 1  
Legette 2000 SC Legislature 1 987-88 22.7 7.7 1 5  
Holmes 2000 GA Senate 1 987-88 44.0 35.1 8 .9 
Clemons & VA Legislature 1 988 57. 1 50.6 6.5 
Jones 2000 
Menifield 2000 MO House 1 987 9 8 1 
1 988 6 5 1 
Menifield 2000 MO Senate 1 988 2 9 -7 
Sull ivan 2000 NC Legislature 1 987-88 51 62 -1 1 
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sponsored legislation was much more l ikely to pass than black-sponsored 
legislat ion (Holmes 2000; Menifield 2000). Nevertheless , the black bi l l  passage 
rate actually exceeded the white bil l passage rate in the North Carol ina 
Legislature (Sull ivan 2000) and the Missouri Senate in its 1988 Session 
(Menifield 2000). 
Although it is difficult to identify why the passage rates differ, Hedge and 
Conkl in (2002) offer three plausible explanations ( See also, Mindiola and 
Gutierrez 1988: 359-360.) .  First , the black sponsored legislation may be more 
difficult to pass because it tends to be too l iberal . Second , the lower passage 
rate may reflect the fact that blacks , as a group, are generally underrepresented 
in positions of power within legislative bodies. Finally, racism and discrimination 
may subvert the passage of black-sponsored legislation. As one black legislator 
from Mississippi commented in a recent telephone interview, "it was often 
enough to simply identify a bil l as a 'nigger bi l l' to ensure defeat in his state's 
legislature" (Hedge and Conklin 2002: 6). 
Only three studies have moved beyond a descriptive approach and 
controlled for intervening variables .  One of these studies could not identify a 
statistically significant relationship between ethnicity and the bil l  passage rate 
once a lawmaker's seniority and leadership position were considered (Hamm, 
Harmel , and Thompson 1 983). In contrast , another study's logit analysis showed 
that blacks were less likely than whites to pass legislation in three of six states 
examined (Bratton and Haynie 1 999). This study control led for a wide range of 
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factors that related to the characteristics of the sponsors and the bills. These 
results are bolstered by a third study . that relied on multiple regression to 
examine the pathways to legislative success in the Missouri House of 
Representatives (Ellickson 1992). This study conceptualized legislative success 
as a sequential process culminating in the passage of legislation , and it ultimately 
found that more successful lawmakers tended to be white, moderately young, 
and wel l-educated. Successful legislators also tended to belong to the majority 
party and they generally possessed more seniority. 
Although informative, the bill passage rate l iterature provides an 
incomplete picture of how blacks and their interests fare within legislatures. 
These studies-many of which are dated-only apply to a small number of state 
legislatures, and they say nothing about the progress blacks have made within 
city councils. In  fact, only one published work addresses the issue at the local 
level (Cole 1976). I t  found that passage rates fluctuate with the subject matter of 
the legislation and that black-sponsored legislation seldom passes . 
Perhaps a more serious problem with the bill passage literature is that it 
does not distinguish between legislation that is especially important to black 
legislators and legislation that is trivial. The bill passage indicator may be more 
meaningful if it narrowly focuses on legislation that black lawmakers prioritize in 
their agendas which, in most cases, probably reflects its importance to the black 
community. Some studies are moving in this direction by examining whether the 
bill passage rates differ across various types of legislation (Bratton and Haynie 
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1 999 ; Cole 1 976 ; Holmes 2000; Legette 2000). This is an important step forward 
because the subject matter of the leg islation might influence the passage rate 
rather than the sponsor's race. Despite this progress, the evidence has been 
mixed . A study of the Georgia Leg islatu re found very l ittle d ifference in the 
content of the bi l ls sponsored by black and white lawmakers (Holmes 2000). 
However, in South Carol ina, black lawmakers tended to introduce more 
consumer protection bi l ls, while whites were more wil l ing to regulate business 
competition . Nevertheless, in both states, the overal l passage rate was lower for 
blacks than whites . 
Other researchers have used descriptive case studies to assess the 
progress that black lawmakers have made within the committee systems of 
various state leg islatures. Here, the l iterature shows that blacks have made 
progress, but only to a certain extent. Some studies show that blacks were given 
assignments on minor or moderately important committees (Perry 1 976; Walton 
1 985). They have also had d ifficulty becoming members of finance committees 
and obtaining chairmanships. For example, Mississippi's black legislators were 
excluded from "money committees" because they were perceived as "spend and 
tax l iberals" (Orey 2000: 803). Likewise, Virginia's black leg islators successful ly 
obtained seats on 9 of the 1 1  standing committees, but they fai led to hold any 
positions of power in the 1 987 to 1 988 legislative session (Clemons and Jones 
2000). 
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On the other hand, case studies focusing on different states suggest that 
blacks receive equitable treatment because they now occupy a substantial 
number of chairmanships, some on prestigious committees (Haynie 2001; 
Menifield 2000; Sullivan 2000). I n  fact, a study of the Texas House found that 
minorities were over-represented on some powerful committees (Thielemann 
1992). Even so, this same study reported that minorities were less satisfied with 
their assignments than their white colleagues who where also members of the 
dominant party in the chamber. These minority legislators favored institutional 
rules that guaranteed fair treatment despite their speaker's genuine effort to 
enhance the quality of their assignments. 
This literature is valuable because it acknowledges the important role that 
committees play within legislatures. But it also contains flaws that detract from 
its utility. First, some of the studies insinuate that blacks do not receive their "fair 
share" of committee chairmanships and assignme�ts on important committees. 
These conclusions are problematic when the studies fail to operationalize what is 
"equitable" or "unrepresentative," and they base their assessments on some 
undefined standard. Second, and more importantly, most of these studies do not 
control for intervening variables. These might include membership in the majority 
party, the member's assignment preferences, or· the amount of seniority that 
minorities have accumulated. Thus, a more sophisticated analysis is necessary 
to remedy these shortcomings and enhance our understanding of these issues. 
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David Hedge, James Button, and their various co-authors have made 
tremendous strides explaining the black legislative experience. Their approach, 
based on survey research, is unique because it relies on the perceptions of 
lawmakers to assess the quality of black legislative life. This methodology is a 
vast improvement over descriptive case studies because it increases the N and it 
allows for intervening variables to be controlled. This strategy is also useful 
because it can potentially reveal subtle instances of discrimination that may 
occur in intimate legislative settings. This type of knowledge is simply not 
accessible by looking only at bill passage rates or who is serving on prestigious 
committees. In other words, survey research can directly expose instances of 
discrimination whereas studies that rely on bill passage rates or committee 
assignments are forced to infer discrimination from discrepancies in the 
achievement levels of black and white lawmakers. 
The primary objective of this impressive body of work is to identify barriers 
that black lawmakers face and the accomplishments they have made within state 
legislatures (See Figure 2.). In one groundbreaking article, Button and Hedge 
(1996) sent separate surveys to black and white state legislators inquiring about 
the black legislative experience. The items in the two questionnaires asked ( 1 )  
whether "black issues" received a fair hearing, (2) whether black legislators 
experienced or observed discrimination, and (3) whether black legislators made 
progress in the last ten years. They also asked about possible discrimination in 
the committee system and by the political parties operating within the legislature. 
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Black 
Leg islators 
Impaired race relations 
Discrimination 
Need to . work harder to 
gain respect 
Difficulty persuading 
white legislators to 
support policies 
favorable to blacks 
Failure to obtain 
influential or preferred 
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assignments 
Figure 2 
Goal of 
Equal 
Inclusion 
Potential Barriers Encountered by Black Legislators 
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Policy 
Benefits 
Their results painted a negative picture of black legislative life across a 
wide-range of indicators, and it revealed differences between the perceptions of 
black and white lawmakers. The vast majority of white lawmakers believed that 
their black colleagues had a positive experience, but black lawmakers tended to 
have a pessimistic outlook. The questions concerning legislative fairness and 
discrimination were typical of this pattern. Only 30% of black lawmakers 
indicated that "black issues" received a fair hearing and 60% reported instances 
of discrimination.  In stark contrast, 73% of the white respondents reported that 
black legislation received a fair hearing and only 24% admitted that they had 
witnessed discrimination . Race was the primary reason for these differences 
even when other important variables were held constant (gender, region , the 
racial composition of the respondent's district, and majority vs. minority party in 
the chamber). 
The dataset from their survey of black legislators yielded a second article 
about the quality of black legislative life (Hedge, Button, and Spear 1996). This 
time , the authors sought to identify which variables explain the variance in quality 
the black legislative life rather than narrowly focusing on how the two groups of 
lawmakers differed in their perceptions. As predicted, individual and contextual 
factors both proved to be important. The results showed that black lawmakers 
who were male, had more seniority, and held leadership positions tended to 
report a more positive experience. Context also mattered as respondents were 
more likely to report a positive experience if they represented a majority-white 
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district. As expected, blacks who served in legislatures with more positive race 
relations tended to be more satisfied with their committee assignments and were 
more influential within their party. Finally, black lawmakers from the Deep South 
were less likely to see themselves as influential even when other variables were 
controlled. 
Another study authored by Edith J. Barrett (1997) yielded similar findings 
from its nation-wide survey of black and white state legislators. She found that 
blacks believe they must work harder than whites to succeed in their legislative 
careers, and they must pursue an agenda that considers both general interests 
and the narrow concerns of their black constituents. Her data also showed that 
certain independent variables affect the black lawmaker's perceptions including 
the size of the legislature and proportion of Democrats serving. On the other 
hand, factors such as the proportion of black lawmakers (less than vs. greater 
than 15% ), the party identification of the governor, and the geographic region 
(South vs . Non-South) were not statistically significant. 
Even these cutting-edge studies do not provide a complete picture of the 
progress that black legislators have made. None address whether blacks have 
assimilated into legislative coalitions, and none make a serious effort to explore 
the extent of interracial cooperation, communication, and compromise. However, 
these limitations are trivial and say more about the topics these scholars have 
chosen to address rather than the way they conducted their research. A more 
serious limitation is that these studies are based solely on perceptions. This is 
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problematic because the authors cannot definitively say that their data reflect the 
objective conditions that exist within the legislative bodies they studied. Even so, 
the problem is not fatal because perceptions themselves are important. As 
Hedge, Button, and Spear (1996: 89) explain, 
We realize there may be a gap between our respondents' 
perceptions and the actual conditions within state legislatures. We 
believe those perceptions, nonetheless, provide a reasonably 
accurate and valid picture of the [quality of black legislative life]. In 
the first instance, those perceptions are, in and of themselves, 
important. It is perceptions that members typically act upon and 
those perceptions are normatively, a legitimate basis for gauging 
how blacks fare in the states' legislatures. 
In sum, a small yet growing body of empirical literature has increased our 
understanding of the black legislative experience. We know black lawmakers 
generally have lower bil l passage rates than whites (See Table 1.). Likewise, we 
know from descriptive case studies that the ability of blacks to secure prestigious 
committee assignments turns on the state in which they serve ·(Menifield 2000 ; 
Orey 2000 ; Perry 1976; Sullivan 2000; Walton 1985). In recent years, scholars 
have also made an important contribution by using survey research to assess the 
black legislative experience (Barrett 1997; Button and Hedge 1996; Hedge, 
Button and Spear 1996). From these studies, we have learned that black and 
white lawmakers have divergent perceptions about the black legislative 
experience, and that blacks are more likely than whites to identify racial barriers 
that impede their progress (Barrett 1997; Button and Hedge 1996). These 
studies also demonstrate that independent variables such as gender, seniority, 
33 
region, leadership positions, racial composition of the legislature, and majority­
minority district can affect the respondent's perceptions. Hence, I will examine 
these variables as well in my subsequent analysis. 
Despite these advances, there is still much to learn because almost all the 
l iterature narrowly focuses on state legislatures rather than city councils. The 
black legislative experience may be different in the local context because city 
councils are unique. These u nicameral bodies are less powerfu l than state 
legislatures, they tend to have fewer members, many lack standing committees, 
and many are non-partisan institutions (Krebs and Pelisser6 2003). Similarly, 
scholars have identified a series of variables, unique to the study of local politics, 
that are thought to be important. However, almost no effort has been made to 
connect these city-level variables to the black legislative experience. Some of 
these variables relate to the local electoral system (at-large vs. wards), the 
municipality's governmental structure (mayor-council vs. council-manager), and 
the demographic composition of the municipality. Hence, my research is vital 
because (1) it is unclear whether conclusions drawn from research on state 
legislatures is generalizeable to city councils, and (2) we know very little about 
which city-level variables affect the black legislative experience. 
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The Local Pol itics Literature 
Political scientists have been fascinated with structural variables and , at some 
level ,  most practitioners would agree with the popular adage: "structure matters ! "  
That is, institutional arrangements shape political outcomes because they are 
essentially the rules governing how politics are conducted .  This school of 
thought (sometimes called neoinstitutionalism) has transcended the empirically­
based subfields within the discipline _ and has greatly contributed to our 
understanding of the political world. The local politics literature is no exception 
and structural variables have taken center stage in many studies. Therefore, it is 
important to examine whether structure influences the quality of black legislative 
life because the answer has important implications for how communities organize 
their governments. The following subsections consider the relevance of electoral 
structure, the overall structure of city government, and structures specifically 
pertaining to city councils. 
Electoral Structure 
Scholars have emphasized the importance the electoral format in their 
work because, in many instances, it is clearly distinct from that employed in state 
and national contests. This uniqueness is attributable to the good government 
movement that sought to dismantle the political machines and depoliticize the 
delivery of governmental services in the early part of the Twentieth Century 
(Harrigan and Vogel 2000 ; Krebs and Pelissero 2003). As a part of these 
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reforms, municipalities began adopting nonpartisan elections and selecting 
councilors from the municipality at-large rather than from wards. As it stands 
now, 77% of America's municipalities do not list a candidate's party affiliation on 
the ballot next to their name (MacManus and Bullock 2003). Likewise, 64% of all 
municipalities use an at-large system, 1 4% elect their councilors exclusively from 
wards, and 21 % employ a hybrid format where some councilors are elected at­
large and others are elected from wards (MacManus and Bullock 2003 ). 
Researchers have noted. that these attributes of the electoral system have 
significant implications for minorities seeking election to city councils. In  
ethnically diverse cities, nonpartisan contests rearrange existing electoral 
cleavages so that voters gravitate toward candidates of their own ethnic heritage 
when they can no longer rely on the candidate's party affiliation as a voting cue 
(Lieske and H il lard 1 984; Pamper 1 966). Another problem is that nonpartisan 
elections contain a latent class bias that favors Republ ican candidates (Lascher 
1991) and those who possess a high socioeconomic status (Cassel 1985; 
Rodgers and Arman 1971  ). This disadvantages black candidates who tend to be 
Democrats and who probably have a lower socioeconomic status than whites. 
In the 1 980s, scholars frequently debated whether at-large districting 
arrangements dilute the black community's voting strength. In  municipalities 
where blacks are a numerical minority, at-large systems disadvantage black 
candidates when voters tend to cast their ballots al.ong racial lines. This, of 
course, means that the predominantly white electorate simply outvotes the black 
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candidates . Moreover , at-large elections may put black candidates at a 
disadvantage because they increase campaign · costs; they require more 
endorsements from civic groups, and they require additional media exposure to 
ensure name recognition (Kamig and Welch 1980 : 29). . Conversely, ward 
elections facilitate black electoral success when . the black community is 
concentrated within the geographic confines of a ward. A great deal of attention 
is usually given to minority interests during the redistricting process (Lyons and 
Jewell 1988) so that at least one majority-black ward is created. Under these 
conditions, the election of a black candidate is virtually assured . In the end , the 
weight of empirical evidence supports the proposition that at-large systems 
disadvantage black candidates (Jones 1976; Robinson and Dye 1978; Taebel 
1978; Welch 1990 ; Zax 1990). 
The literature on city · council elections has greatly increased our 
understanding of the electoral environment in which black candidates operate. 
However, researchers have not take the next logical step by inquiring about how 
the electoral format influences the experiences of black councilors once they win 
election and begin serving their term of office. Despite the paucity of literature on 
the topic, there is good reason to believe a nexus exists between the electoral 
format and the black legislative experience. 
I predict that at-large and nonpartisan elections ultimately work in the 
black councilors' favor and increase the likelihood that they will have a positive 
experience on the council. Nonpartisanship and the depoliticized council it is 
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thought to produce may help black councilors forge al l iances with their white 
colleagues in the absence of overt partisan wrangling. More importantly, black 
councilors who succeed in the presence of an at-large system, no doubt, enjoy 
considerable support from white voters in an electorate that I presume is 
predominantly white. I n  this context, these individuals probably view the pol itical 
process as being more even-handed and less fraught with racial divisions. 
Additional ly, black candidates who win an at-large contest are l ikely to have a . 
leadership style that faci l itates amicable relations with the white lawmakers on 
the council .  These individuals, because they represent a predominantly white 
constituency, will probably advocate pol icies that enjoy the support of many of 
their white colleagues and they will be less l ikely to employ a confrontational style 
to achieve their objectives. 
Governmental Format 
Mu nicipalities have adopted different governmental formats in their 
charters. MacManus and Bul lock (2003) explain recent trends using survey data 
collected in 2001. According to them, 53% of the responding municipalities 
util ize a "council -manager" government where an elected council and chief 
elected official (usual ly cal led the mayor) have the authority to make pol icy, but a 
professional administrator runs the government's daily operations. Thirty-eight 
percent util ize a "mayor-council" government where the council serves in a 
legislative capacity and the chief elected official retains administrative powers. 
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Six percent of the sample possessed a "town meeting" government where voters 
make basic policy decisions and choose a board of selectmen who implement 
these policies. Finally, the "commission" government and the "representative 
town meeting" government each comprised approximately 1 % of the sample. In 
a commission government, individuals elected in at-large contests serve as both 
lawmakers and administrative department heads. In a representative town 
meeting government, voters choose representatives at town meetings and these 
individuals vote on policy matters. 
The form of municipal government is a variable that researchers should 
consider in their analyses. This variable is important, as John P. Pelissero 
(2003 : 14) suggests, because the "political and policy making roles performed by 
city councils, mayors, city managers, and bureaucrats wil l  vary with the form of 
government used." However , in recent years, scholars have noticed that 
differences between the various formats are becoming less pronounced 
(Desantis and Renner 2002; Frederickson and Johnson 200 1; MacManus and 
Bul lock 2003 ). Hence, they are beginning to question whether the traditional 
typology has become outmoded as more municipalities adopt hybrid forms of 
government (Frederickson, Wood, and Logan 2001; Svara 2001 ). 
The existing literature makes no direct connection between governmental 
format and the quality of black legislative life. The most relevant studies consider 
whether reformed governmental structures such as council-manager 
governments are more fiscal ly conservative than unreformed structures such as 
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mayor-council governments (Lineberry and Fowler 1967; Lyons 1978; Morgan 
and Pelissero 1980). The answer to this question, as Lyons (1978: 120) astutely 
observes, has important ramifications for minorities who benefit from increased 
governmental spending because they "rely on individually divisible goods Uobs) 
or group divisible goods (social services) to a greater degree." Thus, the 
argument can be made that black councilors will have a more positive experience 
in mayor-council cities where government spending is ostensibly higher. I n  these 
places, they wi ll probably have a greater ability to bring tangible benefits to their 
constituents because there are more goods being distributed. However, in 
places with strict constraints on spending (council-manager cities), it is 
reasonable to assume that black lawmakers will report a more negative 
experience because there is heightened competition for scare resources. I n  this 
environment, white council members (if they hold a numerical majority) may 
exclude blacks from the dominant coalition because the legislative spoils can be 
divided between a smaller number of lawmakers (Riker 1 962). 
Unfortunately, the empirical studies have arrived at different conclusions 
and there is no definitive answer as to whether a particular governmental format 
is related to governmental spending. Lineberry and Fowler's (1967) seminal 
work found that reformed structures have lower levels of taxing and spending 
than unreformeq structures. They also noted that reformed structures tend to be 
less responsive to the demographic characteristics of their constituencies than 
unreformed structures. Similarly, Lyons (1978) found that unreformed 
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municipalities increase their expenditures more rapidly than reformed 
jurisd ictions as financial resources and citizen demands increase. However, 
Morgan and Pelissero ( 1 980) reached a d ifferent conclusion. They tried to 
approximate an experiment by examining 1 1  municipal ities that adopted reform 
structures and 1 1  municipalities that maintained their unreformed structures 
during this same time period . They found no appreciable differences between 
the experimental and control groups. 
Perhaps a better explanation for why governmental format matters has to 
do with the decision-making coal itions within city council�. One authoritative 
work argues that minorities and their interests fare better when a minority 
counci lor is included in the dominant voting bloc (Browning, Marshall , and Tabb 
1 984 ). Based on an analysis of ten California cities, these authors observed that 
the l ikel ihood of a minority lawmaker being included in the dominant coal ition 
increases when reform institutions decline and are replaced by unreformed ones 
(p. 201 ). If so, l iberal coal itions frequently become dominant and mayors and 
councilors assume more ind ividual power. The presence of a l iberal coalition 
favors black councilors because they are overwhelmingly Democrats and are a 
better ideological fit within a l iberal coal ition than a conservative one. 
Accord ingly, the mayor-council form of government (an unreformed structure) is 
probably more conducive to the pol itical incorporation of minorities, which in turn, 
probably enhances the qual ity of their experience. 
41 
The Structure of City Councils 
Students of local politics generally believe that the way city councils are 
organized is important. Scholars writing on a variety of topics have used council 
size as a variable in their analyses (Alozie and Manganaro 1993; Karnig and 
Welch 1 979; Pelissero and Krebs 1 997). Others have pointed out that staggered 
terms of office (versus concurrent ones) should be considered when looking at 
minority representation on city councils (Bullock and MacManus 1 987). Still 
others insist that an increased level of council professionalization is important 
because it provides councilors with greater opportunities for advancement within 
th� legislative body (Clingermayer and Feiock 1 994 ). Professionalism is not a 
structural variable per se, but it is closely associated with structure because it is 
likely to be measured in structural terms. I ndicators of professionalism might 
include the frequency of council meetings, the number of council staff, the 
councilors' salaries, and the use of standing committees. 
The l i terature provides no guidance as to how the aforementioned 
variables might influence the quality of black legislative life. Hence, I have 
mentioned them because of their general interest to scholars, not because the 
literature identifies a compelling reason for their inclusion in my research. Even 
so, two elements of council structure might influence the black councilors' 
legislative experiences. First, smaller councils are probably associated with a 
more positive experience because more intimate settings probably encourage 
interracial cooperation. This may occur because small councils probably give 
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lawmakers more opportunities to become acquainted and to showcase their 
legislative skills before all their colleagues. Second, more professional councils 
are probably more conducive · to a positive legislative experience than less 
professional councils. Not only will there be more opportunities for advancement, 
but the desirable nature of the position is likely to attract politically savvy 
candidates (both black and white) who possess a higher level of education. If so, 
one might expect that whites serving on professional councils would be less likely 
to engage in discriminatory conduct assuming, of course, that prejudice is the 
product of ignorance and unfamiliarity. 
In summary, the local politics literature has greatly contributed to our 
knowledge by highlighting the importance of structural variables. We know that 
at-large and non-partisan elections ·place minority candidates at a disadvantage 
(Jones 1976; Lieske and Hillard 1984; Robinson and Dye 1978 ; Zax 1990). We 
know that the way a municipal government is arranged affects the roles 
performed by its mayor, city councilors, and bureaucrats (Pelissero 2003). And, 
the literature informs us that the term of office, council size, and 
professionalization are important variables to consider when studying city 
councils (Alozie and Manganaro · 1993; Bullock and MacManus 1987; 
Clingermayer and Feiock 1994 ). Despite this progress, we still have much to 
learn because scholars have made little or no effort to connect these structural 
variables to the quality of black legislative life. For instance, they have devoted 
considerable attention to how electoral formats affect the. election of minority 
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candidates, but they have not examined whether the electoral format matters 
once the victor assumes office. Likewise, scholars have hinted that a 
municipality's governmental format might be related to the black legislative 
experience (Browning, Marshall, and Tabb 1984 ), but there is almost no 
empirical evidence that directly establishes this connection. Given this gap in the 
literature, I make a unique and valuable contribution by testing whether these 
structural variables are associated with the black legislative experience. 
Black Officials in Local Government 
I n  the previous sections, I reviewed two strands of literature that relate to my 
research. The first dealt with the black legislative experience and the second 
dealt with the structure of local governments. Now, I will discuss literature that 
comes closest to bridging the gap between these two strands. First, I review the 
literature that addresses whether local black officials have been able to deliver 
substantive policy benefits to their black constituents. Second, I discuss specific 
barriers that local b lack leaders encounter during the course of their service. The 
local focus of this literature makes it especially relevant, but there is still much to 
learn because scholars have focused on black officials in general rather than 
concentrating on black city councilors. 
44 
Substantive Representation in the Local Context 
Scholars have noted that the presence of local black officials has 
important implications for black citizens and their interests. Several studies have 
examined whether the presence of black mayors is related to the spending 
patterns of municipal governments (Karnig and Welch 1980; Keller 1978). These 
works assume that particular types of aggregate budgetary expenditures are of 
greater importance to black citizens. For example, Karnig and Welch (1980) 
authored an important book that addresses this subject using data collected from 
cities with populations over 50 ,000 . Their statistical analysis revealed that 
communities with a black mayor and greater black representation on their 
councils spent significantly more money on welfare services and significantly less 
on amenities (parks and l ibraries), physical facilities (streets, sanitation , and 
hospitals), and protective services (fire and police). 
These findings are informative, but they are also flawed in two important 
respects. One criticism is that expenditure data is "too dependent on law, 
history, or economics, and thus not subject to short-term influences of 
government officials" (Saltzstein 1989: 526). Another problem, as Eisinger 
(1982) points out, is that there is no way to determine how much benefit is 
actual ly conferred upon citizens of each race. Thus, studies relying on aggregate 
budget figures sometimes make tenuous assumptions about what policies are 
truly important to black citizens. For instance, Karnig and Welch (1980 : 119) 
hypothesized that cities with a black mayor and greater black representation on 
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their councils would spend less on protective services. Nonetheless, it is equally 
plausible that this reduction in spending disadvantages black citizens because 
the incidence of fire is greater in poor areas and blacks are more likely to be 
victimized by crime (Eisinger 1982). 
Other scholars have linked the presence of local black leaders ( especially 
black mayors) to the number of blacks holding public-sector jobs. Public jobs are 
thought to be an attractive benefit - because they are more secure and have 
higher pay than comparable positions in the public-sector (Eisinger 1982). Civil 
service reforms largely dictate who municipal governments hire, but affirmative 
action policies give minorities an advantage despite the merit-based requirement. 
Thus, black employment, as a measure of black progress, is · an improvement 
over aggregate budget figures because it is "easily measurable, divisible [by 
race] , and a relatively unambiguous prize" (Eisinger 1982: 381 ). 
Researchers have used different methods to show that the presence of 
black officials expands public-sector opportunities for blacks. Some have used a 
comparative approach to demonstrate that black mayors have secured municipal 
jobs for black citizens (Nelson and Meranto 1977; Stein and Condrey 1987). 
Black mayors are able to do this by throwing their support behind affirmative 
action policies and placing black administrators in charge of their city's personnel 
office (Eisinger 1983 ). These results have been bolstered by quantitative studies 
with more sophisticated designs. One cross-sectional study of 43 cities found 
that the number of black public employees was largely attributable to the size of 
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the black population and the presence of a black mayor (Eisinger 1982). A�other 
study's pooled time-series data revealed that the number of minority employees 
is a function of minority councilors and, more importantly, minority administrators 
occupying key positions in the bureaucracy (Kerr and Mladenka 1994 ). Minority 
administrators were thought to _have a long-term effect on hiring patterns 
because they can consistently influence the opportunities that are available to 
minorities. Interestingly, this same study found that black mayors had very little 
effect on the ability to minorities to secure public-sector employment over time. 
Other studies have shown that black officials have been able to confer 
benefits to their constituents that are not related to public employment. One 
ground breaking work, focusing on 82 urban school districts, identified a 
statistically significant relationship between the number of black school board 
members and equitable education policies for black students (Meier and England 
1984 ). This relationship remained even when controlling for black political and 
economic resources. Another study indicates that black mayors are associated 
with citizen controls being placed over police departments (Saltzstein 1989 ). 
These two studies demonstrate that the link between black officials and 
substantive representation extends beyond the realm of public employment and 
the achievements of these officials are not simply the product of a modern form 
of machine politics. 
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This body of literature demonstrates that black officials are not just 
symbolic assets to the black community because they can deliver policy benefits 
to their constituents. Although not explicitly stated, these studies suggest that 
black officials have been successfully integrated into the political system and 
their experiences must be positive in light of their accomplishments. This 
reasoning, no doubt, calls into question whether it is even necessary to examine 
the quality of black legislative life because the main impetus behind studying the 
topic is its ostensible link with public policy. Simply put, these studies raise a 
provocative question: why study the black legislative experience when black 
officials are apparently achieving their policy goals? 
Compelling reasons exist for studying the black legislative experience 
although the aforementioned literature suggests that local black officials are 
successful. First, most studies concentrate on the ability of black mayors to 
deliver substantive benefits to black constituents. I t  would be improper to 
assume that the success of black mayors is generalizeable to black councilors. 
I n  many municipalities, the mayoral experience is different because mayors are 
independent executives who are elected separately from the council. Councilors, 
on the other hand, must operate within the confines of the legislative body and 
they have no independent authority to act. To be successful, they must forge 
alliances and persuade their fellow councilors to support their agenda. Second, 
and more importantly, the substantive representation literature usually looks for a 
correlation between the presence of black officials and favorable policies, but it is 
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poorly suited for revealing specific barriers that black officials encounter during 
the course of their service. It is possible that barriers do exist, and that they 
prevent black officials from being even more successful than they already are. If 
so, it is important that we identify these barriers, learn how they operate, and 
determine what conditions produce them. 
Barriers Encountered by Local Black Officials 
Only one study has made a serious to effort to identify barriers that local 
black officials encounter during the course of their service (Button, Richards, and 
Bethune 1998). This study, focusing on local black officials from Florida, 
compared personal interview data collected in 1975 to survey data collected in 
1993. Although much of the article was devoted to the changes that had 
transpired, it also illuminated many of the perennial obstacles that black 
officeholders face. Respondents from both time periods cited a lack of revenue 
as the greatest barrier. Furthermore, a majority of the respondents indicated that 
a lack of cooperation from black citizens impairs their ability to serve. This lack 
of cooperation is characterized by apathy, an absence of electoral support, 
factionalism, and unreasonably high expectations. Conversely, the respondents 
reported that their white colleagues impeded their ability to effectively represent 
their constituents. In the 1990 survey, a majority of the responde�ts admitted 
that they were outvoted by their white counterparts and they acknowledged that 
whites were generally unwilling to cooperate. White opposition occurred with 
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greater frequency when redistributive policies were at issue or when black 
officials attempt to alter their municipality's priorities (p. 185). 
This study also identified variables that influenced the effectiveness of the · 
local black officials. As for contextual factors, the community's per capita income 
was a significant predictor of effectiveness, but no statistically significant 
relationship existed for the community's size, percent black, or its electoral 
system (at-large vs. wards). Only one political factor-the perceived helpfulness 
of affirmative . action programs-was significant across the three dependent 
variables which included the black official's effectiveness, economic growth, and 
black employment. Finally, education was the only personal attribute that had a 
meaningful connection to economic growth and development. Other individual 
factors such as years in office and ideology were not significantly related to any 
of the dependent variables including the black officials' perceived effectiveness. 
This study is especially valuable because it is the only one that identifies 
specific barriers that local black officials face during their tenure in office. I t  also 
makes an significant contribution by linking local variables to the black political 
experience. Despite this meaningful contribution, additional work is necessary to 
fully understand the black legislative experience within city councils. First, the 
study only covered black officials serving in Florida so its results are not widely 
generalizeable-especially since that particular state is not typical of other 
southern states. Second, this study mixed together responses from black 
councilors and responses from other black officials who serve in different 
50 
capacities. This, of course, means that it is possible that the study's results 
might change once responses from the black councilors are separated from 
those provided by the other black officials. 
To review, we have learned much about the policy successes of local 
black officials. Their presence is associated with policies and expenditures 
thought to confer a greater benefit upon blacks than whites (Karnig and Welch 
1980; Keller 1978; Saltzstein 1989; Meier and England 1984 ). We also know 
that their presence is associated with increased employment opportunities for 
black citizens (Eisinger 1982; Kerr and Mladenka 1994; Nelson and Meranto 
1977; Stein and Condrey 1987). Nevertheless, there is still reason to believe that 
local black officials encounter racial barriers that impede their progress. Opinion 
data from a Florida study showed that many black officials perceived that their 
white colleagues were generally unwilling to cooperate and, they reported that 
they were frequently outvoted by whites (Button, Richards, and Bethune 1998). 
There · is still much to learn although a growing body of literature 
chronicles the experiences of local black officials. Much of what we know comes 
from studies about black mayors rather than black councilors. In fact, only two of 
the aforementioned substantive representation studies (Karnig and Welch 1980; 
Kerr and Mladenka 1994) even considered black councilors in their analyses. 
Extending conclusions about mayors to city councilors is improper because the 
councilors operate in a different environment and have different limitations. 
Unlike mayors, they do not have unilateral authority to set policy, hire/fire 
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personnel , or set directives for city bureaucrats. Instead , they must rely largely 
on d iplomacy and their personal powers of persuasion to garner the support of 
their fel low councilors if they hope to accomplish their objectives. 
We also have much to learn because most of the existing stud ies only 
show a correlation between the presence of black officials and substantive 
benefits received by the black community (Eisinger 1 982; Karnig and Welch 
1980; Meier and England 1984; Saltzstein 1989). Hence, these stud ies have 
difficulty establishing causation and they are poorly suited for identifying 
particular barriers that black officials encounter. Only one study (Button, 
Richards, and Bethune 1998) has attempted to identify such barriers , but its 
focus was l imited to Florida and it combined opinion data from black councilors 
and other city officials. Hence, we only have a vague idea whether these 
· findings hold true nationally when just city councilors are examined . 
Expected Findings 
General Expectations 
Many commentators believe that racial divisions persist and that whites 
continue to deny ethnic minorities full inclusion in the political process. Indeed , 
Lani Guinier argues that the election of black lawmakers has not remedied this 
problem, but merely shifted it from society at-large to legislative bodies. 
evaluate this argument by describing how black councilors assess the quality of 
their experiences on mixed-race city councils. Based on recent empirical 
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findings (Barrett 1 997; Button and Hedge · 1 996; Button , Richards, Bethune 
1 998), I anticipate that black councilors wil l perceive themselves to be less 
influential members of their council and perceive that race relations are 
impaired . I also expect a large portion of the black councilors to identify barriers 
that impede their progress. These perceived obstacles will probably include 
racial discrimination ,  blacks must work harder than whites to gain respect, race is 
used as a factor when determining who receives a · leadership position,  and 
blacks will be less l ikely to interact with the mayor than whites. 
Research also shows that blacks and whites view the world and the 
political landscape differently. Public opinion data demonstrates that wh ite 
citizens generally believe that African-Americans receive fair and equitable 
treatment in ou r society, but blacks typical ly feel that prejud ice and discrimination 
persist (Siegelman and Welch 1 991 ). This divergence in perceptions also 
extends to blacks and whites who serve in state legislatu res. One 
groundbreaking work demonstrates that black legislators are much more l ikely 
than whites to observe discrimination and report that issues important to blacks 
do not receive a fair hearing (Button and Hedge 1 996). Based on this evidence, 
I expect th is same pattern wil l be present when I compare the responses of the 
black and white city councilors. A finding of this nature could have sign ificant 
impl ications for how local governments handle racial issues. As Button and 
Hedge (1 996: 21 5) correctly observe, "those very real d ifferences make it less 
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likely that issues important to African Americans, including discrimination, wil l be 
addressed or resolved easily." 
Individual Explanations 
Another objective of my research is to account for the variance in the 
qual ity of black legislative l ife. As Hedge, Button, and Spear (1996) note, 
· individual factors play a critical role in determining the quality of a black 
lawmaker's experience including their seniority, status (leadership positions and 
chairmanships), and gender. I f  these individual characteristics (treated as 
independent variables) are significantly related to the quality of black legislative 
life, it suggests that merely having a seat at the table is no guarantee that these 
lawmakers will have an equal capacity to influence policy outcomes. 
Higher status councilors are those who hold committee chairmanships or 
positions of power (e.g., the Mayor Pro Tempore). These lawmakers are l ikely to 
be more active and effective because they have lower information and 
transaction costs (Hal l  1996). They may also feel that they have received 
equitable treatment because of their elevated status and power. Thus, I expect 
that black councilors who enjoy an elevated status will be more l ikely to positively 
assess their legislative career and less l ikely to identify racial barriers that impair 
their abil ity to serve. 
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Seniority is also likely to affect the qual ity of black leg islative l ife (Hamm, 
Harmel , and Thompson 1 983 ; Hedge, Button, and Spear 1 996). Lawmakers 
with greater sen iority are more l ikely to hold leadership positions and 
chairmanships on important committees. Moreover, councilors with greater 
seniority probably have had more opportunities to hone their leg islative skil ls, 
develop an expertise in a particular pol icy area, and forge friendships with other 
important political figures in their municipal ity-both on and off the counci l .  
These qualities will allow councilors with greater seniority to be more successfu l 
than newly elected ones. Based on th is ·reasoning , I expect that the longer a 
member servers, the more positive his or her legislative experience will become. 
Gender is another individual factor that should be considered when 
explaining the variance in the quality of black legislative life . I assume that black 
women will have a less positive experience than black men because they are 
d isadvantaged by virtue of their race and by virtue of their gender. Scholars 
have begun to address this possibil ity, but they have gotten mixed resu lts . Some 
researchers have found that black women confront both a race and a gender 
bias when running for office (Clayton and Stallings 2000; Githens and Prestage 
1 977). Likewise, black women are more pol itically al ienated that black men , 
white men, and wh ite women. They are the most hesitant group to trust the 
federal government; they have the lowest feelings of political efficacy; and , they 
perceive a greater amount of employment discrimination (Baxter and Lansing 
1 983). On the other hand , others have found either no support for the double 
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disadvantage argument (Darcy and Hadley 1 988) or only partial support for it 
(Hedge , Button, and Spear 1996; Moncr ief , Thompson, Schuhmann 1991 ). The 
most relevant evidence comes from Hedge, Button , and Spear's (1 996) survey of 
black state legislators. They found no appreciable difference in the rate at which 
black men and women serve in party leadership roles , the amount of influence 
they wield over party affairs, and satisfaction with their committee assignments. 
However, they also found that black men were sl ightly more l ikely to chair 
committees than black women. And, black women were less l ikely to serve on 
committees deal ing with financial matters, but more l ikely to serve on those 
relating to education, welfare, famil ies, and health. 
Contextual Explanations 
The context in which black counci lors serve may also explain the variance 
in the qual ity of their legislative experience. In this subsection , I consider a host 
of contextual variables that are l ikely to be consequential .  Some of thes·e are 
very broad in scope such as geographic region. Other contextual variables 
narrowly focus on way the city counci l  is organized. Finally, some contextual 
factors are even more restricted their scope and deal only with the type of district 
that the counci lor represents. In the remainder of this subsection , I identify these 
variables and explain how each might affect the black legislative experience. I 
do this by moving from factors that are broad in scope to those with a more 
restr icted focus. 
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I hypothesize that the environment in which black councilors serve affects 
the quality of their experience. Specifically, I assume that respondents from 
municipalities in the Deep South will be more inclined to report a negative 
experience given that region's history of racial strife. Regrettably (from a 
normative standpoint), others have found evidence to this effect at the state level 
(Hedge, Button, and Spear 1996). They learned that black state legislators from 
the Deep South were less likely to chair committees or report that they were 
influential. These findings (in conjunction with others) prompted these authors to 
conclude that societal tensions ultimately play themselves out within legislative 
bodies so as to limit potential advances of minority groups. 
The type of government a municipality adopts . is important because it 
dictates the roles played by its municipal officials. Some scholars associate the 
presence of a city manager with deceased government spending (Lineberry and 
Fowler 1967). I f  so, this might mean that council-manager governments pit black 
and white lawmakers against each other when the council is deciding how to 
allocate the municipality's limited resources. In this situation, whites may exclude 
their black counterparts from the dominant coalition so the legislative spoils can 
be divided between a smaller number of coalition members (Riker 1962). Other 
scholars have used a different argument to arrive at this same conclusion. 
Browning, Marshall, and Tabb (1984: 201) observed that the presence of a 
minority lawmaker in the dominant coalition is more likely in unreformed 
governments that employ the mayor-council format. Here, liberal coalitions 
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frequently become dominant and mayors and councilors enjoy more individual 
power. · Based on this evidence, I anticipate that black councilors from mayor­
council cities · will have a more positive experience than those who serve in 
council-manager cities. 
Although empirical evidence is scarce, I predict that both nonpartisan and 
at-large contests favor black lawmakers once they win election. Nonpartisanship 
may help the black lawmakers forge alliances with their white colleagues by 
suppressing overt partisan bickering. Conversely, black candidates who succeed 
despite an at-large system will probably report a more positive experience 
because they enjoy considerable support from the white electorate. Hence, 
these lawmakers probably view the political process as being even-handed and 
less divided along racial lines. They are also likely to have leadership style and 
agenda that facilitates amicable relations with white councilors. That is, they 
probably favor a race-neutral, policy oriented approach rather than militant or 
confrontational style when pursuing their objectives because they depended on 
white votes to win reelection. 
The structure of city councils may also influence the quality of black 
legislative life. Blacks who se.rve on smaller councils probably ·have a better 
experience than those who serve on larger ones. · This may be so because 
smaller councils have a more intimate legislative setting that requires blacks and 
whites to work together on a more personal level. The more intimate setting may 
also enhance the ability of black councilors to prove they are skilled lawmakers. 
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Next, blacks who serve on professional councils ·are more l ikely to report a 
positive experience than those who serve on less professional councils .  
Professionalism is characterized by higher salaries, more staff, the presence of 
standing committees, and frequent meetings. Thus, councils with professional 
attributes may provide their black members with more opportunities for 
advancement. Likewise, these counci ls may attract candidates (both black and 
white) with higher levels of education because the job is more desirable. If so, 
the increased levels of education are l ikely to decrease discrimination based on 
the assumption that d iscrimination is the product of ignorance. 
Structural variables are certainly important, but human actors probably 
play a meaningful role too. I assume that greater numbers of black leaders in 
key positions of power wil l  enhance the quality of black legislative life. Black 
councilors who serve in such an environment wi l l  probably enjoy a more positive 
experience because they are less isolated and they have more all ies with in the 
pol itical system. Thus, I suspect that the quality of black legislative l ife . wi l l  
improve as the percentage of blacks on the council increases. Similarly, black 
councilors wil l  probably report a more positive experience when their city is 
represented by .. a black mayor. 
Another important factor to consider is the size of the black population 
within the municipality. A large black population,  especial ly when mobil ized , may 
have the potential to influence the behavior of white councilors through its voting 
power (See, Browning, Marshal l ,  and Tabb 1 984). If so, white councilors who 
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represent a large black constituency may be more inclined to support the policies 
advocated by the black councilors. Based on this reasoning, I assume that black 
lawmakers serving in municipalities with large black populations will report a 
more positive experience. 
The quality of black legislative life may also reflect the racial and economic 
composition of the districts that the black councilors represent (Hedge, Button, 
and Spear 1996). I anticipate that black counGilors from affluent or 
predominantly white districts (or cities in the case of councilors elected at-large) 
will report a more positive experience because they are likely to maintain an 
agenda that enjoys the support of their white colleagues. The constituents that 
these black councilors represent probably have much in common with the 
constituents represented by the white councilors. Thus, whites on the council are 
likely to support the black councilor's initiatives because they would advantage 
their. constituents too. 
The nature of the member's constituency may also determine the type of 
person who gets elected and the way they set out to accomplish their policy 
goals (Hedge, Button, and Spear 1996). A black councilor from an affluent or 
predominantly white district probably has an agenda and style that is agreeable 
to white lawmakers because they were elected with the support of white voters. 
Thus, blacks from such districts will probably be more successful and satisfied 
because they are more apt to employ a race-neutral style rather than a militant or 
confrontational one. I f  this argument holds true, it raises a troubling dilemma for 
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civil rights activists who advocate the use of majority-minority districts as the 
primary vehicle for achieving substantive representation. That is, black 
lawmakers from the majority-minority districts, by virtue of their "authenticity," 
may not be well received by their white colleagues; and, when aggressively 
serving their black constituents, they may zealously advocate policies that are 
too liberal t� be politically viable. In contrast, black lawmakers from 
predominantly white districts may fare better within the legislative body, but they 
may lack authenticity if they are co-opted by the establishment. Hence, critics of 
"race-neutral" or "deracialized" political strategies argue that these black officials 
forsake a progressive agenda that is important to black citizens (Jones 1991. 
See also, Albritton et al. 1996). 
Why My Research Matters: A Summary 
Civil rights activists who embrace the BEST believe that black lawmakers will be 
able to deliver substantive policy benefits to their black constituents. This 
position is based on the premise that these individuals will have no difficulty 
assimilating into legislative bodies and convincing white lawmakers to support 
their agenda. However, Guinier (1994) disputes this contention and asserts that 
merely having a seat at the table is no guarantee that black lawmakers will be 
satisfied or successful. Instead, she argues that many black lawmakers operate 
in a hostile environment where good-faith and cooperation are atypical. In such 
instances, a predominantly white council can marginalize the black lawma·kers so 
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they remain ineffective. My research is timely and relevant because it directly 
addresses this important debate. The empirical evidence I present in the 
following chapters has far-reaching implications for the quality of democracy 
enjoyed by ethnic minorities because it would, no doubt, be a hollow 
achievement for them to win descriptive representation but fail to achieve 
substantive gains because their representatives are not fully included in the 
legislative process. 
A small body of empirical l iterature addresses Guinier's concern, but there 
is still much to learn. We know that black lawmakers generally have lower bill 
passage rates than whites. We know that black lawmakers have difficulty 
obtaining assignments to powerful committees in some state legislatures. We 
also know that black and white lawmakers have divergent perceptions about the 
black legislative experience. Blacks general ly assume a more pessimistic view 
and are more l ikely to identify racial barriers that hamper their progress. 
However, almost all our knowledge comes from studies of state legislatures 
rather than city councils. We cannot be sure that these state-level findings apply 
to the local context since city councils and their members are distinct. 
Scholars who study local government have noted the importance of 
structural variables. We know that the electoral format has significant 
implications for black candidates seeking office. We know that the governmental 
format determines the roles played by municipal officials. Likewise, scholars 
have demonstrated that the way a city council is arranged is generally  important. 
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Nevertheless, the literature has not connected these structural variables to the 
experiences of black lawmakers once they assume their place on the council. 
Examining whether these variables influence the quality of black legislative life is 
important because the answer has significant implications for how communities 
organize their governments. 
Some scholars have studied the experiences of black officials in the local 
context. Their work shows that these officials have been instrumental in 
delivering policy benefits to their black constituents in the form of employment 
opportunities (Eisinger 1982; Kerr and Mladenka 1994 ), helpful welfare services 
(Karnig and Welch 1980), and citizen controls being placed over police 
departments (Saltzstein 1989). Even so, there is still much to learn because 
most of what we know comes from studies of black mayors rather than black city 
councilors. The councilors experiences are likely to be different because the 
nature of their office prevents them from acting unilaterally. Moreover, it is also 
possible that racial barriers prevent black officials from being more successfu l 
than they already are. Only one study (Button, Richards, and Bethune 1998) 
describes specific barriers that local officials encounter, but it is based on a 
dataset that includes both city councilors and other local officials. Hence, it is 
unclear whether its findings hold true once the responses of the back councilors 
are separated from the data supplied by the other officials. 
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I n  the end, we still know relatively little about the about extent to which 
black city councilors have been accepted by their white counterparts and whether 
they are satisfied with their careers. Scholars have yet to adequately assess the 
standing of blacks on city councils, the obstacles they face, and their ability to 
accomplish their policy goals. There is some research that speaks to these 
issues, but no particular study is directly on point. Accordingly, my research is 
necessary because it helps fill this gap in the literature. 
64 
CHAPTER THREE 
METHODOLOGY 
Data Col lection 
used two separate mail surveys to generate data for my study. I sent one 
survey to black city councilors and I · sent the other to their white counterparts. 
The two instruments were similar in content although, out of necessity, I phrased 
some questions differently to account for the respondent's race. These slight 
modifications only affected two questions and did not alter their meaning or 
substance. Therefore, I was able to draw direct comparisons between the two 
sets of lawmakers based on their responses to the overlapping items in my 
questionnaires. 
I found a comparative approach to be useful because, with the exception 
of two innovative studies (Barrett 1997; Button and Hedge 1996), not much is 
known about how black and white lawmakers view the black legislative 
experience. As the authors of one of these studies observed, it is important that 
we learn how black and white legislators interact, how their backgrounds 
compare, and how they perceive one another's experiences (Button and Hedge 
1996). Similarities could facilitate accommodation while differences might result 
in conflict andior discrimination. 
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My Survey of Black Councilors 
I randomly. selected the names and addresses of 1000 black councilors 
from a list complied by the Joint Center for Political and Economic Studies 
(JCPES) located in Washington, D.C. This roster was the most comprehensive 
one available and it consisted of 3530 individuals who ostensibly represent the 
entire population of local black lawmakers. Nevertheless, the roster had several 
recognizable limitations that detracted from its usefulness. First, and most 
importantly, the large number of municipalities where black lawmakers potentially 
serve makes it difficult (if not impossible) for the JCPES to update its roster to 
include newly elected councilors and exclude those who have recently left office. 
To some extent, I rectified this problem by placing telephone calls to each 
municipality where there was a non-respondent so I could eliminate individuals 
who were no longer in office. This remedy, however, was incomplete because it 
could not redress situations where new black councilors recently won election. 
Second, the roster contained names and addresses of black councilors who were 
serving on all-black councils. This problem, if not corrected, could potentially 
compromise my study's validity because many of the items in my questionnaire 
assumed the presence of a mixed-race council where at least one black and one 
white member were serving. For this problem, I felt the most appropriate remedy 
was to exclude the 34 respondents (13.2% of my sample) who reported that they 
served on an all-black council. However, in one section of this manuscript 
(p. 114 ), I utilized this data to compare black councilors from mixed-race councils 
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to those who serve on all-black councils in terms of their personal profiles and 
how they perceive the needs of their constituents. 
I constructed my questionnaires according the approach outlined by Don 
A. Dillman in the Total Design Method (1978) and the Tailored Design Method 
(2000). I mailed them to black councilors in the fall and winter of 2002 along with 
a stamped return envelope and a cover letter explaining the nature of my 
research. I sent two subsequent mailings consisting of a postcard reminder and 
duplicate survey packet to all non-respondents in two or three week intervals 
after my initial mailing. My original sample consisted of 1000 black councilors , 
but telephone calls to municipal clerks revealed that 239 of these lawmakers 
were no longer in office. I excluded these individuals as potential respondents 
because many clerks indicated that it was unlikely that these former lawmakers 
would receive mail sent to them at city hall, and because my questionnaire 
assumed that respondents were currently sitting on their council. Ultimately, 258 
of the remaining 761 black councilors returned their questionnaire, which is a 
33.9% response rate. 
Nonresponse can threaten the inferential value of survey data. However, 
this perennial concern is unlikely to pose a serious problem for my study 
although its response rate was considerably lower than other recent mail surveys 
of municipal officials (Clingermayer and Feiock 1994; Fox and Schuhmann 2000; 
Lascher 1993; MacManus 1992). In the study of municipal government, 
response rates lower than 30% are typical of surveys mailed to political elites, 
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organizations, and governmental entities (Abbe and Herrnson 2003; Cooper and 
Nownes 2003; I hrke, Proctor, and Gabris 2003; Stumm and Corrigan 1998). 
Similarly, in marketing research, response rates as low as 15% are considered 
acceptable when the population being surveyed is business executives (Baldauf, 
Reisinfer, and Moncrief 1999; Tomaskovic-Dewey, Leiter, and Thompson 1994 ). 
In  short, my 33.9% response rate appears to be typical and it does not seem to 
jeopardize the inferential value of my data. 
My Survey of White Councilors 
There was no complete and reliable l ist of white city councilors so I had to 
compile one. To do this, I collected the names and addresses of al l the white 
councilors in municipalities where a where at least one black councilor 
responded in my earl ier survey. I began by examining the webpages of these 
204 municipal ities in hopes of finding a picture and address for each councilor. I f  
this online search was unsuccessful for a particular councilor (this occurred about 
57 .8% of the time), then I placed a telephone cal l to the municipal clerk or council 
staff to obtain the information. Not surprisingly, the unique nature of my request 
created some difficulties even when I asked for a city hall address rather than a 
home address. Clerks in five municipal ities refused to assist me and four others 
would not divu lge the information unless I provided them with a formal request on 
university letterhead. Despite the recalcitrance of some clerks, I obtained the 
information for 96.1 % of the municipalities. 
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Once I assembled my list of white councilors, I sent questionnaires to all 
797 individuals on the list. The primary limitation of this strategy is that the 
perceptions and demographics reported are not representative of the total 
population of white councilors who serve on mixed-race councils. Even so, this 
flaw is apparently not fatal since Button and Hedge (1996: 201) relied on a 
similar approach in their study of black and white state legislators. They selected 
their sample of whites "from states with two or more black survey respondents 
and the number of white legislators was selected in proportion to the number of 
black legislators in each house of those states who had responded to [their] 
earlier survey." More importantly, however, there is some degree of randomness 
in my study because I selected my sample of white councilors from municipalities 
where a randomly drawn black councilor responded to my earlier survey. In 
other words, some degree of randomness from my survey of black councilors 
finds its way into my survey of their white counterparts. Therefore, the white 
respondents are representative of those who serve in the municipalities where a 
black lawmaker responded to the first survey. This allows me to make 
informative comparisons between the two groups so long as it is understood that 
they are only valid for the narrow class of cities where a black councilor 
responded to my earlier survey. 
Just like my earlier survey, I constructed the questionnaires for the white 
councilors according to the approach described by Dillman (2000 & 1978). I sent 
the initial mailing in the summer of 2003 with a stamped return envelope and a 
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cover letter explaining my study's purpose. I sent all non-respondents two 
subsequent mailings consisting of a postcard reminder and duplicate survey 
packet. Precisely when I sent the follow-ups depended upon whether I was 
sending the materials to a home address or a city hall address. 3 For home 
addresses (46.7% of the potential respondents), I sent the follow-ups in two week 
intervals after the initial mailing, but I sent my subsequent mailings to city hall 
addresses (53.3% of the potential respondents) in monthly intervals. I modified 
the timing of my follow-up procedures because recent evidence suggests that 
approximately 69% of city councils meet twice a month and about 20% meet 
once a month (MacManus and Bullock 2003). Hence, I adopted this strategy to 
avoid situations where the councilors receive the initial survey packet and the 
follow-ups simultaneously. I n  the end, my response rate for home addresses 
was 46.77%, my response rate for city hall addresses was 41.98%, and my 
overall response rate was a respectable 44.22% (352 total responses out of 796 
potential respondents). 
I was not surprised that my survey of white councilors had a higher 
response rate than my survey of black councilors. This can probably be 
attributed to the shorter questionnaire I sent to the white lawmakers and the fact 
that the timing my follow-up procedures differed. Another possible explanation, 
3 For my survey of white councilors, my telephone calls to municipal clerks 
revealed whether a particular address was a home address or city hall address. 
However, for my survey of black councilors, I was unable to distinguish between 
the two types of addresses by simply looking at the JCPES's roster. 
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although less compelling , is that the some black lawmakers-especially those 
who serve on predominantly white councils-may have feared that their 
responses could somehow be used against them (Cf. , Abbe and Hermsen 2003 : 
239). This may be the case because racial issues remain contentious and 
divisive. As some public figures have learned, controversial statements about 
racial issues have the potential to generate a tremendous public outcry that can 
. adversely affect the status of their · employment (witness Trent Lott, Rush 
Limbaugh, and Jimmy 'The Greek"). Finally, the literature on political 
participation generally - demonstrates that black citizens are less inclined to 
participate in politics in than white citizens (Ashenfelter and Kelley 1975; 
Campbell et al. 1960; Matthews and Prothro 1963 ; Verba and Nie 1972). 
Although this gap narrows when · socioeconomic variables are controlled 
(Antunes and Gaitz 1975 ; Orum 1966; Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980), it may, 
nevertheless, help to explain the difference in the two response rates. 
Additional Data 
I decided that a number of city-level variables-especially those pertaining 
to the municipality's governmental structure and electoral · format-should be 
included in my dataset given their importance to students of local politics. Even 
so, I did not inquire about these variables in the aforementioned surveys because 
I initially thought this information was available through archival sources ; 
because including additional items in my questionnaires might jeopardize my 
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response rate; and, because the respondents might be unable to answer items 
that applied to other political actors in their municipality. Unfortunately, as data 
collection progressed, I realized that archival sources were not very helpful 
because they were either incomplete or outdated (Carpenter with Provorse 1996; 
I nternational City/County Management Association 1996 & 2002; Schmittroth 
2001 ). Thus, it became necessary for me to develop an alternative strategy for 
collecting this information for all the municipalities where a lawmaker respondent 
to my earlier surveys. 
I relied on the Census Bureau's factfinder webpage to obtain information 
about the municipality's total population and racial composition (U.S. Bureau of 
the Census 2000). Next, I sent a six page questionnaire to municipal clerks 
asking about their municipality's governmental structure. I mailed these 
questionnaires in the fall of 2003, and I sent a duplicate survey packet to non­
non-responding municipalities about one month later (See Appendix C.). For this 
instrument, I borrowed most of my questions from a 2001 survey of municipal 
clerks administered by the I nternational City-County Management Association 
( ICMA). Likewise, Susan MacManus of the University of South Florida 
generously provided me a copy this dataset, which occasionally helped me fill in 
data from non-responding cities. In  the end, this strategy yielded information for 
64.37% of the municipalities in my study. 
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Measurement 
My surveys of black and white councilors consisted of a series of items intended 
to estimate the quality of black legislative life-a concept formulated by Hedge, 
Button , and Spear (1 996). Drawing heavily on their work, I took a broad view of 
this concept and relied on both open and closed-ended questions to assess how 
black lawmakers and their interests fare within city councils. I borrowed many 
questions from previous works (Barrett 1 995; Button and Hedge 1 996; Hedge, 
Button , and Spear 1 996) to alleviate concerns over question wording and 
facilitate comparisons between the views of the state legislators that these other 
scholars studied . I n  short, I heeded the advice of Maestas, Neeley, and 
Richardson (2001 : 1 00) who encouraged researchers to "Standardize question 
wording and response scales for commonly studied concepts. "  
I n  my survey of black councilors, one set of items focused on the personal 
experiences of these lawmakers so I could assessed their individual careers. 
Here, I asked them whether they personally experienced discrimination,  whether 
they felt compelled to work harder than whites to gain respect, the number of 
committees they chaired , and whether they were satisfied with their committee 
assignments (See Appendix A.). Conversely, I asked white councilors whether 
they observed one or more instances of racial discrimination against a black 
councilor, and whether their black counterpart(s) must work harder than whites to 
gain respect (See Appendix 8. ). 
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I relied on a second set of items to determine how well black interests in 
general fared within mixed-race city councils. I asked both black and white 
councilors this entire battery of questions because both groups had a basis for 
responding. Specifically, I inquired about (1 ) the overall quality of race relations 
within the respondent's council , (2) the amount of influence black councilors 
wield, (3) whether a councilor's race influences his or her ability to obtain 
leadership positions, (4) whether black councilors experience discrimination 
when seeking committee assignments, and (5) the likelihood of black councilors 
interacting with the mayor compared to whites. In short, these questions gave 
me an overal l sense of the black legislative experience and the role blacks play 
within city councils. 
It is important to note that I measure the quality of black legislative life in 
largely subjective terms that are predicated on the lawmakers' personal opinions 
and perceptions. Hence, critics wil l likely to point out-and rightly so-that the 
respondents' perceptions may be different than the actual conditions that exist 
within the councils. Like others (Welch and Bledsoe 1 985), I rel ied on perceptual 
data because it allowed me to employ a large-N design rather than one that 
restricted my focus to the small number of cities where objective measures are 
available through archival sources. I favored the large-N approach because it 
provided me with a means of control and it allowed me to make broad 
generalizations. However, the disadvantage of this strategy is that there are only 
two objective measures at my disposal :  (1 ) self-reported committee 
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chairmanships, and (2) self-reported bil l passage raies. However, neither 
measure proved to be especially helpful for th is project. The committee 
chairmanship variable is of l ittle use because only about one-third of my councils 
have committees. Thus, the small number of observations confounds statistical 
analysis. Self-reported bil l passage rates do not have this problem, but they are 
probably a better measure of substantive representation than the qual ity of black 
legislative l ife. Hence, it seems more appropriate to set th is data aside for a 
d ifferent project that narrowly focuses on that topic. Although I rely exclusively 
on perceptual data, th is does detract from the significance of my work. The 
lawmakers' perceptions are important in their  own right because they probably 
d ictate how the councilors behave (Button , Richards, Bethune 1 998; Hedge, 
Button, and Spear 1996). That is, lawmakers operate in a world where objective 
information is not always at their d isposal ;  so, to compensate, they look to their 
personal experiences when decid ing how to conduct themselves. 
Summary of My Methodology 
The preceding sections reveal that my study, l ike any piece of research , has 
l imitations that generate some degree of uncertainty about its resu lts . In  my 
view, these l imitations are minor and neither compromise my study's overall 
integrity nor outweigh its scholarly contribution.  As one oft cited source explains, 
"An important topic is worth studying even if l ittle information is available. The 
resu lt of applying any research design in this situation wil l be relatively uncertain 
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conclusions, but so long as we honestly report our uncertainty, this kind of study 
can be very useful" (King, Keohane, and Verba 1994: 6). Therefore, despite its 
flaws, my data are well suited to answering the questions I pose here. Namely, 
what is the quality of black legislative life on mixed-race city councils in the 
United States? And, what factors account for the variance in the quali ty of the 
black councilors' perceptions? 
· I n  the end, I believe that a large-N survey research strategy is best suited 
for exploring these questions. I found this strategy to be superior to a case study 
approach because it enabled me to make broad generalizations and control for 
intervening variables. To implement this strategy, I sent 1000 surveys to black 
city councilors and 797 surveys to their white counterparts throughout the United 
States.4 The comparative aspect of my design allowed me to look at the black 
legislative experience from two different perspectives-black and white. This 
was important because similarities between the two groups might facilitate 
accommodation, while differences might result in conflict and/or discrimination 
(Button and Hedge 1996). The comparative strategy also helped me to interpret 
some of my findings because information collected from the white councilors 
could sometimes be used as a baseline for assessing the black legislative 
experience. Therefore, regardless of its limitations, my study makes a valuable 
4 Although I initially sent 1,000 surveys to black city councilors, I calculated my 
response rate based on a sample size of 761 individuals. I did so because 
phone calls to city clerks revealed that 239 nonrespondents were no longer in 
office and unlikely to receive mail sent to them at city hall. 
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contribution by greatly increasing our understanding of the black experience in 
local legislative bodies. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
A COMPARISON OF BACK AND WHITE COUNCILORS 
Introduction 
In this chapter, my primary objective is to compare the black and white city 
councilors. I begin by using descriptive statistics to contrast their personal 
profiles and constituencies. Next, I compare how they perceive the quality of 
black legislative life. Finally, I identify a series of independent variables likely to 
condition the responses of the two groups of councilors. In  doing so, I examine 
the quality of black legislative life in . terms of region, gender, city size, 
governmental structure, electoral format, and the racial composition of both the 
counci l and the lawmaker's constituency. 
My data show that black and white city councilors generally have similar 
profiles. However, the two groups are fundamentally different in terms of their 
constituencies and perceptions. Although many black counci lors report a 
positive legislative experience, significant differences emerge when I compare 
their perceptions to those maintained by white councilors. I n  other words, the 
black respondents generally say they are satisfied and successful, but many still 
have a more pessimistic outlook than their white counterparts. This suggests a 
disconnect between the two groups such that the white lawmakers neither 
completely understand their black colleagues nor recognize the barriers they face 
while serving. These differences remain when I control for other factors. 
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A Descriptive Profi le of the Councilors 
Demographic Characteristics 
Black and white councilors share many of the same demographic 
characteristics. Both groups are older individuals whose average age is 58.5 for 
black councilors and 56. 7 for white councilors. Both groups have deep roots in 
their community. On average, black councilors have resided in their community 
for 39.3 years while their white colleagues have resided there for 38.5 years. 
Furthermore, the two groups have a comparable amount of legislative experience 
and seniority. Black councilors, on average, have held their seat for just over 1 O 
years while their white counterparts have been serving for 8.5 years. As for 
gender , both groups are predominantly male, though there are slightly more 
females among the black councilors (28.8% vs. 21.3%). 
Some important socioeconomic distinctions can be drawn · between the 
two groups. The majority of both groups tend to be well-educated-61.8% of the 
black councilors and 65.1 % of the white councilors have a college degree. 
However , the black councilors are more likely to have an advanced degree 
(40.6%) than their white counterparts (31 %). Despite this additional 
achievement, they are less likely than whites to be lawyers or members of 
another profession (See Table 2.). Instead, they are more likely than whites to 
be governmental employees or educators such as teachers , principals , 
superintendents, and college professors. 
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Table 2 
Principal Occupations of Black and White City Councilors 
Black Councilors 
% 
Retired 28 .8 
Teachers or Educators 1 5 .7 
Other Professionals 1 0 .5 
Government Employees 1 0.5 
Business Executives or Managers 6.8 
Business or Industry Employees 6.8 
Self-Employed or Business Owners 5.2 
Other 4.2 
Service Industry Employees 2.6 
Lawyers 2. 1 
Craftsmen, Tradesmen, Artists 2 . 1  
Ful l-Time Councilor o r  Mayor 2 . 1  
Clergy 1 .6 
Framers or Ranchers 0.5 
Homemakers 0.5 
Total = 1 00% 
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N 
55 
30 
20 
20 
1 3  
1 3  
1 0  
8 
5 
4 
4 
4 
3 
1 
1 
1 91 
White Councilors 
% N 
24.2 79 
6 . 1  20 
1 7 .4 57 
4.9 1 6  
7.6 25 
9.2 30 
7.3 24 
1 .5 5 
0 .3 1 
8 .3 27 
4.6 1 5  
5.8 1 9  
0.6 2 
0.3 1 
1 .8 6 
1 00% 327 
The two groups, as expected , d iffer in terms of their party identification 
and ideology. The overwhelming majority of black councilors are Democrats 
(9 1 .2%) compared to just over half of white respondents (51 .7%). Conversely, a 
high proportion of the white councilors are independents (1 9.9%) compared to a 
low proportion of black councilors (4 .4%). Since many city counci ls are not 
organized by partisanship, the respondent's ideology is perhaps a more 
important factor to consider. Here too, the groups differ, but this gap is less 
pronounced than the one associated with party identification . On a seven-point 
scale ranging very l iberal to very conservative, the mean score for white 
respondents is 4.63 compared to 4.0 1 for black respondents. Thus, both groups 
fal l  in the "moderate range," and whites tend to position themselves more toward 
the conservative-end of the pol itical spectrum than blacks. This finding stands in 
stark contrast to a recent study of state legislators. Using the same scale, Button 
and Hedge (1 996) found that their white respondents had an average score of 
4 .5 while their black respondents' mean score was a relatively liberal 3 . 1 . The 
black councilors' more moderate ideology can be attributed to the unexpectedly 
large proportion of ideological conservatives in my sample (32 .7%). 
The Councilors' Constituencies 
The vast majority of the black counci lors (71 .3%) come from the 1 1  states 
that formerly belonged to the Confederacy. They also hail from cities with an 
average population of 72 ,688. However, a closer look at the distribution reveals 
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that a considerable proportion of them reside in small communities. Just over 
half serve in municipalities . with less than 10,000 people, while about one-third 
serve in communities with less than 5,000 people. Not surprisingly, these cities 
tend to have sizeable black populations. Black councilors serve in communities 
where black residents, on average, comprise 41.36% of their city's total 
population. These cities generally have biracial populations composed almost 
exclusively of · black and white residents. Granted, my data show that some 
municipalities in the Southwest and West do have appreciable H ispanic 
populations, but this is the exception rather than the rule. Thus, the mean 
Hispanic population in cities with a black respondent is only 6.38%, the median 
drops to 2.32%, and the mode is 0%. 
The black and white councilors have very little in common in terms of their 
constituencies. Although about one-third of both groups represent an urban 
constituency, there are noteworthy differences in non-urban settings. The black 
counci lors are much more l ikely to represent a small -town constituency {56.6%) 
and are less likely to represent a suburban constituency {6.8%) than whites 
{45.1 % small-town and 18.7% suburban). Moreover, a slightly higher proportion 
of the black councilors represent a rural constituency than whites (8.3% vs. 
3.4%). 
The black councilors are generally elected from wards {61 %) although a 
healthy proportion of them (39%) have managed to win their seat in an at-large 
contest. These individuals tend to represent economically disadvantaged 
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constituencies that are predominantly black. My data show that 33% of the black 
respondents compared to only 8 .3% of the white respondents represent a 
constituency with an average family income under $20,000. Likewise, the mean 
percentage of black residents represented by a black councilor is 54.99% 
compared to 26.77% for white councilors. This finding came as no surprise since 
Voting Rights Act litigation has encouraged (and in some cases has mandated) 
the creation of majority-black wards. Nevertheless, some of white councilors (37 
respondents, or 11.7%) represent a majority-black constituency and a large 
number of black councilors (48 respondents, or 24%) represent a predominantly 
white constituency. This suggests that, to some extent, councilors of both races 
have transcended racial barriers in the electoral process. Although my data 
cannot explain why this occurs, it is very possible that these individuals are 
successful because they have demonstrated their commitment to their 
constituents' substantive interests. Conversely, voters may be beginning to 
attach greater importance to a candidate's qualifications and their perceived 
ability to deliver substantive benefits rather than their descriptive characteristics. 
Perceptions of the Quality of Black Legislative Life 
My questionnaires contained a series of items designed to measure the quality of 
black legislative life-the central concept in my study. I asked both sets of 
councilors about the quality of race relations within their council, the amount of 
influence that black members wield, whether the black lawmakers feel they must 
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work harder than whites to gain respect, whether discrimination exists, and the 
likelihood of black councilors interacting with the mayor compared to whites. 
Thus, I relied on many indicators so I could gain a comprehensive understanding 
of the black legislative experience in local government. 
The Black Councilors' Perceptions 
The black councilors' perceptions are interesting in their own right. 
Hence, I explore their views in isolation before I examine them from a 
comparative perspective. As Table 3 demonstrates, very few black councilors 
negatively evaluate their legislative experience. Only 7 .9% say race relations are 
"poor'' on their council; only 15.9% say blacks councilors exert little or no 
influence; about two-thirds say they have not personally experienced 
discrimination; only 14.3% say they perceive a "great deal" of discrimination in 
committee assignments; and, over three-fourths say they are satisfied with their 
committee assignments. These findings are certainly cause for optimism 
because they evince that black councilors are generally satisfied, successful, and 
operate in a collegial legislative environment. This evidence is consistent with 
view espoused by the civil rights activists who embrace the BEST. These 
activists believe that, once elected, the black lawmakers will have little difficulty 
assimilating into legislative bodies because the intimate setting, continuous 
voting opportunities, and institutional rules promote accommodation rather than 
exclusion. 
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Table 3 
Black City Councilors' Assessments of the Quality of Black Legislative Life 
Assessment Black Councilors 
% N 
Black influence on the council 
A Lot 43.5 93 
Some 40.7 87 
Only a Little 1 2 .6 27 
None 3.3 7 
1 00% 214 
Quality of race relations on the council 
Excellent 1 4.9 32 
Good 46.5 1 00 
Fair 30.7 66 
Poor 7.9 1 7  
1 00% 21 5 
Race influences leadership positions 
Yes 55.7 1 1 2 
No 44.3 89 
1 00% 201 
Likelihood of interacting with the mayor compared to whites 
More Likely than Whites 23.4 49 
As Likely as Whites 49.8 1 04 
Less Likely than Whites 26.8 56 
1 00% 209 
Perceived discrimination in committee assignments 
A Great Deal 14.3 1 8  
Some 27.8 35 
None at All 57.9 73 
1 00% 1 26 
Personal satisfaction w/ committee assignments 
Satisfied 76.7  99 
Dissatisfied 23.3  30 
1 00% 1 29 
Feel compelled to work harder than whites to gain respect 
Agree 76.7  1 65 
Disagree 23.3 50 
1 00% 21 5 
Personally experienced racial discrimination 
Yes 31 . 1  65 
No 68.9 144 
1 00% 209 
Note. The N drops for some items because many councils do not have committees. 
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Although there is cause for optimism, two items in my questionnaire 
suggest that race still matters. A majority of the black councilors say that race is 
used as a factor when leadership positions are awarded. And, over three-fourths 
feel compelled to work harder to gain respect because of their race. As one 
black councilor put it: 
I think as an African-American elected official, you are always held 
to a higher standard. You have to be more prepared and know the 
issues. Other members of the group, if they belong to _ the majority 
race, do not have to prepare and are not held to the same 
standard. 
These two items clearly show that, despite their overall satisfaction, local black 
lawmakers do not operate in a colorblind environment where there are no racial 
obstacles left to confront. Instead, there remains a tension between the 
accomplishments that the black lawmakers have made and the barriers they 
continue to face. This tension is reflected in the comments that several black 
councilors wrote on the back cover of their questionnaires. One person outlined 
h is legislative and political achievements, then lamented that "race is still a factor 
a lot of times in decision making." Another stated, "as the junior member of the 
council (in terms of tenure) many of the perceived and/or real barriers have been 
resolved-almost!" 
At first glance, some of my data (especially the two aforementioned items) 
seem to bolster Lani Guinier's contention that the BEST is defective. However, a 
closer examination shows that she overstates her case by suggesting that white 
lawmakers engage in a systematic effort to render their black counterparts 
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ineffective. Although my data show that racial obstacles persist , they are not 
indicative of a pervasive- effort to marginalize the black councilors . First , there 
cannot be a wide-spread effort of this nature because too many black councilors 
claim to be satisfied and successful. Second, even the two items that imply a 
poor legislative experience are not compel ling evidence a systematic effort. The 
fact that black councilors feel compelled to work harder than whites to gain 
respect neither means they are marginalized nor precluded from succeeding at 
this endeavor . Indeed, many respondents would probably agree that they have 
ultimately earned the respect of their col leagues since so many report that blacks 
wield "a lot" of influence on their council. Granted, the leadership item is more 
problematic and should not be summarily dismissed. Nevertheless, the question 
technical ly leaves open the possibility that blacks are awarded leadership 
positions because of their race. In other words, this question's wording does not 
specify how race influences leadership positions although it demonstrates that 
the black lawmakers do not serve in a colorblind environment. Even if this 
question is interpreted in the light most favorable to Guinier's argument, standing 
alone, it only provides weak support for her position. 
Another interesting issue is whether there is a distinction between how the 
respondents assess their individual career versus the collective experience of 
blacks councilors. As Table 3 demonstrates, only one item suggests that this 
distinction is meaningful : the item that shows over three-fourths of the black 
councilors feel compelled to work harder than whites to gain respect. However, 
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for other aspects of their individual career, the respondents assessments were 
generally positive and consistent with their perceptions of the collective 
experience of blacks. Namely, 68.9% say they have not personally experienced 
discrimination, and 76. 7% say they are satisfied with their committee 
assignments. In short, the "working harder to gain respect" item seems to be an 
anomaly because, aside from it, there does not appear to be much difference 
between the personal and collective experiences of black lawmakers. 
The Black Legislative Experience From A Comparative Perspective 
Bivariate crosstabulations reveal remarkable differences in how the two 
sets of councilors view the black legislative experience (See Table 4. ). In  fact, 
their perceptions are so divergent that two-tailed chi-square tests show 
statistically significant differences for all of the indicators.5 Moreover, with only 
once exception (black influence on the council) ,  the differences are significant at 
the .00 1 level. White councilors overwhelmingly report that their black 
colleagues have a positive experience and encounter few barriers or inequalities 
that might hamper their legislative effectiveness. Although many black councilors 
concur with this assessment, blacks still tend to be more cynical than whites 
about their standing on their council, and they are still more likely than whites to 
identify racial barriers that impede their progress. 
5 To perform these chi-square tests, I was required to merge my black and white 
datasets together. 
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Table 4 
Black and White City Councilors' Assessments of the 
Qual ity of Black Legislative Life 
Assessment Black White 
(N = 1 99) (N = 325) 
Black influence on the council 
A Lot 
Some 
Only a Little 
None 
Quality of race relations on the council 
Excellent 
Good 
Fair 
Poor 
Blacks must work harder to gain respect 
Agree 
Disagree 
Likelihood of interacting with the mayor compared to whites 
More Likely than Whites 
As Likely as Whites 
Less Likely than Whites 
Race influences leadership positions 
Yes 
No 
Experienced or observed racial discrimination 
Yes 
No 
Perceived discrimination in committee assignments 
A Great Deal 
Some 
None at All 
43.5%** 
40.7 
1 2.6 
3.3 
1 4.9%*** 
46.5 
30.7 
7.9 
76 .7%*** 
23.3 
23.4%*** 
49.8  
26 .8 
55.7%*** 
44.3 
34. 1 %*** 
65.9 
1 4.3%*** 
27.8 
57 .9 
Note. Numbers enclosed in parentheses are approximations and vary by item. 
*p < .05. **p < .01 . ***p < . 001 (all tests two-tailed). 
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52. 1 %  
41 .3 
6 .0 
0.6 
51 .2% 
38.7 
8.6 
1 .5 
1 1 .5% 
88.5 
1 9.4% 
71 . 1  
9.5 
1 6. 9% 
83. 1 
2.4% 
97.6 
0.3% 
4.0 
95.7 
I asked both groups several questions designed to gain an overall sense 
of how blacks and their interests fare. Specifically, I prompted each group about 
the amount of influence that blacks wield and the quality of race relations within 
their councils (See Table 4. ). Disparities narrowed between the groups when I 
inquire about the amount of influence that black councilors hold. Just over half of 
the white councilors report that their black colleague(s) maintain "a lot" of 
influence compared to 43.5% of the black councilors. Approximately 40% of both 
groups agree that the black councilor(s) possess at least "some" influence. On 
its face, this finding is encouraging because it suggests that many black 
councilors experience some indicia of legislative success. Unfortunately, this 
optimism quickly evaporates once I place this finding in a broader context. A 
small yet meaningful percentage of the black councilors (approximately 16%) say 
they possess little or no influence on their council, and the differences between 
the two groups are statistically significant at the .01 level. 
Perhaps more disconcerting are my findings about the quality of race 
relations on the city councils. Almost 90% of the white respondents say that race 
relations are either "good" or "excellent, " while only about 60% of black 
responses fall into these two categories. I nstead, the remaining black 
respondents classify the race relations as either "fair'' or "poor." Further, the 
overwhelming majority of black councilors (76. 7%) agree that they must work 
harder than whites to gain respect. Taken together, these findings suggest that 
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although many black councilors believe they are influentia l ,  many also feel they 
must su rmount additional hurdles in their quest for influence. 
I a lso prompted the two groups about specific barriers that black 
lawmakers might encounter. Over one-third of the black respondents say they 
have either experienced or observed d iscrimination on their counci l ,  whi le very 
few white respondents acknowledge instances of d iscrimination . Respondents 
also had an opportunity to describe the discrimination they experienced or 
witnessed . The open-ended responses show that d iscrimination manifests itself 
in many forms ranging from "subtle" to "overt." The most commonly cited 
conduct was d isparaging remarks d irected at black councilors. One person, for 
example, reported that a white col league cal led him an "Uncle Tom" because he 
objected to the location of a traffic signal . I n  another jurisd iction, a black 
councilor described an egregious incident that occurred after he and another 
black councilor found themselves on opposing sides of a d ivisive issue. During 
the next counci l  meeting, the city's white mayor d isplayed a picture of two black 
jackasses with their tai ls bound together pul l ing in opposite d i rections. 
A more serious problem was that some black councilors complained that 
they were not ful ly included in the decision-making process. These individuals 
insisted that their white col leagues discounted their input even when the pol icies 
being d iscussed had a d irect impact on black citizens. Simi larly, it was common 
for black councilors to report that they were intentionally kept out of the loop 
when decisions were made. A few respondents claimed that they were not 
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informed of meeting times while another contended that his white colleagues 
intentionally withheld important information from him. Other black councilors 
indicated that they had difficulty winning support for their legislation and that 
discrimination was evident from their colleagues' voting patterns. 
Black councilors in some municipalities reported that their white 
colleagues were actively seeking- to institutionalize inequality or at least preserve 
their hegemony on the council. One person wrote that discrimination was 
institutionalized on his council because, at council meetings, white lawmakers 
were recognized to speak before the black lawmakers. Conversely, black 
councilors frequently complained about discrimination during the redistricting 
process. I n  fact, one respondent felt that his white colleagues attempted to have 
their municipality annex land adjacent to their community with a large white 
population so that they could preserve their majority on the council. 
I t  is especially important to learn about barriers that black councilors face 
when seeking committee assignments and leadership positions since 
committees, those who chair them, and other legislative leaders have a 
heightened ability to influence the content and passage of legislation (Davidson 
and Oleszek 2004 ). Therefore, I relied on several closed-ended questions to tap 
the councilors' perceptions on these topics. Again, the data show there is a 
tremendous gap between the perceptions of the black and white councilors (See 
Table 4. ). Over 40% of the black councilors perceive at least some 
discrimination in how committee assignments are awarded, but less than 5% of 
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the white councilors agree with this assessment. Likewise, a majority of the 
black respondents say that race is a factor in the selection of leaders compared 
to only 16.9% among whites. Admittedly, this question leaves open the 
possibility that white councilors may be denied leadership positions because of 
their race and that race may be an asset to black councilors seeking a leadership 
position. Hence, the item is not useful in establishing the precise nature of the 
relationship although, at the very least, it demonstrates that many councilors 
believe that they do not serve in a colorblind environment where race is never a 
factor in how legislative spoils are allocated. 
Explaining the Perceptual Gap 
The preceding sections demonstrate that black and white councilors share many 
of the same background characteristics, but their perceptions of the political 
world are dissimilar. White councilors generally see the political landscape in 
neutral terms where all lawmakers, regardless of race, have an equal opportunity 
to participate in the legislative process. Although many black councilors agree 
with this view (perhaps even a majority), a meaningful proportion of them do not. 
Thus, black councilors, as a group, are more inclined than whites to report 
discrimination and other racial barriers that detract from the quality of their 
legislative experience. In this section, I use bivariate crosstabulations to identify 
key factors that might influence the perceptions of the two groups and thereby 
account for the perceptual gap between them. 
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The literature generally shows that at-large electoral formats make it 
d ifficult for black cand idates to succeed when the black population is relatively 
small and racially polarized voting exists ( See generally, Jones 1 976; Welch 
1990; Zax 1990). Scholars, however, have not taken the next logical step by 
asking whether the electoral format affects the quality of black legislative life 
once black cand idates secure a place for themselves on the council. In Chapter 
Two, I pred icted that this independent variable would play a critical role shaping 
the black councilors' perceptions and that it is associated with a positive 
legislative experience. Blacks who succeed in at-large contests probably do so 
because they are able to cultivate the support of their city's white voters . I f  so, 
this means they have an agenda and leadership style that is amenable to whites. 
These ind ividuals may find it easier to build bridges with their white colleagues on 
the council, and they probably command more respect because the community 
as a whole has sanctioned their presence on the council. 
My data are consistent with this argument. Table 5 shows that black 
councilors elected at-large view their legislative experience more positively than 
those elected from wards. This trend is pervasive (all seven ind icators) and 
typically robust such that this independent variable seems to be more meaningful 
than the other ones I consider in this section. Black at-large councilors are more 
likely than black ward councilors to say black lawmakers exert "a lot" of influence 
(48.6% vs. 40.4%). They are much more likely to say race relations are either 
"excellent" or "good" (70.8% vs. 54.9%). A smaller proportion of them claim that 
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Table 5 
Black and White City Counci lors' Assessments of the Qual ity 
of Black Legislative Life by Electoral Format 
At-Large Ward 
Counci lors Councilors 
Assessment Black White Black White 
{N = 67) {N = 1 86) {N = 1 02) {N = 1 35) 
Black influence on the council 
A Lot 48.6% 55.5% 40.4%* 48.2% 
Some 43. 1 37.7 40.4 46.0 
Only a Little 5.6 6 .8 1 5.6 4.4 
None 2.8 0 3.7 1 .5 
Race relations on the council 
Excel lent 20.8%** 43.2% 1 0.8%*** 61 .4% 
Good 50.0 43.2 44. 1 32.9  
Fair 25.0 1 1 .5 35. 1 5.0 
Poor 4.2 2. 1 9.9 0.7 
Must work harder to gain respect 
Agree 69.0%*** 1 1 .5% 83.8%*** 1 1 .0% 
Disagree 31 .0 88.5 1 6.2 89.0 
Interacting with the mayor 
More Likely than Whites 38.6%*** 1 8.3% 1 0.3%*** 21 .5% 
As Likely as Whites 41 .4 72.0 57.0 69.6 
Less Likely than Whites 20.0 9.7 32.7 8.9 
Race influence leadership positions 
Yes 38.2%*** 1 7.0% 65.7%*** 1 7.2% 
No 61 .8 83.0 34.3 82.8 
Experience or observe discrimination 
Yes 23.6%*** 1 .6% 44.5%*** 3 .6% 
No 76.4 98.4 55.5 96.4 
Discrimination in committee assign. 
A Great Deal 9.5%*** 0% 1 7.2%*** 0.8% 
Some 1 9.0 4.6 31 .3  3. 1 
None at Al l 71 .4 95.4 51 .6 96.1  
Note. Numbers enclosed in parentheses are approximations and vary by item. 
*p < . 05. **p < .01 . ***p < . 001 (all tests two-tailed). 
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they must work harder than whites to gain respect (69% vs. 83.8% ). A 
significantly lower proportion of them say that race influences leadership 
positions (38.2% vs. 65.7%). And, they are less likely to report discrimination 
(23.6% VS. 44.5%). 
I t  is important to note that statistically significant differences remain 
between the black and white councilors regardless of whether they are elected 
at-large or from a ward. This suggests that the electoral format conditions the 
views of the black councilors, but it does not fully account for the perceptual gap 
between blacks and whites. I nterestingly, the electoral format variable seems to 
have little impact on the white respondents' perceptions. For them, it is only of 
consequence (opposite direction than expected) when I prompted them about the 
quality of race relations on the council. I could not identify an cogent argument 
that explains this unusual finding. 
The quality of black legislative life may also be a function of the racial 
composition of the lawmakers' districts (Hedge, Button, and Spear 1996). Here 
too, the argument is that black councilors who represent a predominantly white 
constituency enjoy greater support from whites on the council because they 
possess an amenable agenda and leadership style. Hence, the perceptual gap 
between black and white councilors should shrink or widen based on the racial 
composition of the respondent's constituency. Specifically, I expect that blacks 
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representing majority-white constituencies will have perceptions that closely 
resemble those of their white colleagues. 
As Table 6 demonstrates, the racial composition of the lawmaker's 
constituency is important. For six of the seven aspects of black leg islative l ife , 
blacks who represent a predominantly white constituency report a more positive 
experience than those who represent a majority-black constituency. Accordingly, 
black councilors who represent a majority-white constituency are less l ikely to 
experience or observe discrimination than blacks who represent a predominantly 
black constituency (25% vs. 33% ). They are less l ikely to report "a great deal" of 
committee assignment d iscrimination (3.6% vs. 1 8%). They are less l ikely to say 
race influences leadership positions (48 .9% vs. 60.6%). A h igher percentage of 
them say that blacks are more l ikely than whites to interact with the mayor 
(30 .4% vs. 21 . 8%). They are more incl ined to classify race relations as either 
"good" or "excellent" (66.7% vs. 57. 1 %). And, they are less l ikely to agree that 
blacks must work harder than whites to gain respect (72.3% vs. 80.5%). Despite 
these find ings, it is important to note that statistically significant d ifferences 
remain between blacks and whites regardless of their constituencies' racial 
composition .  Therefore, in the end , the racial composition of the lawmaker's 
constituency seems to modify the black councilors' perceptions, but it does not 
close the pronounced perceptual gap between the black and white respondents . 
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Table 6 
Black and White City Counci lors' Assessments of the Qual ity of Black 
Legislative Life by the Racial Composition of their Constituencies 
Majority White Majority Black 
Constituency Constituency 
Assessment Black White Black White 
(N = 43) (N = 222) (N = 1 03) (N = 36) 
Black influence on the council 
A Lot 45.8%* 50.4% 45.5% 69.4% 
Some 39.6 42.9 39.3 22.2 
Only a Little 8.3 6.2 1 2.5 8.3 
None 6.3 0.4 2.7 0 
Race relations on the council 
Excellent 1 8 .8%*** 51 . 1 % 1 1 .6%*** 62.2% 
Good 47.9 38.4 45.5 32.4 
Fair 22.9 8.7 34.8 5.4 
Poor 1 0.4 1 .7 8.0 0 
Work harder to gain respect 
Agree 72.3%*** 1 1 .0% 80.5%*** 1 1 .4% 
Disagree 27.7 89.0 1 9.5 88.6 
Interacting with the mayor 
More Likely than Whites 30.4%*** 1 8.0% 21 .8%* 27.0% 
As Likely as Whites 43.5 72.5 50.0 64.9 
Less Likely than Whites 26. 1  9.5 28.2 8. 1 
Race influences leadership positions 
Yes 48.9%*** 1 5.3% 60.6%*** 21 .9% 
No 51 . 1  84.7 39.4 78. 1 
Experience or observe discrimination 
Yes 25.0%*** 2.2% 33.0%** 5.4% 
No 75.0 97.8 67.0 94.6 
Discrimination in committee assign. 
A Great Deal 3.6%*** 0.5% 1 8.0%** 0% 
Some 35.7 3.4 1 8.0 6 . 1  
None at All 60.7 96. 1  63.9 93.9 
Note. Numbers enclosed in parentheses are approximations and vary by item. 
*p < .05. **p < .01 . ***p < .001 (al l  tests two-tailed). 
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Based on research pertaining to blacks and other disadvantaged groups 
(Barrett 1997; Button and Hedge 1996; Kanter 1977; Thomas 1991 ), I assume 
- that the rate at which blacks are represented in legislative bodies affects the 
quality of their experiences. As Button and Hedge (1996: 213) explain, there is 
a point at which black lawmakers "reach a critical mass or threshold beyond 
which minority political influence will increase and discrimination will decrease." 
For my analysis, it is probably unwise to use the proportion of black councilors as 
the independent variable since that percentage can be quite large on small 
councils even when there is only one black serving. As an alternative, I use the 
number of black councilors as the independent variable, and I compare councils 
with only one black member to those with two or more black members. In the 
latter situation, black councilors are less politically isolated and they probably 
wield more power by casting their votes as a bloc. 
Table 7 demonstrates that the racial composition of the legislative body 
matters. Blacks who serve on a council with at least one other black colleague 
tend to report a more positive experience than solitary black councilors. In many 
instances, this pattern is also evident in the responses of the white councilors 
who acknowledge that blacks enjoy a better experience when multiple blacks are 
serving. Thus, the perceptual gap is apparently affected by the racial 
composition of the council although statistically significant differences persist 
between blacks and whites. 
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Table 7 
Black and White City Councilors' Assessments of the Qual ity of Black 
Legislative Life by the Racial Composition of the City Council 
One Black Two or More 
Member Black Members 
Assessment Black White Black White 
(N = 45) (N = 90) (N = 151)  (N = 234) 
Black influence on the council 
A Lot 36.7%* 24.2% 45.5%*** 63.3% 
Some 36.7 61 . 1  41 .8 33 .3 
Only a Little 20.4 1 3.7 1 0.3 3.0 
None 6 . 1  1 . 1 2.4 0.4 
Race relations on the council 
Excellent 8.2%*** 52.6% 1 6.9%*** 50.6% 
Good 53. 1 39.2 44.6 38.5 
Fair 26.5 7.2 31 .9 9.2 
Poor 1 2.2 1 .0 6.6 1 .7 
Must work harder to gain respect 
Agree 88.0%*** 1 9. 1 %  73.3%*** 8.4% 
Disagree 1 2.0 80.9 26.7 91 .6 
Interacting with the mayor 
More Likely than Whites 22.4%** 1 3.7% 23.8%*** 21 .7% 
As Likely as Whites 51 .0  75.8 49.4 69. 1 
Less Likely than Whites 26.5  1 0.5 26.9 9. 1 
Race influences leadership positions 
Yes 6 1 .7%*** 1 1 . 1 %  53.9%*** 1 9. 1 %  
No 38.3 88.9 46 . 1  80.9 
Experience or observe discrimination 
Yes 30.6%*** 2.0% 35.2%*** 2.6% 
No 69.4 98.0 64.8 97.4 
Discrimination in committee assign. 
A Great Deal 1 0.0%*** 1 .3% 1 5.6%*** 0% 
Some 40.0 5.3 24.0 3.5 
None at All 50.0 93.4 60.4 96 .5 
Note. Numbers enclosed in parentheses are approximations and vary by item. 
*p < .05. **p < .01 . ***p < .001 (all tests two-tailed). 
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Judging by the data suppl ied by the black respondents , th is pattern clearly 
holds true for three of the seven indicators-whether blacks must work harder to 
gain respect, whether race influences leadership positions, and especially for the 
amount of influence that blacks maintain on the counci l .  Two other indicators 
point toward this same conclusion, but the patterns are less pronounced. First, 
black respondents who serve with another black col league are more l ikely say 
race relations are "excellent," and less l ikely to classify them as "poor'' than black 
councilors who serve in isolation . Even so, this trend is reversed for the "good" 
and ''fa ir'' categories. Second, black counci lors who serve with at least one other 
black col league are less inclined to report discrimination in the awarding of 
committee assignments than blacks who serve alone. But a slightly higher 
proportion of them say there is a "great deal" of committee assignment 
discrimination compared to sol itary black councilors (1 5.6% vs. 1 0.0%). 
I nterestingly, two other items do not fit th is general pattern. The racial 
composition of the council seems to have no effect on the l ikelihood of black 
councilors meeting with the mayor compared to white counci lors (See Table 7 . ) . 
This seems to imply that the racial composition of the council only influences 
things that occur within the council itself, not in the broader political environment. 
The · other item that breaks with the general trend is the one dealing broadly with 
discrimination .  Here, solitary black councilors are less l ikely to observe or 
experience discrimination than black councilors who have at least one black 
colleague on their council .  The most l ikely explanation for this is that the 
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presence of mu ltiple black councilors, by virtue of their larger number, gave 
respondents more opportunities to witness discrimination being directed against 
others. 
Next, I examine whether the size of the municipality's black population 
affects the quality of the black councilors' experiences. My assu mption is that 
black councilors will be more satisfied and successful if they serve in a city with a 
large black popu lation. I n  these places, white councilors will have more black 
constituents who vote on their tenure. Thus, the black community, especially 
when mobilized, can influence which whites are elected and how they behave 
once they are in office. The literature does not explicitly make this connection, 
bu t it points in this direction. For example, Browning, Marshall, and Tabb's 
(1984) seminal work indicates that a mobilized black community is one key factor 
that leads to the political incorporation of ethnic minorities. 
As Table 8 shows, the size of the black community is important for certain 
aspects of black leg islative l ife. According to both black and white respondents, 
black councilors serving in cities with large black popu lations have greater 
influence and are more likely to interact with the mayor. Similarly, black 
councilors from communities with large or medium-sized black populations 
perceive less discrimination (in general, and probably in the awarding of 
committee assignments) than those from cities with small black populations. 
This pattern, however, is not definitive for the remaining indicators and it is 
reversed for the item regarding leadership positions on the council. Hence, for 
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Table 8 
Black and White City Counci lors' Assessments of the Qual ity of Black 
Legislative Life· by the Proportion of the City's Population that is Black 
Proportion of the City's Population that is Black 
Small Medium Large 
0 to 25% 26 to 50% 51 to 1 00% 
Assessment Black White Black White Black White 
(N=46) (N=99) (N=86) (N=1 51 ) {N=62) (N=58) 
Black influence on council 
A Lot 28.6% 33.0% 43.6%* 57.4% 56. 1 %  65.0% 
Some 51 .0 55.0 39.4 37.4 33.3 31 .7 
Only a Little 1 4.3 1 1 .0 1 3.8 4.5 9.1 3.3 
None 6.1 1 .0 3.2 0.6 1 .5 0 
Race relations on the council 
Excellent 1 8.4%*** 53.9% 1 3.7%*** 51 .6% 1 3.6%*** 47.5% 
Good 40.8 37.3 46.3 38. 1  51 .5 39.3 
Fair 26.5 7.8 33.7 8.4 30.3 1 1 .5 
Poor 1 4.3 1 .0 6.3 1 .9 4.5 1 .6 
Work haroer to gain respect 
Agree 72.9%*** 1 3.9% 76.8%*** 1 1 . 1 % 77.6%*** 1 1 .7% 
Disagree 27.1 86.1 23.2 88.9 22.4 88.3 
Interacting with the mayor 
More Likely than Whites 1 7.0%*** 14.3% 21 .5%*** 1 8.2% 31 .3 32.1  
As Likely as Whites 46.8 77.6 50.5 72.7 51 .6 53.6 
Less Likely than Whites 36.2 8.2 28.0 9. 1 1 7.2 14.3 
Race influences leadership 
positions 
Yes 51 . 1 %*** 1 2.2% 55.2%*** 1 4.0% 58. 1 %** 30.4% 
No 48.9 87.8 44.8 86.0 41 .9 69.6 
Experience/observe discrim. 
Yes 40.8%*** 2.9% 31 .9%*** 0% 31 .3%*** 5.0% 
No 59.2 97.1 68. 1  1 00 68.7 95.0 
Committee assign. discrim. 
A Great Deal 1 2.9%*** 0% 1 0.9%*** 0.7% 1 5.6%*** 0% 
Some 35.5 4.4 34.8 3.6 1 7.8 3.6 
None at All 51 .6 95.6 54.3 95.7 66.7 96.4 
Note. Numbers enclosed in parentheses are approximations and vary by item. 
*p < .05. **p < .01 . ***p < .001 (all tests two-tai led). 
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certain items, the black community's size influences how extensive the 
perceptual gap is between the black and white respondents. 
Gender may also cond ition the respondents' perceptions. Some scholars 
have argued that black female lawmakers may be disadvantaged once by virtue 
of their race and once by virtue of their gender (Button and Hedge 1996; Darcy 
and Hadley 1988). Hence, I anticipate that black female councilors will be more 
apt to report d iscrimination and have a more pessimistic outlook than black 
males. 
My results lend only partial support for my assumption _(See Table 9. ). 
Black female councilors are much more likely than black male councilors to 
report d iscrimination in the awarding of committee assignments. Furthermore, 
they are slightly more likely to experience or observe d iscrimination and say race 
relations on their council are "poor." Nevertheless, there is hardly any d ifference 
between how black male and female councilors perceive black influence on their 
counci l  and whether race influences one's abi l ity to obtain leadership positions. 
For the two remaining items (respect, and interacting with the mayor), the 
relationship is in the opposite d irection. Major d ifferences also persist between 
black and white respondents even when gender is held constant. Simply put, 
gender only accounts for some of the perceptual gap between the black and 
white councilors and only for a few aspects of black legislative life. 
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Table 9 
Black and White City Councilors' Assessments of the 
Qual ity of Black Legislative Life by Gender 
Men Women 
Assessment Black White Black 
(N =139) {N = 251 )  (N  = 56) 
Black influence on the council 
A Lot 43.4%** 53. 1 %  42.6% 
Some 40.8 41 . 1  41 .0 
Only a Little 1 2.5 5.4 1 3. 1  
None 3.3 0.4 3.3 
Race relations on the council 
Excellent 1 4.5%*** 50.4% 16 . 1 %*** 
Good 48.0 39.6 41 .9  
Fair 32.2 8. 1 27.4 
Poor 5.3 1 .9 1 4.5 
Must work harder to gain respect 
Agree 78.3%*** 8.7% 72.6%*** 
Disagree 21 .7 91 .3  27.4 
Interacting with the mayor 
More Likely than Whites 20. 1 %*** 20.0% 30.5%** 
As Likely as Whites 53.7 71 .2 40.7 
Less Likely than Whites 26.2 8.8 28.8 
Race influ. leadership positions 
Yes 56.6%*** 1 5.7% 54.4%*** 
No 43.4 84.3 45.6 
Experience/observe discrimination 
Yes 32.9%*** 2.7% 37.7%*** 
No 67. 1  97.3 62.3 
Discrimination in committee assign. 
A Great Deal 1 1 . 1 %*** 0% 20.5%*** 
Some 24.7 3.4 34. 1  
None at All 64.2 96.6 45.5 
Note. Numbers enclosed in parentheses are approximations and vary by item. 
*p < .05. **p < .01 . ***p < .001 (all tests two-tailed). 
1 05 
White 
(N = 67) 
51 .5% 
38.2 
8 .8 
1 .5 
52.9% 
35.7 
1 1 .4 
0 
1 9 .7% 
80.3 
1 8.8% 
69.6 
1 1 .6 
22.7% 
77.3 
1 .4% 
98.6 
1 .6% 
6.3 
92. 1 
At the outset, I assumed geographic region would be important and that 
black councilors serving in the South ( especially in the Deep South) would 
encounter more racial obstacles. Moreover, I expected that the perceptual 
disparities between black and white councilors would be the widest in the Deep 
South because of that region's history of racial strife. My data did not support my 
assumptions. Table 10 shows statistically significant differences between the 
black and white councilors, but these differences transcend all three geographic 
regions. 
White councilors have remarkably similar perceptions regardless of 
region. The black councilors perceptions differ from region-to-region, but no 
clear pattern equates the South with a lower quality of black legislative life. The 
only item consistent with this assumption is the one asking whether a councilor's 
race influences his or . her ability to obtain leadership positions. Here, black 
councilors from the Deep South and Rim South are more likely to answer 
affirmatively than those from the Non-South. Black councilors from the Deep 
South are also more likely to report a "great deal" of discrimination in the 
awarding of committee assignments. However, this evidence is not as powerful 
because a higher percentage of blacks from the Non-South reported more 
committee discrimination than those from the Rim South. 
Contrary to my initial assumption, there are several instances where black 
councilors from the Non-South report a poorer experience than those from the 
two southern regions. First, a larger proportion of blacks from the Non-South 
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Table 1 0  
Black and White City Counci lors' Assessments of the 
Qual ity of Black Legislative Life by Region 
Region 
Deep South Rim South Non-South 
Assessment Black White Black White Black White 
(N=78) (N=1 04) (N=61 ) (N=1 1 6) (N=58) (N=105) 
Black influence on council 
A Lot 41 .2%* 57.4% 43.3% 54.3% 46.8% 44.4% 
Some 41 .2 36. 1  43.3 41 .4 37. 1 46.3 
Only a Little 1 4. 1  5.6 1 0.4 3.4 1 2 .9 9.3 
None 3.5 0.9 3.0 0.9 3.2 0 
Race relations on council 
Excellent 1 4.0%*** 55. 1 %  1 7.9%*** 49.2% 12.9%*** 49.5% 
Good 45.3 38.3 53.7 38.3 40.3 39.4 
Fair 32.6 3.7 26.9 12 .5 32.3 9.2 
Poor 8.1 2.8 1 .5 0 1 4.5 1 .8 
Work harder for respect 
Agree 77.0%*** 1 1 . 1 %  77.3%*** 7.8% 75.8%*** 1 5.9% 
Disagree 23.0 88.9 22.7 92.2 24.2 84. 1  
Interacting with the mayor 
More Likely than Whites 24.7%* 1 9.4% 1 8.8%* 1 9.0% 26.7%*** 1 9.8% 
As Likely as Whites 48.2 68.0 57.8 71 .6 43.3 73.6 
Less Likely than Whites 27. 1  12.6 23.4 9.5 30.0 6.6 
Race influ. leadership posit. 
Yes 63.3%*** 1 5.5% 58. 1 %*** 16 .7% 43.3%** 18 .4% 
No 36.7 84.5 41 .9 83.3 56.7 81 .6 
Experience or observe 
discrimination 
Yes 32.9%*** 0% 29 .9%*** 4.2% 40.3%*** 2.8% 
No 67.1 100 70.1 95.8 59.7 97.2 
Discrimination in committee 
assignments. 
A Great Deal 1 9.6%*** 1 . 1 %  9.4%*** 0% 1 2.5%*** 0% 
Some 23.9 5.5 28. 1  2.7 31 .3 4.0 
None at All 56.5 93.4 62.5 97.3 56.3 96.0 
Note. Numbers enclosed in parentheses are approximations and vary by item. 
*p < .05. **p < .01 . ***p < .001 (all tests two-tailed). 
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(14 .5%) say that race relations are "poor'' in comparison to the respondents from 
the other regions (8.1 % for the Deep South, and 1.5% for the Rim South). 
Second, and perhaps more importantly, black councilors from the Non-South are 
more l ikely to experience or observe racial discrimination. I n  the end, the results 
provide no compell ing evidence that black councilors from any particular region 
have a more positive experience. 
I also attempted to l ink the type of city government to the quality of black 
legislative l ife. The l iterature provides l ittle guidance al though one authoritative 
work argues that the mayor-council format favors minority lawmakers by 
increasing the l ikel ihood that they will be incorporated into the council's dominant 
decision-making coalition (Browning, Marshal l ,  and Tabb 1984). These scholars 
also point out that the mayor-council format benefits minority councilors by 
increasing their individual power, which would also seem to improve their 
experience. 
Table 11 shows that a city's governmental format is of little consequence 
to the black legislative experience. The white councilors' views are remarkably 
similar regardless of their city's governmental format. Likewise, only minor 
differences distinguish the perceptions of black councilors hailing from mayor­
council cities and those from council -manager cities. A closer look at these 
differences shows that black respondents from council-manager cities are slightly 
more positive in. their assessment of race relations, interacting with the mayor, 
and discrimination (both indicators). In  contrast, only two indicators (must work 
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Table 1 1  
Black and White City Counci lors' Assessments of the Quality of 
Black Legislative Life by Governmental Format 
Mayor-Council Council-Manager 
Assessment Black White Black White 
(N = 91)  (N  = 1 72) (N = 74) (N = 120) 
Black influence on the council 
A Lot 43.4%* 52.8% 43.0% 
Some 40.4 41 .5  43.0 
Only a Little 1 2. 1  5 . 1  1 1 .4 
None 4.0 0.6 2.5 
Race relations on the council 
Excellent 1 6.2%*** 49.7% 1 5.0%*** 
Good 40.4 42.4 50.0 
Fair 31 .3 6 .8 31 . 3  
Poor 1 2. 1  1 . 1 3.8 
Must work harder to gain respect 
Agree 75.0%*** 1 1 .4% 82.3%*** 
Disagree 25.0 88.6  1 7.7 
Interacting with the mayor 
More Likely than Whites 22.7%*** 20.0% 20.8%* 
As Likely as Whites 45.4 72.9 53.2 
Less Likely than Whites 32.0 7. 1 26.0 
Race influences leadership positions 
Yes 52. 1 %*** 1 6. 1 %  58.4%*** 
No 47.9 83.9 41 .6 
Experience or observe discrimination 
Yes 38.0%*** 2.9% 32.9%*** 
No 62.0 91 .7 67. 1 
Discrimination in committee assign. 
A Great Deal 1 3.8%*** 0% 1 2.2%*** 
Some 29.3 4.2 22.4 
None at AH 56.9 95.8 65.3 
Note. Numbers enclosed in parentheses are approximations and vary by item. 
*p < .05. **p < .01 . ***p < . 001 (all tests two-tailed). 
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52.4% 
39.5 
7.3 
0.8 
52.4% 
32.5 
1 3.5 
1 .6 
9.7% 
90.3 
1 7. 1 %  
71 .5 
1 1 .4 
1 8.0% 
82.0 
2.4% 
97.6 
0% 
2.8 
97.2 
harder to gain respect, and race influences leadership positions) seem to favor 
the mayor-council format, but these differences were trivial as well. I n  short, 
governmental format does not seem to matter much and it is of little use 
explaining the perceptual gap between the black and white councilors. 
Students of local politics generally believe that city size is an important 
variable to consider although nobody has established an empirical or theoretical 
connection between it and the quality of black legislative life. Therefore, in the 
absence scholarly guidance, I analyzed the variable because researchers 
generally find it to be important. As with my other independent variables, there 
are statistically significant differences between black and white councilors for 
almost every item. 
No clear pattern helps explain the perceptual gap between the two groups 
of lawmakers (See Table 12.). Three of the seven indicators suggested that 
black councilors from large cities enjoy a more positive experience in terms of 
their overal l influence, . interacting with the mayor, and leadership positions. I n  
contrast, data supplied by just the black respondents shows that council race 
relations are better in small and mid-sized communities. The items dealing with 
discrimination are also inconsistent. Black councilors from large cities are more 
likely than blacks serving in small or medium-sized cities to report they have 
either experienced or observed discrimination. But the opposite is true of 
discrimination narrowly pertaining to committee assignments. In  short, my 
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Table 12  
Black and White City Councilors' Assessments of the 
Qual ity of Black Legislative Life by City Size 
City Size 
Small Medium Large 
0 to 14,999 1 5,000 to 89,999 90,000+ 
Assessment Black White Black White Black White 
(N=1 1 1 ) (N=1 30) (N=54) (N=1 1 4) (N=34) (N=80) 
Black influence on council 
A Lot 45. 1 %* 51 .5% 36.8% 42.0% 48.6% 67.9% 
Some 37.7 43.2 43.9 46.2 45.7 30.9 
Only a Little 1 3 . 1  3.8 1 5.8 1 1 .8 5.7 1 .2 
None 4.1 1 .5 3.5 0 0 0 
Race relations on council 
Excellent 1 6.3%*** 56.3% 1 2.3%*** 52. 1 %  1 4.3%** 41 .5% 
Good 47.2 37.0 49. 1  37.0 40.0 43.9 
Fair 29.3 5.2 31 .6 9.2 34.3 1 3.4 
Poor 7.3 1 .5 7.0 1 .7 1 1 .4 1 .2 
Work harder to gain respect 
Agree 74.0%*** 1 3.5% 78.9%*** 1 1 .0% 82.9%*** 8.8% 
Disagree 26.0 86.5 21 . 1  89.0 1 7.1  91 .3 
Interacting with the mayor 
More Likely than Whites 25.8%** 1 6.8% 1 0.7%** 1 6 .4% 36.4%*** 28.2% 
As Likely as Whites 50.0 72.5 57. 1  71 .6 36.4 67.9 
Less Likely than Whites 24.2 1 0.7 32. 1  1 2. 1  27.3 3.8 
Race influences leadership 
positions 
Yes 55.9%*** 1 6.7% 60.7%*** 1 3 .3% 47. 1 %** 22.2% 
No 44.1  83.3 39.3 86.7 52.9 77.8 
Experience or observe 
discrimination 
Yes 27.6%*** 2.2% 39.3%*** 0% 48.6%*** 6.2% 
No 72.4 97.8 60.7 1 00 51 .4 93.8 
Committee assign. Discrim. 
A Great Deal 1 7 .2%*** 0.8% 1 5.0%*** 0% 7 . 1 %** 0% 
Some 29.3 4.1  32.5 5. 1 1 7.9 2.5 
None at All 53.4 95. 1  52.5 94.9 75.0 97.5 
Note. Numbers enclosed in parentheses are approximations and vary by item . 
*p < .05. **p < .01 . ***p < .001 (all tests two-tailed). 
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findings for city size are mixed. This incoherent pattern makes it difficult for me 
to formulate a logical explanation for what is occurring. 
Finally, I consider the partisan nature of the council (partisan vs. non­
partisan) as a potential explanation for the perceptual gap between black and 
white councilors. Although the literature provides no guidance, I believe that this 
variable might be connected to the black legislative experience. Black councilors 
might thrive in a non-partisan environment because, in the absence of overt 
partisanship, there is probably less wrangling among the members. 
As Table 13 demonstrates, my data do not support my hypothesis. 
Statistically significant differences persist between the black and white 
respondents for almost all aspects of black legislative life. But the respondents' 
perceptions within their particular group are virtually the same regardless of 
whether their council is partisan or non-partisan. This is especially true for the 
white councilors (all seven indicators) and generally true for the black councilors 
(five of the seven indicators). For the black councilors, the only two exceptions 
are with race relations and committee discrimination. The former suggests that 
black legislative life is better in non-partisan councils while the latter favors 
partisan councils. Consequently, the partisan variable does not seem to be 
associated with the black legislative experience, and it does little to explain the 
perceptual gap between blacks and whites. 
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Table 13  
Black and White City Councilors' Assessments of the Qual ity 
of Black Legislative Life by Council Partisanship 
Partisan Non-Partisan 
Councils Councils 
Assessment Black White Black White 
(N = 42) (N = 71 ) (N = 92) (N = 167) 
Black influence on the council 
A Lot 40.9% 44.6% 43.6% 53.2% 
Some 45.5 50.0 38.6 38.6 
Only a Little 1 1 .4 5.4 1 2 .9 7.0 
None 2.3 0 5.0 1 .2 
Race relations on the council 
Excellent 1 3.0%*** 50.7% 1 5.8%*** 52.9% 
Good 37.0 43.8 51 .5 37.4 
Fair 39. 1  2.7 25.7 9.2 
Poor 1 0.9 2.7 6.9 0.6 
Must work harder to gain respect 
Agree 76. 1 %*** 1 2.5% 80.0%*** 9.8% 
Disagree 23.9 87.5 20.0 90.2 
Interacting with the mayor 
More Likely than Whites 20.5%* 23.9% 21 .4%*** 1 5.5% 
As Likely as Whites 52.3 69.0 53. 1  76.8 
Less Likely than Whites 27.3 7.0 25.5 7.7 
Race influence leadership positions 
Yes 53.3%*** 1 8.8% 55.2%*** 1 5.5% 
No 46.7 81 .2 44.8 84.5 
Experience or observe discrimination 
Yes 37 .0%*** 1 .4% 36 .0%*** 2 .9% 
No 63.0 98.6 64.0 97. 1  
Discrimination in committee assign. 
A Great Deal 14 .3%*** 0% 1 2.3%*** 0% 
Some 1 7 .9 4 .4 31 .6 5.2 
None at All 67.9 95.6 56. 1  94.8 
Note. Numbers enclosed in parentheses are approximations and vary by item. 
*p < . 05. **p < .01 . ***p < .001 (al l  tests two-tailed). 
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Entirely Black City Councils: An Afterthought 
I n  my survey of black city councilors, thirty-four respondents - (13.12% of my 
sample) serve on a council where all their colleagues are black. In the other 
sections of this manuscript, I excluded these individuals from my statistical 
analyses . because most items in my questionnaire focus on the nature of 
black/white race relations. However, in this section, I utilize this untapped 
resource ·to explore whether blacks who serve on all-black councils are different 
than those who serve on mixed-race councils. I begin by comparing the two 
groups in terms of their personal profiles and constituencies. Next, I examine 
whether they perceive their constituents' policy interests differently. Finally, I 
describe what issues seem to be most important to black citizens based on the 
perceptions of their representatives. 
The two sets of black councilors have remarkably similar profiles. I n  terms 
of age, both groups are in their mid to late fifties. Both groups have resided in 
their community for a considerable length of time (about 40 years for blacks 
serving on mixed-race councils and about 36 years for those serving on all-black 
councils). Both groups are well-educated since approximately 60% of each 
group has earned a college degree. Moreover, the two groups are 
indistinguishable in terms of their partisanship and ideology. Over 90% of each 
group are Democrats and both groups consider themselves to be ideological 
moderates. I n  fact, on a seven-point scale ranging from very liberal to very 
conservative, both groups have an almost identical score (4.1 vs. 4.0). Finally, 
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there is almost no difference between the two groups in terms of the economic 
wel l-being of their constituencies. The vast majority of both groups represent 
economical ly d isadvantaged constituencies where the average annual family 
income does not exceed $40,000. 
On the other hand , important d istinctions can be sti l l  be drawn between 
the two groups. B lack councilors from mixed-race counci ls are predominantly 
male (7 1 .2%), but those from al l-black counci ls are predominantly female 
(51 .5%). The two groups also differ in  terms of their seniority. Blacks from 
mixed-race councils have served for a slightly longer time (1 0.07 vs. 7 .71 years). 
They also represent very different constituencies. A much larger proportion of 
the black councilors from mixed-race councils serve in the South (7 1 .3%) than 
those serving on al l-black councils (52.9% ). They also serve in larger cities. 
Black councilors from mixed-race councils serve in cities where the average 
population is 72,688 (the med ian is 9,862), while those from al l-black councils 
serve in smaller communities where the average population is 4,404 (the median 
is 1 ,346). Not surprisingly, the percentage of black residents in the municipalities 
where the two groups serve is very different. On average, blacks serving on 
mixed-race councils reside in communities where 41 .36% of the total population 
is black. I n  contrast, black councilors serving on all-black councils hail from 
communities where 79.35% of the residents are black. 
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In light of these differences, a more interesting question is whether the two 
sets of councilors have divergent views as to what issues are important to their 
constituents. To explore this question, I relied on a series of items that asked the 
respondents to assess the importance of urban renewal, jobs, housing, public 
education, public assistance, and representation in office. The bivariate 
crosstabulations I present in Table 1 4  show there is virtually no distinction 
between how the two groups perceive their constituents' needs. Chi-square tests 
show that there is a statistically significant difference for only one of the seven 
dependent variables-urban renewal. This finding was unanticipated since 
councilors serving on all-black city councils tend to live in smaller communities 
than those serving on mixed-race councils. Perhaps this can be explained by the 
fact that municipalities with small populations can still be located in major 
metropolitan areas. Likewise, councilors from smaller, non-urban communities 
may have interpreted "urban renewal" as encompassing any type of community 
beautification project rather than those undertaken exclusively in urban settings. 
Comparisons between councilors from mixed-race councils and all-black 
councils are informative, but they are not without their limitations. The major 
drawback is that these comparisons ignore the fact that the proportion of blacks 
on mixed-race councils fluctuates greatly. In response, I ran additional 
crosstabulations where I divided the mixed-race councils by those where blacks 
hold a majority and those where blacks remain a minority. As Table 1 5  
demonstrates, this distinction does not have much effect on how the respondents 
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Table 14  
Issues Important to Black Citizens: Perceptions of Blacks Serving on 
Al l-Black Councils and Those Serving on Mixed-Race Councils 
Respondents From Respondents From 
Mixed-Race Councils Al l-Black Councils 
Assessment % N % N 
Urban renewal 
Very important 59.9* 1 1 8 82. 1  23 
Somewhat important 28.4 56 1 7.9 5 
Not very important 1 1 .7 23 0 0 
1 00% 1 97 1 00% 28 
Jobs & economic opportunities 
Very important 90.5 1 90 93. 1 27 
Somewhat important 5.7 1 2  6.9 2 
Not very important 3.8 8 0 0 
1 00% 21 0 1 00% 29 
Housing 
Very important 79.2 1 64 78.6 22 
Somewhat important 1 7.9 37 1 7.9 5 
Not very important 2.9 6 3.6 1 
1 00% 207 1 00% 28 
Public education 
Very important 84.0 1 73 86.2 25 
Somewhat important 1 3. 1  27 1 3.8 4 
Not Very important 2.9 6 0 0 
1 00% 206 1 00% 29 
Police accountability 
Very important 81 .3 1 69 86.2 25 
Somewhat important 1 3.9 29 1 3 .8 4 
Not very important 4.8 1 0  0 0 
1 00% 208 1 00% 29 
Public assistance 
Very important 53.9 1 1 0 67.9 1 9  
Somewhat important 36.3 74 28.6 8 
Not very important 9.8 20 3.6 1 
1 00% 204 1 00% 28 
Representation in office 
Very important 66.2 1 37 86.2 25 
Somewhat important 28.5 59 1 3.8 4 
Not very important 5.3 1 1  0 0 
1 00% 207 1 00% 29 
Note. *p < .05. **p < .01 . ***p < .001 (all tests two-tailed). 
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Table 1 5  
Issues Important to Black Citizens: Perceptions of Black Councilors 
By the Proportion of their Council that is Black 
Assessment 1 - 50% Black 51 - 99% Black 1 00% Blac,k 
(N = 1 50) (N = 56) (N = 29) 
Urban renewal 
Very important 58.0 64.8 82. 1  
Somewhat important 30. 1 24. 1 1 7.9 
Not very important 1 1 .9 1 1 . 1  0 
1 00% 1 00% 1 00% 
Jobs & economic opportunities 
Very important 89.6 92.9 93. 1 
Somewhat important 7. 1 1 .8 6.9 
Not very important 3.2 5.4 0 
1 00% 1 00% 1 00% 
Housing 
Very important 76.8 85.7 78.6 
Somewhat important 20.5 1 0.7 1 7.9 
Not very important 2.6 3.6 3.6 
1 00% 1 00% 1 00% 
Public education 
Very important 83.4 85.5 86 .2 
Somewhat important 1 3.9 1 0.9 1 3.8 
Not Very important 2.6 3.6 0 
1 00% 1 00% 1 00% 
Police accountability 
Very important 79.6 85.7 86.2 
Somewhat important 1 5.8 8.9 1 3.8 
Not very important 4.6 5.4 0 
1 00% 1 00% 1 00% 
Public assistance 
Very important 52.7 57. 1  67.9 
Somewhat important 37.8 32. 1  28.6 
Not very important 9.5 1 0.7 3.6 
1 00% 1 00% 1 00% 
Representation in office 
Very important 64.9 69.6 86 .2 
Somewhat important 29.8 25.0 1 3.8 
Not very important 5.3 5.4 0 
1 00% 1 00% 1 00% 
Note. Numbers enclosed in parentheses are approximations and vary by item. 
*p < .05. **p < .01 . ***p < .001 (al l  tests two-tailed). 
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assess their constituents' needs. Once again, chi-square tests show there are 
no statistica l ly significant differences between the black councilors assessments . 
The crosstabulations in Tables 14  and 1 5  show that the majority of black 
councilors, regardless of the proportion of blacks serving on their counci l , 
classify al l the aforementioned issues as being "very important" to their 
constituents. However, there is sti l l  enough differentiation in their responses to 
determine what issues matter most to black citizens. Jobs and economic 
opportunities are clearly take precedence over other issues since approximately 
90% of both groups of councilors say th is is "very important" to their constituents. 
This · is not surprising since jobs and economic opportunities can have a direct 
and immed iate effect on the wel l-being of black citizens. Education is also of 
high priority, but it sti l l  is not quite as important as jobs and economic 
opportunities. This probably is attributable to the fact that that the economic 
benefits delivered by education are less immediate than those del ivered by high­
paying jobs or helpfu l economic opportunities . Similarly housing is of great 
concern , but it is sti l l  not quite as critical as jobs and economic opportunities. 
This is, no doubt, attributable to the fact that the presence of high paying jobs wil l  
assist black citizens in  finding better housing. I n  short, black councilors seem to 
bel ieve that jobs and economic opportun ities are the key to the wel l-being of thei r  
constituents. 
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Interestingly, blacks serving on mixed-race councils are less likely to say 
that representation in public office is as important to their constituents as some of 
the other issues. This was unexpected since the literature suggests that most 
civil rights activists believe that descriptive representation is the key to black 
empowerment and substantive representation. One possible explanation is that 
the black councilors feel that, by virtue of their presence on the council, their 
constituents already have descriptive representation. They may also realize that 
additional gains in descriptive representation are unlikely given racial 
composition of their cities,  past efforts to increase black representation, and the 
racial climate within their community. However, this argument is undermined by 
the fact that 86.2% of the black councilors from all-black councils say that 
representation in public office is "very important." 
A rival explanation can be derived from the from black economic 
empowerment literature. Empowerment theorists believe that the key to 
achieving parity with whites is the development the black community's economic 
resources. The idea is that "Black capitalists, entrepreneurs, and consumers 
must develop a group consciousness with respect to economic development; the 
black dollar has to stay in the black community longer than it presently does 
(Hanks 1987: 158). Thus, an economically healthy black community can do 
more for itself and can make more gains than the those that are realized through 
black representation in public office. As Hanks explains (1987: 158), "Although 
there is a role for government in the black economic facilitation process, there is 
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a growing consensus that the ultimate answer to black economic inequality must 
come within  the black community. "  Therefore, black councilors may prioritize the 
economic well-being of their constituents not only because it helps them get 
reelected , but also because they subscribe to this view of black empowerment. 
Discussion 
My resu lts show that black and white city councilors have similar backgrounds 
and personal profiles . Both groups are similar in age, have deep roots in their 
community, and have served on the council for about the same length of time. A 
significant proportion of both groups are well-educated and , surprisingly enough, 
they both fall in the moderate range on the pol itical spectrum (although black 
counci lors are stil l more l iberal than their white colleagues). These commonalties 
are important because they are l ikely to be a basis for cooperation between the 
two groups . 
Despite this potential for bridge-building, fundamental d ifferences sti l l  
remain between the two groups that are l ikely to be sources of friction. The two 
groups are markedly d ifferent in their party affiliations, although this probably 
matters less in the local context where many jurisdictions no longer use 
partisanship as a mechanism for organizing their councils. More importantly, the 
two groups represent vastly d ifferent constituencies that almost certainly have 
d ifferent needs. The black councilors tend to represent economically 
d isadvantaged d istricts with large black populations, while white councilors' 
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districts tend to be more affluent with large white populations. It is therefore easy 
to conceive of situations where the two sets of councilors might come into conflict 
over how and where to spend their municipality's limited resources. The "where" 
is particularly important in local race politics because black communities usually 
live in a geographically confined area within their municipality rather than being 
dispersed throughout it (Harrigan and Vogel 2000). Indeed, this argument is 
supported by some of the open-ended responses provided by the black 
councilors. One respondent , for example , commented that his white colleagues 
sometimes grumbled when municipal funds were expended in the black 
community and sarcastically asked, "Who pays the most taxes?" Another black 
councilor indicated that his white colleagues disregarded the most urgent needs 
(apparently in the predominantly black ward) when deciding how to dispense city 
services. 
The two groups also have strikingly different views about the quality of 
black legislative life . Wh ite councilors overwhelmingly say that their black 
colleagues' experiences are positive and, only on rare occasions, do they identify 
discrimination or report that race relations are impaired. These sentiments 
extend to all aspects of black legislative life and they appear consistently in the 
"additional comments section" located at the very end of my questionnaires. In 
this open forum, the main theme expressed by the white respondents is that their 
council operates in a race-neutral manner where no invidious barriers encumber 
their black colleagues' ability to participate in the legislative process. Granted, 
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many black councilors concur with th is assessment (perhaps even a majority), 
but statistical ly sign ificant d ifferences stil l  remain between the two groups of 
councilors. Blacks tend to be more pessimistic than whites about their legislative 
experience, and they are more l ikely identify racial barriers. The survey item on 
discrimination is ind icative of this contrast, as 34.4% of the black respondents 
compared to only 2.4% of the wh ite respondents reported instances of 
discrimination (See Table 5. ). 
These find ings beg the question : who is right? Unfortunately, there is no 
way of knowing which groups' perceptions come the closest to the actual 
cond itions that exist within  local legislative bodies. Although objective measures 
would be informative, the perceptions of the two groups should not be d iscounted 
simply because they are perceptions. Councilors operate in an environment with 
l imited and imperfect information such that they must rely on their perceptions 
when decid ing how to behave. My data are important because they suggest that 
black and white councilors view the world through very d ifferent lenses and they 
may not completely understand each other. These perceptual d ifferences could 
have far-reaching impl ications for how city councils handle racial issues. Whites 
may be less wil l ing to accommodate the needs of black citizens because they 
seem to be less sensitive and aware of the perceived obstacles that ethnic 
minorities face. 
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A related question, but perhaps a better one to ask is: why are the two 
groups' perceptions so d ivergent? One argument is supplied by Edward E. 
Banfield in The Unheavenly City, a controversial classic published a midst the 
racial tensions of the late 1960s. He argues that prejudice against African­
Americans has d iminished since World War I I  while other impediments (primarily 
socioeconomic ones) have increased. He explains that the typical African­
American does not appreciate these subtle changes, and "naturally, he 
concludes that the same old cause---"Whitey"-is still producing the same old 
effects" (p. 85). He goes on to write that: 
Negro leaders cannot be expected to explain that prejudice is no 
longer the obstacle. Even those of them who understand that it is 
not are bound to pretend otherwise. Like every specialist, the 
Negro leader is prone to magnify himself as well as to others the 
importance of his specialty, seeing every problem in terms of it. 
Even when he recognizes that the situation of most Negroes would 
not be fundamentally d ifferent even if there were no racial prejudice 
at all, the logic of his position as a leader prevents him from saying 
so. To acknowledge nonracial factors are more important than 
racial ones would cool the zeal of his supporters, give aid and 
comfort to the enemy, and destroy his very reason for being. So 
long as there is any racial prejud ice at work, the leader cannot risk 
seeming to tolerate it, as he would if he emphasized those other 
(nonracial) aspects of the situation which from a practical (but not a 
moral) standpoint are vastly more important. For the race leader, 
there is everything to gain and nothing to lose by treating all 
problems as if they derived solely from the racial one. 
Banfield's eloquently written argument falls short of explaining the 
perceptual gap between black and white councilors because it is based on three 
dubious assumptions. First, he assumes that black leaders raise racial issues 
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because doing so helps ensure their electoral success and political viabil ity. I n  
the context of my study, this assumption i s  without merit because I promised the 
respondents that I would not associate their name with the information they 
provided . Black respondents, therefore, gained nothing political ly by altering 
their responses so as to inflate the number and extent of the barriers they face. 
Second , Banfield assumes that black leaders' jobs are insecure and their 
constituents show no loyalty to incumbents. This point is also debatable. Carol 
Swain (1 993: 73), for example, writes: 
Electoral accountabil ity is so weak in some historically black 
d istricts that one black representative told me unabashedly: 'One 
of the advantages, and disadvantages, of representing blacks is 
their shameless loyalty to their incumbents . You can almost get 
away with raping babies and be forgiven. You don't have any_ 
vigi lance about your performance. 
Finally, Banfield assumes that black leaders, motivated by blatant self-interest, 
are wil l ing to compromise their personal integrity by purposely recharacterizing 
pol itical and social realities . This contention , as appl ied to city councilors ,  loses 
some of its force because the monetary benefits derived from that office are 
usually very small . My data show that 8 .2% of the black respondents receive no 
monetary compensation and the ones who do only receive an average salary of 
$8 ,91 5.94.  Thus, it is unl ikely that black councilors seek reelection for financial 
gain, so it would seem that the next l ikely motive behind their wil l ingness to serve 
is intangible psychological benefits . In  other words, they probably motivated by 
the sense of wel l-being that comes from helping constituents and participating in 
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community affairs ( See generally, Campbell et al. 1 960; King and Walker 1 992 ; 
Moe 1 980; Verba and Nie 1 972; Wilson 1 973). If psychological benefits are the 
motivation behind· their · service, it is unrealistic that black councilors would 
willingly encounter the psychological "low" that comes from providing 
disingenuous survey responses and being deceitful about social and political 
realities (i. e. ,  people feel bad when they lie). 
As for whites, Banfield contends that they too "find prejudice a peculiarly 
satisfying explanation for the troubles of the Negro" (p. 86). According to him, 
upper and middle class whites try to better society and assume moral blame for 
not doing enough to improve it. Thus, emphasizing racial barriers does little 
harm and probably does some good , so it is better "to err on the side of seeing 
more prejudice than is really there." (p. 86). This argument is simply not 
supported by my data. Very few white councilors report instances of 
discrimination and they generally adopt an extremely positive view of the black 
legislative experience . Therefore, if he is right and whites do inflate the extent of 
prejudice, then based on my results, there must be absolutely no prejudice 
whatsoever on American city councils. As most students of politics would admit, 
this formulation is not rooted in reality. 
In  contrast to Banfield's argument, my data show that race is the primary 
factor explaining the perceptual gap between the black and white councilors. I 
controlled other factors that might influence the councilors' perceptions, but even 
the most relevant variables only moderated the effect of race while not totally 
1 26 
accounting for it. The type of district that the respondents represent (at-large vs. 
wards) and the racial composition of a councilor's constituency (majority-white 
vs. majority-black) had the most discemable effect across all seven aspects of 
black legislative life. · The racial composition of the council, the racial composition 
of the city, and gender also conditioned the councilors' responses, but only for 
certain aspects of black legislative life. In contrast, other factors seemed to be of 
little or no consequence including geographic region, governmental format, city 
size, and the partisan nature of the council (partisan vs. nonpartisan). 
My data can also be used to evaluate the BEST and Lani Guinier's (1994) 
argument for why the theory fails. The BEST asserts that black lawmakers, by 
virtue of their personal experiences, have a better appreciation of the black 
community's needs and can translate this knowledge into minority-friendly 
policies. It predicts that black lawmakers will succeed because the institutional 
rules, the intimate legislative setting, and continuous voting opportunities 
promote accommodation rather than exclusion. Guinier, however, rejects the 
BEST because she believes that many white lawmakers are unwilling to act in 
good-faith and engage in a meaningful dialogue with their black counterparts. 
Therefore, she believes that many black lawmakers become token 
representatives because they operate in a hostile legislative environment where 
racial barriers preclude them from being effective. 
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Although my results do not specifically address the substantive 
representation issue, they do shed l ight on perceived racial barriers in local 
legislative bodies. Black councilors tend to have a more pessimistic outlook than 
whites, and they are more l ikely than whites to identify obstacles that encumber 
their progress. However, Guinier's argument is only valid for about one-third of 
the black respondents if the discrimination variable is used as the baseline for 
making this assessment. I t  would, therefore, be over-reaching to label al l black 
lawmakers as tokens, or to say that they are general ly marginal ized within 
legislative bodies. Indeed, a many black respondents report a positive 
experience and feel they are key players on their councils. Given this state of 
affairs, it would seem that the BEST is a viable strategy for accomplishing the 
minority community's objectives, but there are stil l municipalities where it will 
probably be ineffective due to the hostile legislative environment. 
Perhaps more troubling for the BEST is my finding that the quality of black 
legislative l ife (as reported by black councilors) is conditioned by the racial 
composition of the respondent's constituency and the type of district that the 
person represents (at-large vs. ward). That is, blacks elected from majority-black 
wards are more inclined to have a negative experience and encounter more 
barriers in the course of their service. The reason this is troubl ing is because the 
civil rights activists frequently lobby for the creation of majority-black wards to 
ensure black representation on city councils. I ronically, however, my 
crosstabulations suggest that the very strategy they use to achieve electoral 
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success increases the l ikel ihood that the victor from the predominantly black 
ward wil l be victimized once they are on the council .  
This criticism of majority-black districts i s  consistent with Carol Swain's 
(1 993) conclusion that so cal led "influence districts" are the best hope for the 
future in terms of black pol itical empowerment (although her argument is based 
on d ifferent reasoning). Influence districts, compared to majority-black districts , 
may be preferable because their representatives seem to have a more positive 
legislative experience. However, I do not mean th is to be an unequivocal 
endorsement of the influence district strategy, which too is flawed in several 
important respects . First, the exclusive use of influence districts as the primary 
vehicle for black empowerment d iscounts the value of descriptive representation 
and the legitimacy that it brings to the pol itical system. Second, lawmakers from 
influence d istricts may be less l ikely share the orig inal civil rights vision since 
they must appeal to white voters if they hope to be elected and reelected . 
Summary and Conclusion 
Black and white councilors have similar backgrounds and personal profiles, but 
there are sti l l  important differences that must be acknowledged. The two groups 
differ substantial ly in  their party identifications and their constituencies. They 
also see their pol itical world in very d ifferent terms. Whites generally 
characterize the black legislative experience in positive terms and they say there 
are few, if any, barriers that encumber black progress. Although many black 
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councilors agree and claim to be satisfied and successful, as a group, they still 
are more cynical about their standing and they are still more likely than whites to 
identify inequalities that detract from their legislative experience. Bivariate 
crosstabulations show that race is the primary factor explaining the perceptual 
gap between the black and white respondents. I controlled for a host of 
intervening variables (gender, region, city size, electoral format, and the racial 
composition of the councilor's constituency, council, and city); however, even 
these factors only moderated the effects of race. 
My findings have far reaching implications for black councilors and the 
constituents they represent. I t  is encouraging that black and white councilors 
have similar personal profiles because these commonalties could potentially 
serve as a basis for cooperation between the two groups. However, differences 
in their party affiliations and constituencies are potential sources of friction. For 
example, anecdotal evidence from my open-ended questions shows that 
tensions can arise when councils debate which ward will receive benefits that 
cannot be shared. The divergence between the two groups' perceptions is also 
troubling. I t  suggests that white councilors may not fully understand their black 
colleagues or appreciate their needs. I f  so, it follows that white councilors may 
not fully understand the needs of the black citizens who live in their community. 
This, of course, might result in indifference when the council is asked to consider 
issues that have a direct and substantial impact on their city's black community. 
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My findings also can be used to evaluate whether the BEST is a viable 
strategy for black pol itical empowerment. This strategy is based on the premise 
that black lawmakers have l ittle d ifficulty assimilating into legislative bod ies. My 
data generally support this view as most black councilors say they are satisfied 
and successfu l .  Even so, some of my findings reveal the BEST's l imitations. 
First, it is clear that a small proportion of the black respondents operate in a 
hostile environment where their white col leagues are unwil l ing to bargain in 
good-faith . In these places, it seems that Lani Guinier's view of the black 
legislative experience is more accurate and these councilors will probably have 
difficulty providing substantive benefits to their constituents. Second, my 
crosstabulations reveal that the racial composition of the respondent's 
constituency and the type of d istrict that the person represents (at-large vs. ward ) 
affects the councilors' leg islative experiences. Specifically, blacks who represent 
majority-black wards are more incl ined to report a negative experience and say 
they encounter more barriers. Thus, the lobbying for the creation of majority­
black wards may be counterproductive because the candidate who prevails is 
more l i kely to have a negative experience once they begin serving . 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
EXPLAIN ING THE BLACK COUNCILORS' PERCEPTIONS 
The Necessity of this Chapter 
Like any piece of research, the previous chapter has methodological 
shortcomings that detract from its utility. Perhaps the greatest limitation is my 
use of bivariate crosstabulations to explain the perceptual gap between the two 
sets of councilors. I selected this method for its descriptive value and its ability to 
demonstrate that race is the predominant factor explaining the perceptual gap 
between blacks and whites. However, these crosstabulations provided only a 
crude means of control and the time-consuming nature of their application 
prevented me from examining other independent variables that might be of 
importance (e.g., seniority, age, education, ideology, the mayor's race, and 
council size). In  this chapter, I remedy these shortcomings by using more 
sophisticated methodology. I also shift my focus to a slightly different issue so 
my analysis does not plow the same field twice. Instead of describing the quality 
of black legislative life or trying to explain the perceptual gap between blacks and 
whites, I account for the variance in the quality of black legislative life by looking 
only to the responses of the black councilors. I make no effort to explain the 
variance among the white councilors because little differentiation, if any, is found 
within their responses. I n  the end, this analysis provides a more comprehensive 
understanding of the black legislative experience in local politics. 
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Methodology 
I rely on d ichotomous logistic regression to explain the variance in the qual ity of 
black legislative life because rival techniques are incompatible with my data . 
First, traditional linear regression is inappropriate because many of my 
dependent variables are categorical .  I n  some instances, it  is technically possible 
for me to apply OLS regression to my ordinal dependent variables. However, I 
decided against this because they are not normally distributed , and changing 
their functional form via logging or cubing does not remedy this problem. 
Second , log istic regression is more useful than crosstabulations because it is 
better-suited for continuous independent variables ; it provides a more 
sophisticated means of control ; and it generates helpfu l summary statistics . As 
one scholar put it, legit analysis "provides a global test for the significance of a 
given predictor control ling for all other predictors in the model , as wel l  as a test 
for the significance of a set of predictors, controlling for other effects" (Demaris 
1 992 : 1 ) . 
Researchers commonly apply logistic regression to qualitative data where 
the dependent variable is dichotomous. Here, the variable's value is not 
intrinsically interesting since the researcher assigned it as a matter of 
convenience. However, as Scott Menard (2002: 1 2) notes, "What is interesting 
is whether the classification of cases into one or the other of the categories of the 
dependent variable can be predicted by the independent variable ." Furthermore, 
he explains, " Instead of trying to predict the arbitrary value associated with a 
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category, it may be useful to reconceptualize the problem as an attempt to 
predict the probability that the case will be classified into one as opposed to the 
other of the two categories of the dependent variable (2002: 12). In short, logistic 
regression has more to do with probability and odds ratios than identifying a 
linear relationship between the variables. 
I also utilize "robust" or "heteroskedasticity-corrected" standard errors in 
conjunction with my logit analysis. Social scientists are relying on this procedure 
with greater frequency because they have realized that it is helpful when working 
with clustered data. For instance, psychologists sometimes employ this 
technique when their subjects are nested within a larger group or entity such as a 
family, school, class, firm, worksite, clinic, or community (Gibbons and Hedeker 
1994; Norton et al. 1996). Although robust standard errors are relatively new to 
political science, their use has become more prevalent as more practitioners 
become aware of their benefits. For instance, political scientists have used them 
to account for state-specific factors that affect how individuals vote (Carsey and 
Wright 1998), nation-specific factors that influence homicide rates (Neumayer 
2003), and case-specific factors when analyzing judicial decisions (Brenner and 
Heberlig 2002). 
The impetus behind robust standard errors is that clusters have unique 
attributes that either defy quantification or are unknown to the researcher. As a 
result, researchers are unable to control for these variables by incorporating 
them into their statistical models . Unfortunately, the id iosyncratic nature of these 
1 34 
variables means that the observations within a cluster are correlated rather than 
being independent. Normal . standard errors ignore these correlations and 
wrongly assume that the observations are from unrelated ind ividuals. The l ikely 
result is inefficient coefficients (Brenner and Heberl ig 2002) and "overly 
optimistic" standard errors (Gibbons and Hedeker 1 994: 286). The robust 
· standard errors technique corrects th is problem by "treat[ing] each cluster as a 
'super-observation' ,  considering first variability with in each cluster and then 
summing across clusters for the final adjustment" (Zorn 2003: 3) .  I n  the end, 
researchers who fai l  to take clusters into account increase the l ikel ihood that they 
will commit a Type I error by rejecting a true nul l  hypothesis (Norton et al .  1 996). 
Robust standard errors are appropriate for my research because my 
observations seem to be correlated . The strongest evidence of clustering is that 
multiple respondents sometimes serve on the same city counci l .  This problem 
affects 22 respondents who serve in 1 1  d ifferent municipalities. Likewise , many 
of my cities are in close geographic proximity to each other such that their 
councilors are probably exposed to the same environmental cond itions. By using 
robust standard errors in response to this problem, I am less l ikely to over or 
under-represent the information contained in my data and I will probably have 
more accurate parameter estimates (Zorn 2003: 3). 
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My Primary Models 
The models I present in subsection are superior to rival formulations and best 
account for the variance in the black councilors' perceptions. These models are 
especially attractive because they strongly predict how the dependent variable is 
classified. I n  fact, all four models successfully predict the dependent variable 
over 80% of the time, and their predictive power is a considerable improvement 
over the computer's guess based solely on the modal category (See Table 16. ). 
Unfortunately, my goodness of fit measure yields less satisfying results. The 
Wald Chi-Square is only significant for one of the four models (Personally 
Experienced Discrimination) and approaches significance in another ( I nteracting 
with the Mayor). This probably occurs because municipal governments differ 
considerably; a large number of independent variables are relevant; and I omitted 
some of these variables to avoid multicolinearity problems. Although my 
goodness of fit measure is not outstanding, I believe the predictive power of my 
models justifies their use especially since the sine qua non of logistic regression 
is prediction. 
Table 16 shows that the factors explaining the variance in the black 
legislative experience tend to differ from one model to the next. I n  other words, 
the quality of black legislative l ife turns largely on which aspect of the black 
legislative experience is being discussed. For example, gender matters in the 
context of personal discrimination, but it is not important in the other three 
models. Region is significantly related to black influence on the council, but not 
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Table 1 6  
Logit Analysis of the Quality of Black Legislative Life 
lndhlidual Explanatiao& 
Gender ( 1 =Male) 
Age 
Education ( 1 =College Degree) 
Ideology (1 -7 Liberal to Conserv.) 
Contgxtual Explanation� 
Region (1 =Deep South) 
Mayor's Race (1 =Black) 
Elec. Format (1 =Elec.At-Large) 
Council Size 
Council Salary 
% Council Black 
Council Race Relations (1 =Good) 
District Race (1 =Majority Black) 
Dist. Income (1 =Under $20,000) 
Summa� Statistic& 
N 
Log Pseudo-Likelihood 
Wald Chi-Square 
Probability Chi-Square 
Pseudo R2 
Modal Category 
% Correctly Predicted 
Reduction in Error 
Personally 
Exp. Disc. 
{1 =Yes) 
B 
(Rob. SE) 
-1 .3* 
(0.65) 
0.02 
(0.02) 
-1 .35 
(0.76) 
-0. 1 7  
(0. 1 7) 
-0. 1 8  
(0.56) 
-0.50 
(0.86) 
-1 .76* 
(0.85) 
0 . 1 1 *  
(0 .04) 
0.00* 
(0.00) 
-0.02 
(0.0 1 ) 
-2 . 1 2** 
(0 .62) 
-1 .74** 
(0.63) 
0.33 
(0.71 ) 
87 
-35.32 
28.42 
0.0079 
0 .3622 
68.90 
82.76 
44.56 
Must Work Black 
Harder for Influence 
Respect (1 =lnfuential) 
{1 =Agree) 
B B 
(Rob. SE) {Rob. SE) 
0.89 -2.00 
(0.76) (1 . 1 7) 
0.02 0.05 
(0.03) (0.04) 
-1 .62 -1 . 1 8  
(0.95) (0.92) 
-0.96** 0.02 
(0.36) (0.20) 
-1 .48 -2.82* 
(0.90) ( 1 .25) 
-1 .45 3.79* 
(1 .05) ( 1 .78) 
-0.56 3.21 * 
(0.78) ( 1 .40) 
0.09 0.01 
(0.08) (0.2 1 ) 
0.00 -2.67e-06 
(0.00) (0.00) 
-0.03 0.05 
(0.02) (0 .03) 
-1 .77 4.0 1 ** 
(0.96) (1 .36) 
0.87 4.06 
(0.72) (2.22) 
0.52 -2. 1 9 
(0.94) (1 .65) 
88 88 
-30.63 -20.51 
1 9.64 1 4.33 
0.1 046 0.3507 
0.2907 0.5085 
76.74 84. 1 1 
87.50 92.05 
46.25 49.93 
Note. *p < .05. **p < .01 .  ***p < .001 (all tests are two-tailed ). 
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Interacting 
w/ Mayor 
(1 =More 
Likely or as 
Llkel�) 
B 
{Rob. SE) 
0.07 
(0.73) 
0.01 
(0.03) 
0.38 
(0.75) 
0.50* 
(0.24) 
0.70 
(0.93) 
3 . 1 0** 
(0.99) 
-0 .45 
(0.76) 
-0.09* 
(0 .04) 
0.00* 
(0.00) 
0 .00 
(0 .02) 
2.24** 
(0.73) 
-0 .56 
(0.83) 
-0.99 
(0.85) 
87 
-32.49 
21 .1 4 
0.0702 
0.2884 
73.21 
80.46 
27.07 
discrimination. I n  short, my results suggest that the dependent variables are for 
the other three models. The mayor's race is significantly related to black 
influence on the council · and interacting with the mayor, but it is of little 
consequence when the respondents are asked whether they must work harder 
than whites to gain respect . and whether they have personally experienced 
distinct; and, to fully understand the quality of black legislative life, it is necessary 
to take a very broad view of the concept. 
The first two models in Table 16 focus on the black respondents' 
individual experiences while the second two models relate to the collective 
experiences of black councilors. This raises a provocative question: is there is a 
meaningful distinction between how the respondents assess their individual 
career versus the collective experience of black councilors? Like the 
crosstabulations in the previous chapter, my legit models show that this 
distinction in not very important. Only one independent variable, the mayor's 
race, seems to be affected by this distinction. That is, the presence of a black 
mayor is significantly related to black influence on the council and the likelihood 
of black councilors interacting with the mayor. Conversely, the mayor's race is 
not significantly related to the two items dealing with the respondents' individual 
careers (i.e. ,  whether they have · personally experienced discrimination and 
whether they personally feel compelled to work harder than whites to gain 
respect). Even this distinction seems to be more a function of the mayor's role in 
city government than the difference between the respondents' individual versus 
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col lective experiences. Many mayors are independent executives. Thus, their 
sphere of influence probably extends to occurrences in the broader pol itical 
environment rather than those that unfold within the narrow confines of the city 
council . This may be a more plausible explanation for why a black mayor 
matters in terms of black influence on the council and interacting with the mayor, 
but not when discrimination and working harder to gain respect are at issue. 
In Chapter Two, I hypothesized that individual and contextual explanations 
account for the qual ity of black legislative life. As Table 1 6  demonstrates, both 
individual and contextual factors matter, but the contextual explanations largely 
overshadow the ind ividual ones. In fact, only two individual factors-gender and 
ideology-are significant in any of my models. Women are more l ikely to say 
they have personally experienced d iscrimination . This may occur because black 
women confront both a race and gender bias (Clayton and Stal l ings 2000; 
Githens and Prestage 1 977) and they are the more pol itically al ienated than 
black men , white men, and white women (Baxter and Lansing 1 983). However, 
this finding provides only weak support for the "double disadvantage" argument 
because gender is not statistical ly significant in the three remaining models. 
Regarding ideology, the more conservative the respondent, the less l ikely they 
are to agree that they must work harder than whites to gain respect and the more 
l ikely they are to interact with the mayor. Granted, the ideology variable is less 
theoretical ly meaningfu l  in the "working harder for respect" model. It says more 
about how conservatives think as opposed to explaining the black legislative 
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experience. However, ideology is theoretically interesting in terms of interacting 
with the mayor. Here, the statistically significant relationship can probably be 
attributed to the fact that a large portion of my sample comes from the South 
where the incidence of conservative mayors is probably greater. Thus, a shared 
ideological outlook between conservative black councilors and conservative 
mayors probably serves as a basis for cooperation. 
I also hypothesized that other individual factors like seniority and status 
(leadership positions) would be important. Specifically, I predicted that 
councilors with more seniority and those who hold leadership positions 
(Committee Chairs and the Mayor Pro Tempores) would have a more positive 
experience than those with less seniority and those who are not leaders. While 
running various iterations, I learned that seniority is never statistically significant 
in any of my models. I eventually decided to replace it with the councilor's age 
because that variable, although never significant, improves my models' goodness 
of fit. I did not include both variables simultaneously in the interest of parsimony 
and to avoid a serious multicolinearity problem. As for status, I was unable to 
test my hypothesis because only one-third of the councils have committees. This 
confounds statistical analysis because the committee chairmanship variable 
drastically reduces the number of observations in my models. 
Although different contextual variables are important for each model, there 
are still some noteworthy commonalties. Most importantly, the quality of race 
relations on the council is clearly the most important contextual variable 
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explaining the variance in the quality of black leg islative life .  It is statistica lly 
significant in three of the four models, and it tends to be more significant than the 
other independent variables. This finding clearly supports Guinier's (1 994) 
contention that quality of race relations determines the extent of minority pol itical 
empowerment within leg islative bodies. Black councilors who report "good" race 
relations are (1 ) less l ikely to say they have been personal ly discriminated 
against, (2) more l ikely to say that black councilors are influentia l ,  and (3) more 
l ikely to say that black counci lors are more likely or as l ikely than wh ites to 
interact with the mayor. However, this finding only means that there is a 
relationship between the race relations and the qua lity of black leg islative life. It 
does not imply that race relations are generally impaired on city councils or that 
blacks tend to have a poor legislative experience. The crosstabu lations I 
presented in the previous chapter (Table 4) demonstrate that many black 
councilors have a positive experience despite the fact that their  assessments are 
sti l l more pessimistic than those of their white col leagues. Accord ingly, Guinier 
correctly argues that the quality of race relations determines the extent of black 
empowerment within leg islative bod ies, but poor race relations, as perceived by 
the black councilors, are apparently the exception rather than the ru le. 
A related issue is whether geographic region helps explain the variance in 
the qual ity of black legislative l ife. At the outset of my research , I expected that 
black councilors from the Deep South would report a more negative experience 
given their region's history of racial tensions. However, Table 1 6  disproves my 
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hypothesis. The Deep South variable is not significant in three of my four 
models. In the fourth model, my data show that black counci lors from other 
regions are less l ikely to say they are influential. Th is finding is certainly 
encouraging because it suggests that the South has moved in a new ·direction 
and is now more hospitable to ethnic minorities. Perhaps it no longer deserves 
the negative stigma that is associated with its h istorical legacy. Despite this 
optimistic outlook, there is sti l l  cause for concern. Black councilors from regions 
other than the Deep South are less l ikely to say that blacks are influential on their 
counci l .  Although I am not certain why this occurs, at the very least, th is 
suggests that racial barriers may be pervasive rather than being confined to a 
particular region . 
Another important issue is whether the presence of black officials 
improves the qual ity of black legislative l ife. From the outset, I predicted that 
black councilors would be more l ikely to have a positive experience when their 
city's mayor is black and when there is a higher percentage of blacks on the 
counci l .  In these situations, the respondents are probably less isolated because 
they have more a l l ies within their city's government. My crosstabulations in the 
previous chapter bolstered this contention by showing that, in a bivariate context, 
black councilors who serve with at least one other black col league say they have 
a more positive experience than those who serve in isolation (See Table 7.). 
However, my legit findings are mixed and only partial ly support my initial . 
hypothesis. Table 16 shows that the proportion of blacks on the city council is 
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not sign ificantly related to any of the dependent variables, but the presence of a 
black mayor matters in certain situations. The presence of a black mayor 
increases the l ikelihood that black councilors wi l l  say that blacks are influential . 
The presence of a black mayor also increases the l ikel ihood that black councilors 
wi l l  say they are more l ikely or as l ikely than whites to interact with the mayor. 
Nevertheless, no meaningful connection is present between black mayors and 
the respondents' perceptions about discrimination and working harder than 
whites to gain respect on their counci l .  These findings suggest that black mayors 
have more of an impact on occurrences in the broader political environment 
rather than those that unfold within the narrow confines of the council . This is not 
surprising since many mayors are independent executives rather than legislators. 
Table 1 6  also shows that a municipality's electoral format has important 
implications for the quality of black legislative life. Black councilors elected at­
large are less l ikely to experience discrimination, and they are more likely to say 
that black councilors are influential .  This probably occurs because black 
candidates who succeed in at-large contexts have garnered community-wide 
support rather than just the support of the black community. As a result, these 
lawmakers probably view the pol itical process as being even-handed and less 
divided along racial l ines. The fact that these councilors enjoy community-wide 
support means they probably command more respect, and that they have an 
agenda and leadership style that is agreeable to their white colleagues. 
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Most civil rights activists, according to Guinier (1994 ), believe that the 
election of black lawmakers is the key to substantive representation of minority 
interests. These activists insist that prejudice is the result of unfamiliarity, which 
the black lawmakers can surmount in the intimate settings found in most 
legislative bodies. This argument assumes that white lawmakers will fully include 
their black counterparts in the legislative process once the two sets of lawmakers 
become acquainted and once black lawmakers demonstrate they are skilled 
legislators. Two of my logit models clearly show that black councilors fare better 
in more intimate legislative settings. As council size decreases, respondents are 
less likely to say they have personally experienced discrimination. And, as 
council size decreases, respondents are more likely to interact with the mayor 
compared to whites. Hence, for these two indicators, black councilors tend to 
have a better experience on smaller councils than larger ones. This bolsters the 
contention that more intimate legislative settings encourage inclusion and 
facil itate interracial cooperation. 
In Chapter Two, I predicted that the quality of black legislative life will 
improve as the level of council professionalism increases. Professional councils 
almost certainly provide councilors with more opportunities for advancement. 
They may also attract more educated lawmakers because service on these 
councils is more desirable. I f  so, these lawmakers, by virtue of their increased 
level of education, may possess more tolerant attitudes toward ethnic minorities. 
relied on council salary as a measure of professionalism, but this measure 
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produced mixed resu lts . As council salary increases, the black respondents are 
more l ikely to interact with the mayor than whites. I n  contrast, respondents are 
more l ikely to report discrimination as their salary increases. It is difficult to 
reconcile these find ings. Perhaps they suggest that my initial assumption is 
flawed or that a rival hypothesis has merit. Perhaps more professional councils 
are more competitive councils. Competition, taken too far, may manifest itself in 
the form of racial d iscrimination . Regardless of why this occurs, these mixed 
results show that not much is known about how professional ism relates to the 
black legislative experience and they clearly underscore the need for future 
research in th is area. 
Finally, I hypothesized that the nature of the respondent's constituency 
would affect the qual ity of their legislative experience. Specifical ly, I expected 
that black councilors who represent an affluent or a predominantly white 
constituency would have a more positive experience than those representing a 
less affluent or a predominantly black constituency. As others have suggested 
(Hedge, Button, and Spear 1 996), black legislators from wealthy or 
predominantly white d istricts probably possess an agenda and leadership style 
that is agreeable to white lawmakers because they are elected with the support 
of white voters. I found strong support for this argument in the previous chapter 
using bivariate crosstabulations (Tables 6). I ndeed, for six of the seven aspects 
of black legislative l ife, blacks who represented a majority-white constituency 
reported a more positive experience than those with a majority-black 
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constituency. However, my legit models produced very different results. District 
income is not significantly related to any of the dependent variables. And, the 
racial composition of the councilor's district is only significant in one of the 
models (Personally Experienced Discrimination) and this . relationship is in the 
opposite direction than I anticipated. 
I could not identify a compelling explanation for these mixed results. My 
crosstabulations show that this relationship exists in a bivariate context. 
However, once the racial composition of the district is examined in a multivariate 
context, other independent variables push the relationship in the opposite 
direction. Although multicolinearity is probably the culprit, removing suspect 
variables from my model did not remedy the problem. Therefore, my findings on 
this issue (especially those in the previous chapter) shou ld be accepted 
cautiously. My mixed results underscore the fact that the relationships here are 
very complex and there needs to be additional research to fu lly understand them. 
Addressing the Shortcomings of My Primary Models 
My primary models (Table 16) are superior to riv�I formulations because they 
have a stronger ability to predict how the dependent variable is classified. 
Despite their enhanced predictive power, they are not without shortcomings. In  
this subsection, I identify the limitations of my models in the spirit of fu ll 
disclosure. Next, I present alternative formulations that address these problems. 
I n  the end, these alternative models replicate many of my earlier findings 
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although there are also instances where they do not. Therefore, I am confident 
that the relationships for the unchanged variables are real , but I am more 
skeptical of variables that experienced a profound change in their p values. 
The Tautology Issue 
One noteworthy criticism is that my original models are tautological 
because they include council race relations as an independent variable. 
derived this variable from a survey question that asked respondents how they 
perceived the quality of race relations on their city council . Therefore, critics can 
argue that this independent variable is too similar to my dependent variables, and 
that it is inappropriate to use perceptions to explain perceptions. This variable 
becomes more troublesome when used in conjunction with the d istrict income 
variable. As one of my col leagues informally explained to me, "saying that a low 
district income, which is related to bad city council relations, manifest themselves 
in bad race relations is tautological." 
Although this critique certainly has merit, I believe that the problem is 
overstated . First, one of the seminal works about the black legislative experience 
uses both a d istrict income variable and a race relations variable (based on 
perceptions) in its OLS models (Hedge, Button, and Spear 1 996: 90-91 ). 
Hence, relying on perceptions to explain perceptions is apparently not fatal and 
there is a basis for doing so in the l iterature. Second , and more importantly, my 
race relations variable seems to be measuring something different than my 
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dependent variables. I n  Table 17, I present bivariate correlations between this 
variable and the four dependent variables I use in my primary models. The 
Pearson correlation should approach "1" if the quality of race relations is indeed 
the same as these other variables. However, as Table 17 demonstrates, none of 
the Pearson correlations even approach "1" although two-tailed tests show they 
are still statistically significant. Accordingly, there is no tautology in a 
mathematical sense although there appears to be one in an analytical sense. I n  
light of this evidence, it seems more appropriate to include the race relations 
variable in my analysis to avoid problems associated with an underspecified 
model (i.e. ,  biased coefficients). 
Table 1 7  
Bivariate Correlations for the Quality of Race Relations 
Dependent Variable or Model 
Personally Experjenced Discrimination 
Must Work Harder for Respect 
Black Influence on the Council 
Interacting with the Mayor 
Pearson Correlation 
-0.490** 
-0.322** 
0.424** 
0.381 ** 
Note. *p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001 (all tests are two-tailed). 
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N 
208 
214 
21 3 
208 
I n  response to this critique, I removed the two suspect variables from my 
models and reanalyzed my data . I n  many instances, my revised models 
produce similar results . Once again, the electoral format variable remains 
statistically significant in two of my four models. B lack councilors who are 
elected at-large are sti l l less l ikely to say they have experienced discrimination, 
and they are stil l  more l ikely to say that blacks are influential on their counci l (See 
Table 1 8 . ) . As with my original models , gender and counci l  sa lary both remain 
statistical ly significant in the context of personal discrimination . Again, women 
are more l ikely than men to have personally experienced d iscrimination during 
their legislative service. And , respondents are sti l l  more l ikely to report 
discrimination as thei r  council salary increases. Finally, my ideology variable 
behaves in the same way in my revised models. Here too, the more 
conservative the respondent, the less l ikely they are to agree that they must work 
harder than whites to gain respect. 
Although my revised models replicate some of my earl ier findings , there 
are instances where they do not. Education becomes statistically sign ificant in 
two of the four revised models.6 As Table 19 demonstrates, this variable 
approached significance in my two original models and jt crosses the threshold 
once I omit the quality of race relations and d istrict income variables from my 
6 I a lso ran al l my legit models with education treated as an ord inal variable 
rather than a d ichotomous one. In doing so, I combined the categories for "some 
col lege" and "technical school . "  This d id not change my results in terms of 
whether this variable is statistically significant. 
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Table 1 8  
Alternative Logit Models that Exclude the Council Race 
Relations and District Income Variables 
Individual ExplanatiQD& 
Gender ( 1 =Male) 
Age . 
Education (1 =College Degree) 
Ideology (1 -7 Liberal to Conserv.) 
Contextual ExglanatiQns 
Region ( 1 =Deep South} 
Mayor's Race ( 1 =Black) 
Elec. Format (1 =Elec.At-Large) 
Council Size 
Council Salary 
% Council Black 
District Race ( 1  =Majority Black} 
Summary Statistics 
N 
Log Pseudo-Likelihood 
Wald Chi-Square 
Probabil ity Chi-Square 
Pseudo R2 
Modal Category 
% Correctly Predicted 
Reduction in Error 
Personally 
Exp. Disc. 
(1=Yes) 
B 
(Rob. SE) 
-1 .25* 
(0 .55) 
0.01 
(0.02) 
-1 .69** 
(0.62) 
-0. 1 3  
(0. 1 6) 
-0.37 
(0.58) 
-0.54 
(0.79) 
-1 .65* 
(0.70) 
0.08 
(0.04) 
0.00** 
(0.00) 
-0.02 
(0.01 ) 
-1 .06 
. (0.59) 
90 
-44.32 
27. 1 5 
0.0044 
0.2352 
68.90 
78.89 
32. 1 2  
Must Work Black 
Harder for Influence 
Respect (1 =1nfuential) 
(1=Agree) 
B B 
(Rob. SE) (Rob. SE) 
0.53 0.23 
(0.72) (0 .72) 
0 .02 0.01 
(0.03) (0.03) 
- 1 .97* 0.73 
(0.85) (0.67) 
-0.75** -0.02 
(0.27) (0. 1 7) 
- 1 .67 -1 . 1 3  
(0.86) (0.62) 
-1 .26 1 .72 
(0.77) (1 .3 1 )  
-0.96 2.08* 
(0.76) (0.83) 
0.09 -0.02 
(0.07) (0.04) 
0.00 -5.85e-06 
(0.00) (0.00) 
-0.02 0.04 
(0.02) (0.02) 
1 .00 1 .49* 
(0.78) (0.75) 
91 91  
-35.24 -34.33 
1 7 .62 1 9.29 
0.0908 0.0561 
0 .221 3  0.1 886 
76.74 84. 1 1 
84.62 82.42 
33 .84 -1 0.67 
Note. *p < .05. **p < .01 .  ***p � .001 (all tests are two-tailed). 
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Interacting 
w/ Mayor 
(1 =More 
Likely or as 
Ukely) 
B 
(Rob. SE) 
0.64 
(0 .59) 
0.00 
(0.02) 
0.95 
(0.59) 
0.27 
(0. 1 8) 
0.43 
. (0.60) 
1 .67 
(0 .90) 
0.01 
(0 .70) 
-0.04 
(0.04) 
0.00 
.(0.00) 
0.01 
(0.02) 
-0.59 
(0.65) 
90 
-42.57 
1 3.05 
0.2900 
0.1 070 
· 73.21 
77.78 
1 7 .06 
Table 19  
Comparison .of the p.Values that Resulted in  a Change in the Sign ificance 
of an Independent Variable After Council Race Relations and District 
Income Variables are Removed 
Model Variable Primary Model's Revised Model's Difference 
p Value p Value 
Influence District Race 0.067 0.048 -0.01 9 
Influence Region 0.024 0.066 -0.042 
Discrimination Council Size 0.01 0 0.053 -0 .043 
Int. w/ Mayor Mayor's Race 0.002 0.064 -0.062 
Discrimination District Race 0.006 0.074 -0.068 
Discrimination Education 0.075 0.006 0.069 
Respect Education 0.090 0.020 0.070 
Int. w/ Mayor Ideology 0.039 0. 1 28 -0.089 
Int. w/ Mayor Salary 0.032 0. 1 73 -0. 141 
Influence Mayor's -Race 0.034 0. 1 87 -0. 1 53 
Int. w/ Mayor Counci l  Size 0.039 0.371 0.332 
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analysis. Specifically, black councilors with a college degree are less likely to 
experience racial discrimination, and they are less likely to agree that they must 
work harder than whites to gain respect on their council . Perhaps this occurs 
because more educated councilors are more formidable lawmakers who 
command greater respect by virtue of their scholarly achievement. Perhaps they 
are unlikely targets of discrimination because they are more skillful orators who 
can effectively call attention to such abuses and turn the tables on would be 
discriminators. 
In contrast, some independent variables lose their significance in my 
revised models. Council size and the racial composition of the respondent's 
district are no longer significant in terms of personal discrimination. Region is no 
longer significant in terms of black influence on the council . And, even the 
mayor's race is no longer significantly related to the likelihood of the black 
councilors interacting with the mayor compared to whites. These results are 
problematic because they suggest that I am more likely to accept a false null 
hypothesis (Type 2 error) if I continue to assume that these independent 
variables are meaningful . Even so, shifts in the statistical significance of these 
variables reflect only minor changes in their p values {See Table 19.) .  In fact, the 
mean change in the p values for the four aforementioned variables is only 0.054. 
Thus, the danger of committing a Type -2 error increases, but only marginally. I t  
is also important to note that social scientists usually  select their alpha levels as 
a matter of convention {Frankfort-Nachmias and Nachmias 2000). In most 
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cases, this means there is not a substantial d ifference between a variable that 
dips sl ightly below th is threshold and one that barely surpasses it. 
Admittedly, there are other variables in my revised models that pose a 
more serious problem because they experience a substantial change in their p 
values (See Table 1 9 .) .  These incidences are largely confined to the revised 
model deal ing with the l ikel ihood of the black councilors interacting with the 
mayor. No variables are statistically significant in the revised model, which 
reflects a fundamental change in the p values for ideology, salary, and council 
s ize. Likewise, in the model dealing with black influence, the mayor's race 
variable experienced a dramatic increase in its p value. As a result, conclusions 
about these variables should be made with extreme caution because the average 
change in their p values is 0 . 1 79. 
The Missing Data Issue 
Sample size is if of critical importance in inferential statistics. Logistic 
regression is no exception and conclusions based on log it models are only 
meaningfu l if the sample size is sufficient. As Demaris (1 992: 4 1 ) explains, 
Statistical inference in logit model ing rests largely upon the 
asymptotic behavior of sample statistics-behavior that obtains as 
the sample size increases toward infinity. In order for these 
asymptotic properties to be approximately valid , the sample must 
be relatively large . 
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Although there are over 200 cases in my sample, missing data still compromises 
the integrity of my original models. This occurs because I supplemented the 
survey. data I collected from the black councilors with additional data from 
municipal clerks. About 65% of the clerks provided the necessary information so 
my N decreases dramatically when I include any variable derived from the city 
clerks. In other words, the listwise deletion feature in my statistics package omits 
cases where there is a missing value for any of the variables in my model. 
The missing data problem is confined to two variables in my original 
models-salary and the mayor's race. In  response, I omitted these variables and 
reanalyzed my data. In many instances, my revised models yield similar results 
(See Table 20.). The quality of council race relations is again significantly related 
to personal d iscrimination, black influence, and interacting with the mayor. As 
with my original models, the electoral format variable is significant in terms of 
personal discrimination and black influence on the council. The councilor's 
ideology continues to play an important role in determining the likelihood of black 
councilors interacting with the mayor. And , black councilors from majority-black 
districts are still less likely to report discrimination than those from d istricts where 
blacks citizens do not hold a majority. 
Although my revised models replicate some of my earlier findings, there 
are also instances where they do not. Three variables experienced a minor 
change in their p values that resulted in a change in their statistical significance 
(See Table 21.). The quality of race relations on the council is now statistically 
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Table 20 
Alternative Logit Models that Exclude Variables for 
Salary and the Mayor's Race 
Individual Exulanatign1 
Gender (1  =Male) 
Age 
Education ( 1 =College Degree) 
Ideology ( 1 -7 Liberal to Conserv.) 
CQntixtual ExglanatiQn& 
Region ( 1 =Deep South) 
Elec. Format (1 =Elec.At-Large) 
Council Size 
% Council Black 
Council Race Relations (1 =Good) 
District Race ( 1 =Majority Black) 
Dist. Income (1 =Under $20,000) 
Summa� Statisti�s 
N 
Log Pseudo-Likelihood 
Wald Chi-Square 
Probabili� Chi-Square 
Pseudo R2 
Modal Category 
% Correctly Predicted 
Reduction in Error 
Personally 
Exp. Disc. 
(1 =Yes) 
B 
(Rob. SE) 
-0.73 
(0.54) 
-0.00 
(0.02) 
-0.58 
(0.51 ) 
-0.02 
(0.1 4) 
0.06 
(0.47) 
-1 . 1 8* 
(0.55) 
0.06 
(0.04) 
0.00 
(0.01 ) 
-2.44*** 
(0 .48) 
-1 .08* 
(0.45) 
-0.22 
(0.51 ) 
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-63.89 
32.88 
0.0006 
0.2637 
68.90 
79.86 
35.23 
Must Work Black 
Harder for Infl uence 
Respect (1=Infuential) 
(1=Agree) 
B B 
(Rob. SE) (Rob. SE) 
0 . 14 0.29 
(0.51 ) (0 .63) 
0.00 -0 .04 
(0.02) (0.04) 
-0.33 · -0. 12  
(0.52) (0.64) 
-0.22 -0.22 
(0 '. 1 7) (0 . 1 7) 
-0.51 -0.49 
(0.55) (0.58) 
-0.72 1 .51 * 
(0.50) (0.71 ) 
-0.00 -0.04 
(0.03) (0.06) 
-0.02 0.04* 
(0.01 ) (0 .02) 
-1 .57** 2.73*** 
(0.58) (0.65) 
-0.44 1 .50* 
(0.51 )  (0.75) 
0.40 -1 .57* 
(0.54) (0.74) 
1 43 1 43 
-65.37 -38.30 
1 8.25 28.53 
0.0760 0.0027 
0.1 256 0.3382 
76.74 84. 1 1 
78.32 88.81 
6.78 29.58 
Note. ·  *p < .05. **p < .01 . ***p < .001  (all tests are two-tailed). 
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Interacting 
w/ Mayor 
(1 =More 
Likely or as 
Likel�) 
B 
(Rob. SE) 
-0.03 
(0.47) 
-0.00 
(0.02) 
0.01 
(0.44) 
0.29* 
(0. 14) 
0.42 
(0.53) 
0. 1 7  
(0.47) 
0.02 
(0.05) 
-0.00 
(0.01 ) 
1 .34** 
(0.43) 
-0.09 
(0.48) 
-0 .60 
(0.48) 
14 1  
-68.62 
1 8. 1 8  
0.0776 
0.1 1 90 
73.21 
78.72 
20.59 
Table 21 
Comparison of the p Values that Resulted in  a Change in the Significance 
of an Independent Variable After Salary and Mayor's Race Are Removed 
Model Variable Original Revised Difference 
Model's Model's 
p Value p Value 
Respect Race Relations 0.068 0.007 0.06 1  
Influence % Counci l Black 0. 1 09 0.044 0.065 
Discrimination Council Size 0.01 0 0.085 -0.075 
Discrimination Gender 0.049 0. 173 -0. 1 24 
Respect Ideology 0.008 0. 1 92 -0. 1 84 
Influence Region 0.024 0.397 -0.373 
Mayor Council Size 0.039 0.714 -0.675 
related to whether black councilors feel compelled to work harder than whites to 
gain respect. The proportion of black councilors becomes statistically significant 
in terms of black influence on the council. And, council size is no longer 
sign ificantly related to whether respondents report they have personal ly 
experienced discrimination. Given the slight change in their p values (an 
average change of 0 .067), it is fairly safe to assume that these variables are 
meaningful. 
On the other hand, other variables experienced a fundamental change in 
their p values. Gender is no longer significant in terms of whether the councilor 
personally experienced discrimination. Ideology is no longer significant in terms 
of whether the councilor feels they must work harder than whites to gain respect. 
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Region is no longer significant in terms of black influence on the council . And , 
the council size is no longer significant in terms of the likelihood of black 
councilors interacting with the mayor. Therefore, conclusions about these 
variables should be made with extreme caution because the average change in 
their p values is 0.339. 
Comparing My Findings Across All Three Iterations 
In the beginning of this chapter, I presented my primary models which best 
explain the variance in the quality of black legislative life.  Next, I presented some 
alternative models that addressed the shortcomings in my primary models­
namely, the tautology problem and the missing data problem. The alternative 
models replicated my many of my initial findings such that I am confident that 
these relationships are real .  Even so, there are instances where the alternative 
models produced different results. These differences are not especially troubling 
when the p values for a particular variable experience only a slight change. 
However, in other instances, profound changes raised concerns about the 
validity of some relationships. In  this section, I examine all three iterations of my 
models looking for consistencies and differences. Once again , relationships that 
appear consistently are probably real ,  but fundamental differences in the p value 
for a given variable across the three iterations suggest that the relationship is 
tenuous. 
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Table 22 demonstrates that three independent variables are consistently 
significant when I attempt to explain what factors affect the likelihood of black 
councilors saying they have personally experienced discrimination. As a result, I 
am confident that these relationships are real. First, and most importantly, the 
electoral format is significant in my primary model as well as the two alternative 
models. Black councilors who are elected at large are less likely to report racial 
discrimination than those who are elected from a ward. Second, the quality of 
race relations on city councils is highly significant in my primary model and the 
model that I ran in response to my missing data problem. Black councilors are 
less likely to say they have experienced racial discrimination when race relations 
on their council are "good."  Finally, council salary (my measure of 
professionalism) is significant in my primary model and in the model that 
addresses the tautology issue. As council salary increases, black councilors are 
more likely to say they have experienced racial discrimination. 
In contrast, there are other independent variables that may be of 
importance although evidence to this effect is weaker and caution should be 
exercised when drawing conclusions about these variables. In  two models, 
gender is statistically significant, and this relationship shows that black women 
are more likely to say they have experienced racial discrimination than black 
men. The gender variable, however, loses its significance (a dramatic change in 
its p value) once I remove "mayor's race" and 11council size" from my models. 
Next, black councilors who represent a majority-black constituency are less likely 
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Table 22 
Comparison of the p Values in the Three Models Dealing 
with Personal Discrimination 
Independent Primary Model Responding Model Responding 
Variable Model to the Tautology to the Missing Data 
Issue Issue 
p Value p Value p Value 
Gender 0.049 0.023 0. 1 73 
Age 0.507 0.609 0.962 
Education 0.075 . 0.006 0.252 
Ideology 0.31 8 0.414 0.872 
Region 0.739 0.524 0.897 
Mayor's Race 0.566 0.498 Variable Omitted 
Electoral Format 0.039 0.01 9 0.030 
Council Size 0.01 0 0.053 0.085 
Council Salary 0.01 5 0.006 Variable Omitted 
% Council Black 0.1 69 0.064 0.801 
Race Relations 0.001 Variable Omitted 0.000 
District Race 0.006 0.074 0.01 7 
District Income 0.639 Variable Omitted 0.670 
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to report discrimination. This variable is significant in two models, but not in the 
third. The relationship is in the opposite direction than I expected and it conflicts 
with the results of my crosstabulations (See Table 6 . ). Finally, there is some 
evidence that black councilors with a college degree are less likely to report 
discrimination. However, this evidence is weak because the relationship was 
only significant in one model, close to significant 1n another, and far from 
significant in the remaining model. 
Table 23 shows that my models produce similar results when I attempt to 
identify the factors that relate to whether black councilors feel they must work 
harder than whites to gain respect. Here, all three models (even my primary one) 
demonstrate that very few independent variables are statistically significant. The 
most important of these variables seems to be race relations on the council . It is 
highly significant in one model and it approaches significance in another. I am 
confident that this relationship exists because this variable is consistently 
significant for the other dependent variables in this chapter, showing that blacks 
have a more positive experience when race relations on their council are good. 
Next, ideology seems to be important. It is highly significant in two models, but 
not very significant in the third. Hence, conservative black councilors are 
probably less likely to agree that they must work harder than whites to gain 
respect. Finally, there is some basis for believing that more educated 
respondents are less likely to agree that they must work harder than whites to 
gain respect. Education is significant in one model; it approaches significance in 
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Table 23 
Comparison of the p Values in the Three Models Deal ing 
with Working Harder to Gain Respect 
Independent Primary Model Responding Model Responding 
Variable Model to the Tautology to the Missing Data 
Issue Issue 
p Value p Value p Value 
Gender 0.243 0.467 0.791 
Age 0.555 0.454 0.843 
Education 0.090 0.020 0.527 
Ideology 0.008 0.006 0. 1 92 
Region 0. 1 01 0.053 0.355 
Mayor's Race 0. 1 68 0.099 Variable Omitted 
Electoral Format 0.476 0.208 0. 147 
Council Size 0.234 0.224 0.993 
Council Salary 0.481 0.428 Variable Omitted 
% Council Black 0.225 0. 183 0. 1 06 
Race Relations 0.068 Variable Omitted 0.007 
District Race 0.227 0. 1 98 0.392 
District Income 0.578 Variable Omitted 0.458 
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another; but it is far from significant in the remaining model . Hence, there is 
some basis for believing that education is meaningful although the evidence is 
relatively weak. 
Next, I focus on factors that account for black influence on city councils .  
Table 24 shows that two independent variables-electoral format (at-large vs. 
wards) and quality of race relations-are always statistical ly significant in terms 
of black influence. Hence, I am very confident that bl ack councilors elected at­
large are more likely to say blacks are influential .  Similarly, there is good reason 
to believe that black councilors who serve on councils with good race relations 
are more likely to say that bl acks are influential . 
In contrast, other independent variables are significant in some models but 
not others. Conclusions about these variables are less certain and there is 
clearly a need for additional research to determine whether the relationships that 
I have identified exist. First, two of the three models show there is a statistically 
significant relationship between the racial composition of the counci lor' s  district 
and the amount of black influence. However, this relationship is in the opposite 
direction than I expected because it suggests that majority-black districts are 
associated with increased black influence. Second, region is significant in one 
model; it is nearly significant in another; but it is· far from significant in the third. 
This suggests that back councilors from the Deep South are more likely to say 
they are influential . Third, only my original model suggests that the presence of a 
black mayor enhances the black councilors' influence. This variable lost its 
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Table 24 
Comparison of the p Values in  the Three Models Dealing 
with Black Influence on the Council 
Independent Primary Model Responding Model Responding 
Variable Model to the Tautology to the Missing Data 
Issue Issue 
p Value p Value p Value 
Gender 0.095 0.749 0.643 
Age 0.228 0.706 0.287 
Education 0.201 0.279 0.853 
Ideology 0.907 0.891 0. 1 94 
Region 0.024 0.066 0.397 
Mayor's Race 0.034 0. 1 87 Variable Omitted 
Electoral Format 0.022 0.01 2 0.032 
Counci l Size 0.979 0.709 0.542 
Council Salary 0.934 0.825 Variable Omitted 
% Council Black 0. 1 09 0.060 0.044 
Race Relations 0.003 Variable Omitted 0.000 
District Race 0.067 0.048 0.047 
District I ncome 0. 1 84 Variable Omitted 0.035 
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significance when I omitted the race relations variable and district income 
variables in response to the tautology problem. Finally, there is only weak 
evidence that district income is associated with black influence. In a lone model, 
the data showed that blacks from less affluent districts were less likely to say 
they are influential. 
The final set of models deals with the likelihood that black councilors will 
interact with the mayor in comparison to whites. My primary model indicates that 
five independent variables are important, but my alternative models do not 
substantiate these findings (See Table 25.). No significant relationships exist in 
the model I ran in response to the tautology issue, and only two significant 
relationships exist in the model that I ran in response to the missing · data issue. 
Clearly the most important variable is the quality of race relations. I t  is highly 
significant in two models and it shows that blacks are more likely to interact with 
the mayor if the race relations on their council are good. Ideology is also likely to 
be important. I t  is statistically significant in two models although its p value 
moderately increases in the remaining one. Here, the more conservative the 
black councilor, the more likely they are to interact with the mayor. 
Aside from the aforementioned relationships, other independent variables 
might be important although this evidence is weak. In my primary model, the 
presence of a black mayor increases the likelihood of interaction with black 
councilors. This relationship is highly significant in my primary model, but it only 
approaches significance in the model I ran in response to the tautology issue. 
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Table 25 
Comparison of the p Values in the Three Models Dealing 
with the Likel ihood of Black Councilors Interacting with the Mayor 
Independent Primary Model Responding Model Responding 
Variable Model to the Tautology to the Missing Data 
Issue Issue 
p Value p Value p Value 
Gender 0.924 0.284 0.946 
Age 0.71 8 0.961 0.891 
Education 0.61 1 0. 1 08 0.979 
Ideology 0.039 0. 128 0.037 
Region 0.452 0.474 0.429 
Mayor's Race 0.002 0.064 Variable Omitted 
Electoral Format 0.552 0.985 0.71 5 
Counci l  Size 0.039 0.371 0.714  
Council Salary 0.032 0. 1 73 Variable Omitted 
% Counci l  Black 0.784 0.409 0.958 
Race Relations 0.002 Variable Omitted 0.002 
District Race 0.505 0.368 0.846 
District Income 0.244 Variable Omitted 0.21 1 
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Council size and salary are only sign ificant in my primary model . I am skeptical 
whether these variables are related to the l ike l ihood of black councilors 
interacting with the mayor because their p values in the remain ing models are far 
from sign ificant. 
Summary 
I rel ied on d ichotomous logistic regression with robust standard errors to explain 
the variance in how black city councilors assess the qual ity of their legislative 
experience. I developed a series of models (al l  using the same independent 
variables) that seems to best explain the variance in the black councilors' 
perceptions (See Table 1 6 .) .  This combination of independent variables is 
superior to rival combinations because it can accurately pred ict how various 
dependent variables are classified over 80% of the time. My analysis shows that 
different factors are significant from one model to the next. This suggests that it 
is necessary to take a broad view of the qual ity of black leg islative l ife if one 
hopes to fu l ly understand the concept. My primary models also demonstrate that 
contextual explanations are superior to ind ividual explanations. Only two 
individual-level variables-gender and ideology-are significant in any of my 
primary models. However, a host of contextual factors are significantly related to 
at least some aspect of the black legislative experience. These variables include 
the quality of race relations on the city counci l ,  electoral format, region, council 
size, salary, the mayor's race, and the racial composition of the councilor's 
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district. Other contextual variables are of l ittle consequence includ ing district 
income and the proportion of blacks on the counci l .  
Despite their strong predictive power, my primary models have l imitations 
that detract from their util ity. Critics can argue that these models are tautological 
because they include the qual ity of race relations and district income as 
independent variables. Critics wil l  also point out that missing data compromises 
the inferential value of my data. Although I bel ieve neither critique is fatal ,  I 
omitted variables that created these problems and I reanalyzed my data . My 
revised models repl icate many of my initial find ings; however, there are sti ll 
instances where they produce different . results. Admittedly, this means that one 
must exercise caution when drawing conclusions about these variables­
especial ly when there is a profound change in a variable's p value. Thus, my 
alternative models are useful because they help identify areas of uncertainty in 
my original models. This strategy is consistent with advice issued by King , 
Keohane, and Verba. They assert that "Al l  good social scientists . . .  report 
estimates of uncertainty of their inferences" (1 994: 32). They also caution 
researchers that, "We can make a val id inference in almost any situation , no 
matter how l imited the evidence, . . . but we should avoid forg ing sweeping 
conclusions from weak data" (p. 32). 
Consistent with this advice, l close by using all three iterations of my 
models to identify areas of certainty and uncertainty. I begin by summarizing my 
findings in regard to personal discrimination. I am very confident that salary (my 
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measure of professionalism), electoral format (at-large vs. ward), and the quality 
of race relations on the council are important and significantly related to whether . 
black councilors say they have experienced discrimination. There is also 
evidence that gender, education, and the racial composition of the respondent's 
constituency are related to perceived discrimination. However, this evidence is 
not as strong and caution should be exercised when drawing conclusions about 
these variables. 
My models dealing with "working harder to gain respect" show that very 
few independent variables are relevant. The evidence here is less reliable 
because the patterns are less pronounced across all three iterations. Ideology 
and race relations on the council seem to be the most meaningful variables 
because they are significant (or close to it) in several models . . Education may 
also be of some consequence although it was only significant in one model. 
As for black influence on city councils, many independent variables 
matter. I am confident that electoral format and race relations on the council are 
important because they are statistically significant in all three models. Other 
variables may also be important, but this evidence is weak because the p values 
for these variables are not consistently significant. These variables include 
region, district income, the mayor's race, and the racial composition of the 
councilor's district. Hence, I am less certain that these relationships are real and 
this finding underscores the need for future research on these relationships. 
1 68 
Finally, I examined factors that relate to the likelihood of black councilors 
interacting with the mayor compared to whites. My original model show that five 
independent variable are significant (ideology, mayor's race, council size, salary, 
and council race relations), but few of these relationships maintain themselves at 
a statistically significant level in my subsequent iterations. I am fairly certain that 
ideology and the quality of race relations matter because these variables were 
significant in two of the three iterations. I am also confident that the mayor's race 
matters. This variable was highly significant in my original model and it 
approached significance in another . I am skeptical of the remaining variables 
(salary and council size) because their p values experienced large fluctuations 
from one model to the next and they were not consistently significant. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
CONCLUSION 
Context and Background 
The Voting Rights Act of 1965 began a new era of political empowerment for 
blacks in American politics by dismantling the system of barriers that had 
effectively deprived them of the franchise. The Act facilitated a substantial 
increase in the number of black elected officials throughout the country, which, in 
turn, provided scholars new research opportunities. The first generation of 
studies subtly extolled the value of descriptive representation and attempted to 
identify aspects of a municipality's governmental structure that hampered or 
facilitated the election of black councilors (e.g. , Robinson and Dye 1978; Taebel 
1978). More recently, scholars turned their attention to different issues as they 
came to realize that the descriptive representation of minorities was virtually 
assured. These scholars began inquiring about the goals of these newly elected 
leaders and whether they could deliver · policy benefits to their constituents 
(Combs, Hibbing, and Welch 1 984; Epstein and O'Halloran 1 999; Sharpe and 
Garand 2001 ). 
Despite these advances and the high quality of scholarship in this area, 
there is still much to learn. Scholars have not adequately assessed the role 
blacks play in legislative bodies and, with a few notable exceptions (Button and 
Hedge 1996; Button, Richards, and Bethune 1998; Hedge, Button, and Spear 
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1 996), they have devoted little attention to the barriers they face during the 
course of their service. This void is pronounced at the local level of government 
where there has been very few empirical studies that focus on black city 
councilors once they begin serving their term of office . New forays into th is area 
are imperative because city councils play a central role in the allocation of 
ind ispensable community services (police, fire streets, parks, refuse d isposal 
etc. ), and local legislative bod ies are qu ite distinct from their institutional 
counterparts at the state and national levels of government. Therefore, my 
dissertation has significant implications for the substantive representation of local 
minority interests; and , it is important because our much of our existing 
knowledge is not read ily generalizeable to the local context. 
Summary of My Findings 
My primary objectives were to describe and explain the quality of legislative l ife 
experienced by black lawmakers who serve on mixed-race city councils in the 
United States. I conducted two nation-wide surveys to establish how city 
councilors perceive the black legislative experience. I sent one survey to black 
councilors and another to their white counterparts. The two instruments were 
similar in content and question wording so I cou ld compare the two groups' 
personal profiles and perceptions. 
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My surveys reveal that black and white councilors share many attributes in 
their backgrounds and personal profiles. Both groups are close in age, have 
deep roots in their community, and hold their office for a similar length of time. 
Both groups have a similar level of education and they both fall into the 
"moderate" range on the political spectrum. These commonalties are important 
because they could perhaps serve as a basis for interracial cooperation. 
Unfortunately, pronounced differences (a potential source of friction) overshadow 
these commonalties. Black councilors, who are overwhelmingly Democrats, tend 
to represent economically disadvantaged constituencies with large black 
populations. By contrast, white councilors generally represent more affluent 
constituencies with large white populations, and they are not fiercely loyal to the 
Democratic Party like blacks (only 51.7% are Democrats). 
Black councilors generally assess their legislative experience in positive 
terms. Only about 8% say race relations are "poor" on their C(?Uncil; only 15.9% 
say black cou ncilors wield l ittle or no influence; about two-thirds say they have 
not personally experienced discrimination; only 14.3% say there is a "great deal" 
of discrimination in committee assignments; and, over three-fourths say they are 
satisfied with their committee assignments. These findings evince that black 
councilors are satisfied, successful, and generally operate in a collegial 
legislative environment. Nevertheless, two items in my questionnaires suggest 
that race still matters and that black councilors do not operate in a colorblind 
environment. A majority of the black councilors say that race is used as a factor 
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when leadership positions are awarded. And, over three-fourths feel that they 
must work harder than whites to gain respect on their council . 
Although black councilors are general ly optimistic about their experience, 
they sti l l  perceive their pol it ical environment very differently than whites. White 
councilors almost always agree that their black colleagues' experiences are 
positive and that they rarely encounter barriers such as discrimination and 
impaired race relat ions. These sentiments extend to all aspects of black 
legislative l ife and they consistently appear in the "addit ional comments section" 
at the end of my questionnaires. Here, the dominant theme expressed by whites 
is that their counci l  operates in a race-neutral manner where no invidious barriers 
encumber their black col leagues' legislative process. Many black councilors 
concur with this assessment, but blacks are sti l l more cynical than whites about 
their standing on the council. The item about discrimination is an excel lent 
example of this contrast between the two sets of councilors. Approximately one­
third of the black councilors say they either experienced or observed racial 
discrimination, while only 2.4% of the white counci lors acknowledge that 
discrimination occurs. 
Bivariate crosstabulations demonstrate that race is the primary factor 
explaining the perceptual gap between the black and white respondents. 
Although I controlled for intervening factors, even these factors only moderated 
the effects of race. My crosstabulations show that the type of district that the 
respondent represents (at-large vs. wards) and the racial composition of the 
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councilor's constituency (majority-white vs. majority-black) have the most 
discernable effect across the seven aspects of black legislative life that l 
examined. Other factors were of lesser importance. The racial composition of 
the council, the racial composition of the city, and gender condition the 
councilors' responses, but only for certain aspects of black legislative life. Other 
factors seem to be of little or no consequence including region, the governmental 
format, city size, and the partisan nature of the council (partisan vs. nonpartisan). 
Next, I developed a series of logit models that explain the variance in the 
black councilors' perceptions (See Table 16. ). Different independent variables 
are significant from one model to the next. This suggests my dependent 
variables are unique and that different factors are meaningful for various aspects 
of the black legislative experience. My primary models also demonstrate that 
contextual explanations eclipse individual explanations. Ideology and gender are 
the only individual-level variables that are statistically significant in any of my 
primary models. I n  contrast, many contextual variables are significant in  one or 
more of my primary models. These include region, salary, council size, electoral 
format, the mayor's race, the racial composition of the councilor's district, and the 
quality of race relations on the city council. This is important for policymakers 
because they can change some of these contextual factors in an effort to 
facilitate the black councilors' success (e.g. , council size, electoral format, and 
the racial composition of the council). Other variables-both individual and 
contextual-are never of consequence in any of my primary models. These 
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include age, education, seniority, d istrict income, and the proportion of blacks on 
the council . 
I prefer my primary models to rival formulations because they have a 
strong abil ity to pred ict how the dependent variables are classified . However, 
they stil l  have two notable l imitations. First, missing data for some variables 
undermine the inferentia l value of my data . Second , critics can argue that my 
primary models are tautological because they include the quality of race relations 
and d istrict income as independent variables. Although I bel ieve neither 
l imitation outweighs my model's usefulness, I omitted the variables that created 
these problems and I reanalyzed my data. My revised models corroborate many 
of my orig inal find ings, but my results d iffer for some independent variables. I n  
such cases, one must exercise caution when making inferences about these 
variables, especially when a variable's p value changes profoundly. 
I compared the p values across all three versions my models to identify 
areas of certainty and uncertainty. As a result, I am confident that salary (my 
measu re of professional ism), electoral format (at-large vs. ward), and the qual ity 
of race relations are important and significantly related to whether black 
councilors say they have personally experienced discrimination. Gender, 
education ,  and the racial composition of the respondent's constituency may also 
be important. However, the relationsh ip between these variables and perceived 
d iscrimination is not consistently significant so I am less certain that these 
relationships are real .  
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Few independent variables are sign ificant in any of my models dealing 
with the black councilors' perceptions about working harder to gain respect. I n  
this context, race relations and ideology seem to be the most promising variables 
because they are significant (or close to it) in several models. I am less certain 
that education is of consequence because it was only significant in one model . 
Many independent variables seem to be important in terms of black 
influence on city councils. I am confident that electoral format and race relations 
help explain black influence because these variables are statistically sign ificant in 
all three models. I suspect that other variables may also be important, but I am 
less certain of th is because their p values are not consistently sign ificant. These 
variables include region ,  d istrict income, the mayor's race, and the racial 
composition of the councilor's d istrict. 
Another important aspect of the black leg islative experience is the abil ity 
of black councilors to interact with the mayor. My orig inal model shows that five 
independent variable are significant (ideology, mayor's race, council size, salary, 
and council race relations). Even so, few of these relationships maintain 
themselves at a statistical ly sign ificant level in my revised models. I am fairly 
certain that ideology and the qual ity of race relations matter because these 
variables were significant in two of the three iterations. I am also convinced that 
the mayor's race matters. This variable is h ighly sign ificant in my original model ; 
it approaches sign ificance in another; and strong intu itive logic supports the 
existence of this relationship (i.e. , black councilors are more l ikely to interact with 
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a black mayor). I am skeptical that a relationship exists betw�en the remaining 
variables (salary and council size) and the l ikelihood of black councilors 
interacting with the mayor, because their p values fluctuate greatly from one 
model to the next. 
Implications 
My research has far reaching implications for local black lawmakers and the 
constituents they represent. Specifically, it addresses an ongoing debate within 
the civil rights community about how minorities should pursue pol itical 
empowerment. Most civil rights activists-advocates of the B EST-insist that the 
key to black empowerment is the election of "authentic" black lawmakers who are 
neither indebted to wh ite voters nor co-opted by the white establishment. These 
activists believe that such lawmakers, by virtue of their personal experiences, 
have a better appreciation of the black community's needs and can translate this 
knowledge into policies that are especially beneficial to the black community. 
They also assume that black lawmakers wil l  be successful because the intimate 
legislative setting, institutional ru les, continuous voting opportun ities, and 
ongoing relationships with colleagues promote accommodation. 
I n  contrast, Lani Gu inier (1 994) criticizes the dominant strategy because it 
does not guarantee blacks will be effective lawmakers. She predicts that this 
strategy will fail if whites are unwill ing to treat their black col leagues as equals, 
act in good-faith , and compromise. Therefore, she concludes that many black 
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lawmakers become "token" representatives because they operate in a hostile 
legislative environment that precludes them from being influential. 
My findings suggest that the dominant view among civil rights activists is 
more accurate than Lani Guinier's formulation. Black lawmakers positively 
assess many aspects of their legislative experience. Very few black councilors 
say race relations are impaired; an overwhelming majority claim that blacks wield 
"some" or "a lot" of influence; two-thirds say they have not experienced 
discrimination; and three-fourth are satisfied · with their committee assignments. 
In light of these findings, it appears that black councilors are generally satisfied 
and successful lawmakers rather than tokens. These findings also imply that 
most black lawmakers operate in a collegial environment where there is no 
systematic effort to undermine black influence. 
Race continues to play a meaningful role in the black legislative 
experience although interracial cooperation appears to be the norm. A majority 
of the black councilors say that race is used as a factor when leadership 
positions are awarded. And, over three-fourths feel compelled to work harder 
than whites to gain respect on their council. Black lawmakers may, therefore, 
operate in a collegial environment, but this does not imply that their environment 
is always a colorblind one. Furthermore, black and white councilors have very 
divergent views concerning the black legislative experience. Although black 
councilors are generally optimistic about their standing, they are still more cynical 
than whites. Race remains the primary factor behind this perceptual gap even 
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when I control for other relevant variables . This discrepancy between the two 
groups suggests that whites may not fully appreciate the obstacles that their 
black col leagues encounter. If wh ite lawmakers have difficulty understand ing the 
needs of their black colleagues, it fol lows that they do not fu lly appreciate the 
needs of black citizens. If so, th is does not bode well when predominantly wh ite 
councils address "black issues" or consider pol icies that directly impact the black 
community. 
It is also important to recognize that Guin ier's argument is probably 
meritorious for some jurisdictions ( See, e.g. , Kincaid 1 986). Over 30% of the 
black counci lors say they have experienced discrimination;  26.8% say they are 
less l ikely to interact with the mayor than whites; 23.3% are dissatisfied with their 
committee assignments; 1 4.3% say there is a great deal of d iscrimination in the 
way committee assignments are awarded; 7 .9% report poor race relations; and 
3.3% say blacks have no legislative influence. This evidence of marginal ization 
may be the exception rather than the rule, but that does not mean that the plight 
of these councilors should be overlooked . It is important to recognize that these 
individuals seem to operate in a hostile environment where their presence 
provides black constituents with symbolic benefits rather than meaningful ,  
substantive influence. 
Up to this point, I have focused on the big picture by broadly discussing 
the quality of the black councilors' experiences. Now, I tu rn my attention to some 
important details so I can further evaluate whether the BEST is a viable strategy 
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for black empowerment. As the reader may recall, the essence of this strategy is 
to elect authentic black leaders so they can deliver policy benefits to their black 
constituents. Interestingly, my legit models show that increasing the proportion 
of blacks on city councils has no appreciable effect on the quality of black 
legislative life. The proportion of blacks on the council is almost never 
significantly related to any of the dependent variables including black influence 
on the council. Thus, in a multivariate context, more descriptive representation 
( quantity) does not necessarily translate into additional influence or a more 
positive experience (quality). On the other hand, the presence of a black mayor 
is clearly more important. I am fairly certain that black councilors are more likely 
to interact with the mayor if the mayor is also black. There is also some evidence 
(albeit weaker evidence) that a black mayor increases the likelihood that 
respondents will say blacks are influential on their council. These findings 
suggest that a black mayor may be able to enhance the black lawmakers' 
standing on the council and help them to become more intimately involved in 
their municipality's political affairs. 
The BEST assumes that unfamiliarity produces prejudice. Therefore, it 
predicts that intimate legislative settings will work to the advantage of black 
lawmakers by helping them become acquainted with whites on a more personal 
level. This ostensibly gives the black councilors an opportunity to showcase their 
legislative skills and gives them more opportunities to build bridges. Hence, it 
follows that the smaller the city council, the less likely blacks lawmakers are to 
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experience discrimination. My logit models support this contention. As council 
size decreases, respondents are less likely to say they have personally 
experienced discrimination. This relationship is significant in my primary model 
as well as my two revised versions. However, council size only seems to matter 
in terms of personal discrimination and not for other aspects of the black 
legislative experience. 
As I just mentioned, the BEST assumes that black lawmakers will be 
successful largely because they will be operating within the intimate setting found 
in most legislative bodies. Although the amount of intimacy (measured in terms 
of council size) reduces the likelihood of discrimination, the legislative setting 
itself is no guarantee that blacks will be influential. Guinier (1994) correctly 
argues that the quality of race relations within the legislative body determines the 
extent of minority political empowerment. My logit models clearly show that the 
quality of race relations on the council is the most important contextual variable 
explaining the variance in the quality of black legislative life. This variable is 
significantly related to most aspects of black legislative life including the amount 
of influence that black councilors wield. However, this finding only means that 
there is a relationship between the race relations and the quality of black 
legislative life. It does not imply that race relations are generally impaired on city 
councils or that blacks tend to have a poor legislative experience. 
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Guinier (1994) observes that the main objective for most civil rights 
activists is to elect authentic black lawmakers. I ronically, despite the all 
encompassing nature of this goal, activists pay surprisingly little attention to how 
this goal is accomplished. I t  seems they often accord the same weight to most 
political and electoral strategies so long as the strategy in question produces the 
desired result-black representation. However, the circumstances under which a 
black counci lor is  elected are important and should not be overlooked. My 
crosstabulations as well as my logit models clearly and unequivocally show that 
black councilors elected at-large have a better legislative experience than those 
elected from wards. At-large councilors, for example, are less likely to 
experience discrimination and they are more likely to say that blacks are 
influential on their council. Thus, descriptive representation should . be one of 
many important considerations. The civil rights community needs to devote more 
attention to the circumstances by which a black lawmaker ascends to office 
because these circumstances probably affect how satisfied and successful the 
lawmaker will be once they begin serving . . 
My suggestion that the civil rights community should consider the 
circumstances under which black councilors are elected should not be 
misinterpreted as an endorsement of at-large systems over ward systems. I t  is  
well-established that at-large districting arrangements make it more difficult for 
black candidates to win election. Likewise, black councilors who are elected at­
large in predominantly white cities, no doubt, ascended to their position because 
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they garnered support from the white community. However, these black 
lawmakers may lack authenticity if they have embraced a deracia l ized strategy to 
cu ltivate white support. For example, they might adopt a non-threatening image, 
embrace issues that appeal to the entire electorate , and avoid direct overtures 
designed to mobil ize the black community (Underwood 1 997). As the authors of 
one seminal work observed, "it would be na"ive to th ink that black legislators and, 
for that matter, black interests would somehow be better off if African-American 
lawmakers . . .  could become more like their wh ite counterparts" (Hedge, Button, 
and Spear 1 996 : 96). In the end , more research is necessary to determine what 
pre-electoral factors influence the experiences of black lawmakers after they 
assume office. Once researchers clarify what factors are important, the civil 
rights community shou ld take these findings into account when pursu ing its 
pol itical objectives. 
A related issue is whether civil rights activists should lobby for the creation 
of majority-black wards to ensure black representation on city councils. This 
strategy is attractive because such wards virtually assure the election of a black 
lawmaker. However, some of my find ings suggest that this strategy may also be 
counterproductive. My crosstabulations show that the quality of black legislative 
life (as reported by black councilors) is conditioned by the racial composition of 
the respondent's constituency. Blacks elected from majority-black wards are 
more inclined to have a negative experience and encounter more barriers in the 
course of their service. Nevertheless, my legit analysis calls into question the 
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results of my crosstabulations. On several occasions the racial composition of 
the lawmaker's district is significantly related to whether the councilor personally 
experienced discrimination, but the relationship is in the opposite direction. 
Mul ticolinearity is probably the culprit, but removing suspect variables from my 
models does not reverse the relationship's direction. My mixed results clearly 
underscore the need for future research on this important issue. I f  majority-black 
districts are indeed associated with a poor legislative experience, it would not be 
prudent for the civil rights community to lobby for the creation of these districts if 
their primary goal is substantive representation. 
I n  the end, the BEST may be a viable strategy for black empowerment in 
some respects. I t  correctly assumes that local legislative bodies are generally 
collegial and that intimacy reduces discrimination. Nevertheless, civil rights 
activists must address some important shortcomings that are inherent in this 
approach. First, some black councilors (albeit a small proportion) operate in 
hostile leg islative environments where they encounter formidable barriers. 
Second, increasing the proportion of blacks on the council neither enhances their 
perceived influence nor improves the quality of their experience. Third, blacks 
and whites have divergent perceptions about the black legislative experience. 
This implies that whites may not fully appreciate the needs of their black 
colleagues or the constituents they represent even when the black councilors 
have presumably had an opportunity to sensitize white_s to these concerns. 
Finally, BEST largely ignores the circumstances that bring a black candidate to 
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office although these factors apparently affect their experience once they begin 
serving. 
Regrettably, my critique raises more questions than it answers. It 
suggests that civil rights activists need to fundamentally rethink whether 
descriptive representation should be their central focus. However, it does not 
identify a rival strategy that is unequivocally superior to the BEST. One 
alternative is the use of influence districts as a means of black empowerment. 
This appr�ach calls for the creation of wards where blacks wield some electoral 
clout but not quite enough to hold a majority. This could enhance the overall 
influence of the black community by reducing the number of wards where blacks 
enjoy sizeable majorities in favor of additional "influence" wards. This strategy 
seems to be more likely than the BEST to induce wh ite legislators become 
sensitive to the black community's needs because they have institutional 
incentives to do so. Despite this benefit, the influence district strategy discounts 
the value of descriptive representation because the black community will not 
always be able to elect its preferred candidate. 
Another alternative, one advocated by Guinier (1 994 }, is the use of 
"cumulative" or "bullet" voting. Here, voters are allowed to cast the same number 
of votes and this number is equivalent to the number of available seats on the 
council . The voters may cast all their votes for the same candidate or they may 
distribute them among different candidates. This strategy can produce 
descriptive representation if the black community (which I presume is minority) 
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votes as a cohesive bloc for a black candidate. I t  also has the potential to 
sensitize white councilors to the black community's· concerns if the black 
community distributes its votes between some of the white candidates. However, 
the success of this strategy · turns on a well-organized black community that 
communicates to its members how they should vote. I t  also assumes that white 
candidates who receive electoral support from the black community will realize 
that they are indebted to black voters. I f  neither premise is valid, the strategy 
may be ineffective. 
Directions in Future Research 
My dissertation has limitations that provide future researchers ample 
opportunities to improve upon my work. Most importantly, my work is largely 
descriptive and exploratory because not much is about my research topic. 
Therefore, future researchers could make a substantial contribution by using my 
research as a veh icle for developing a conceptually rich theory that explains the 
black legislative experience. Structural or neoinstitutional theories are promising 
since my logit models suggest that contextual factors have a greater impact on 
the black legislative experience than individual ones. I n  other words, the way 
governments are arranged clearly plays an important role in the black legislative 
experience. 
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Another limitation is that I rely exclusively on perceptions to assess the 
quality of black legislative life. Perceptions are, no doubt, important because 
they most likely govern how the councilors behave. Even so, my approach 
leaves open the possibility that the respondents' views do not reflect the 
objective conditions that exist on their city council . Self-reported rates of bill 
passage are promising although they probably measure substantive 
representation rather than the quality of black legislative life. Committee 
chairmanships might also be an appropriate variable to consider although doing 
so can greatly reduce the number of observations in any multivariate model (only 
one-third of city councils have committees). In sum, future researchers would 
greatly contribute to our understanding of the black legislative experience in local 
government by identifying and utilizing objective measures. 
Future researchers could also improve upon my data collection 
procedures. First, they should recognize that, aside from Census data, archival 
sources containing basic information about city governments are either 
incomplete or outdated. My fa ilure to recognize this ultimately created missing 
data problems that reduced the N in my legit models. It is therefore imperative 
that researchers collect all necessary information in their initial surveys rather 
than trying to obtain it from other sources. Second, researchers should be aware 
that any large mailing list of city councilors probably needs to be updated. Most 
organizations simply cannot do this because the number of municipalities is large 
and they hold their elections sporadically. Researchers who fa il to update their 
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mailing list risk a low response rate because councilors who leave office are 
unlikely to receive mail sent to them at city hall. Perhaps the best way to address 
this problem is to use a stratified sampling technique where the researcher 
randomly selects cities, assembles a list of the councilors from those cities 
through phone calls to municipal clerks, then randomly chooses councilors from 
this list. This technique might also be useful in generating a random sample of 
white councilors since no list comprehensive list is currently available. 
Another major obstacle that I confronted was the uniqueness of city 
councils. The essence of this problem is captured in the age old debate between 
nomothetic and idiographic researchers (See generally, Przeworski and Teune 
1982). The idiographic scholars emphasize the importance of spatiotemporal 
location and they argue that social systems are too unique to be compared (e.g. , 
Winch 1958: 133 ). This ostensibly occurs because the characteristics or 
variables within each social system interact to create a unique pattern that defies 
comparison. I n  contrast, nomothetic researchers believe that this problem can 
surmounted when the relevant variables are know and can be included in a 
multivariate model where spurious relationships can be controlled. I n  such 
instances, nomothetic scholars believe they are justified when drawing random 
samples without regard to the respondent's group or subsystem (Przeworski and 
Teune 1982). 
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My research clearly implicates the idiographic-nomothetic debate since 
city councils are very different from one municipality to the next. Some councils 
are highly professional bodies with large staffs, high salar ies, and permanent 
committees, while others lack these attributes. Some councils are organized 
according to partisanship while others are not. Some councils are large while 
others are relatively small. Consistent with the nomothetic tradition, I controlled 
many of these variables in my logit models. Unfortunately, however , there were 
other variables that I could neither tap with survey instrument nor quantify in my 
statistical analyses. Most importantly, it was impossible for me to fully account 
for the group dynamics and individual personalities on the various councils. To 
some extent , I took these unquantifiable factors into consideration by utilizing 
robust standard errors in conjunction with my logit models, but even this remedy 
was not a perfect fix. As a result, the uniqueness problem may explain why I did 
not find more statistically significant relationships in my data . Given this 
limitation, future researchers would make a valuable contribution by devoting 
greater attention to this issue. Perhaps the most appropriate way to do this is to 
conduct a small-N, qualitative study that narrowly focuses on group dynamics. 
In closing, I wish to identify two additional topics that are worthy of 
scholarly exploration. First, my research focused predominately on the barriers 
that black councilors face during the course of their service. However, it would 
greatly contribute to our knowledge if someone devoted more attention to 
interracial cooperation and the extent that it occurs. Second, and more 
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importantly, . scholars would make a monumental contribution by · studying the 
decision-making coalitions that ostensibly exist on city councils. Much of what 
we know about legislative coalitions comes from formal theory rather than 
empirical data (Banks 2000; Baron 1989; Bianco 1989; Groseclose and Snyder 
1 996; Stratmann 1995). Thus, i t  would be informative to learn (1) whether these 
coali tions are permanent or temporary, (2) the nature of the cleavages that the 
coalitions center around (ideology, partisanship, issues, race, gender, etc.), and 
(3) whether black counci lors have been able to infi ltrate these coalitions. This 
information is critical because the incorporation of minorities into the dominant 
coalition is thought to play a major role in the substantive representation of 
minority interests (Browning, Marshall, and Tabb 1984 ). I included some 
coalition questions in my survey of black councilors, but these questions yielded 
unusable data. I unwisely placed this section in the middle of my instrument so 
many respondents skipped it, and my question wording apparently confused 
some respondents. To avoid these problems, future researchers shou ld pretest 
their instrument, clearly and succinctly define terms such as "coalition" and 
11voting bloc," and they should limit the length of their questionnaire so 
respondents can concentrate on the individual questions. 
I n  the end, my dissertation goes far in filling a significant gap in the 
literature and it greatly enhances our understanding of the black legislative 
experience on city counci ls. Hopefully, my efforts will spark a renewed interest in 
the local race politics literature and entice scholars to conduct more research in 
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this area. Clearly such research would be timely and necessary given the 
limitations of my work and the topic's importance to black councilors and the 
constituents they represent. Perhaps my study will help future researchers 
develop a conceptually rich theory that explains race relations within legislative 
bodies or one that accounts for the qual ity of black legislative l ife. Such a theory 
would, no doubt, be a monumental achievement and welcome contribution to the 
literature. 
1 91 
LIST OF REFERIENCES 
1 92 
Abbe, Owen G., and Paul S. Herrnson. 2003. "Campaign Professionalism in 
State Legislative Elections ." State Politics and Policy Quarterly 2(3): 223-
245. 
Abrams, Kathryn. 1988. "Raising Politics Up: Minority Political Participation and 
Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act." New York University Law Review 
63(3): 449-531. 
Albritton, Robert 8. ,  George Amedee, Keenan Grenell, and Don-Terry Veal. 
1996. "Deracialization and the New Black Politics ." In Race, Politics, and 
Governance in the United States, ed. Huey L. Perry. Gainesville, FL: 
University Press of Florida, 179-192. 
Alozie, Nicholas 0. ,  and Lynne L. Manganaro. 1993 . "Black and Hispanic 
Council Representation: Does Council Size Matter?" Urban Affairs 
Quarterly 29(2): 276-298. 
Antunes, George, and Charles M. Gaitz. 1975. "Ethnicity and Participation: A 
Study of Mexican-Americans, Blacks, and Whites ." American Journal of 
Sociology 80(5): 1192-1211. 
Arnold, Laura W. ,  Rebecca E. Deen, and Samuel C. Patterson. 2000. 
"Friendship and Votes: The Impact of Interpersonal Ties on Legislative 
Decision Making. "  State and Local Government Review 32(2): 142-147. 
Ashenfelter, Orley, and Stanley Kelly, Jr. 1975. "Determinants of Participation in 
Presidential Elections." Journal of Law and Economics 18(3): 695-734. 
Baldauf, Arthur, Herbert Reisinger , and William C. Moncrief . 1999. "Examining 
Motivations to Refuse in Industrial Mail Surveys." Journal of Marketing 
Research Society 41(3): 345-353 . 
Banfield, Edward C. 1968. The Unheavenly City: The Nature and Future of Our 
Urban Crisis. Boston: Little, Brown, and Company. 
Banks, Jeffrey S. 2000. "Buying Supermajorities in Finite Legislatures." 
American Political Science Review 94(3): 677-684. 
Baron, David P. 1989. "A Noncooperative Theory of Legislative Coalitions." 
American Journal of Political Science 33(4): 1048-1084. 
Baron, David P. , and John A. Ferejohn. 1989. "Bargaining in Legislatures." 
American Political Science Review 83(4): 1181-1206. 
193 
Barrett, Edith J. 1995. "The Policy Priorities of African American Women in 
State Legislatures. " Legislative Studies Quarterly 22(2): 223-47. 
Baxter, Sandra, and Marjorie Lansing. 1983. Women and Politics: The Visible 
Majority. Revised Ed. Ann Arbor, Ml: University of Michigan P·ress. 
Black, Merle. 1978. "Racial Composition of Congressional Districts and Support 
for Federal Voting Rights in the American South." Social Science 
Quarterly 22(1): 166-174. 
Bianco, William T. 1989. "Doing the Politically Right Thing: · Results, Behavior, 
and Vote Trading." Journal of Politics 51 (4 ): 886-899. 
Bledsoe, Timothy. 1986. "A Research Note on the Impact of District/At-Large 
Elections on Black Political Efficacy." Urban Affairs Quarterly - 22(1 ): 166-
74. 
Bositis, David A. 2001. Black Elected Officials: A Statistical Summary. 
Washington, D.C. : Joint Center for Political and Economic Studies. 
Bratton, Kathleen A. , and Kerry L. Haynie. 1999. "Agenda Setting and 
Legislative Success in State Legislatures: The Effects of Gender and 
Race." Journal of Politics 61 (3): 658-679. 
Brenner, Saul, and Eric S. Heberlig. 2002. "' I n  My Opinion . . . ' :  Justices' 
Opinion Writing in the U.S. Supreme Court, 1946-1997." Social Science 
Quarterly 83(3): 762-774. 
Brou thers, Lance El iot, and David Lawson McClure. 1 984. "The Effect of 
Council Size and District Elections on City Council Representation." 
Aztlan 1 5(2): 263-276. 
Browning, Rufus P. , Dale Rogers Marshall, and David H. Tabb. 1984. Protest is 
Not Enough: The Struggle of Black and Hispanics for Equality in Urban 
Politics. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press� 
Bullock, Charles S. , I I L  1989. "Symbolics or Substance: A Critique of the At­
Large Election Controversy." State and Local Government Review 21 (3): 
91-96. 
Bullock, Charles S. , 1 1 1 ,  and Susan A. MacManus. 1987. "Staggered Terms and 
Black Representation." Journal of Politics 49(2): 543-52. 
194 
Burns, Peter F. 2003. 'The South, Medium-Sized Cities, and a New Look at the 
Determinants of African-American Representation." Politics & Policy 
31 (4): 620-639. 
Button, James, and David Hedge. 1 996. "Legislative Life in the 1 990s. A 
Comparison of Black and White State Legislators." Legislative Studies 
Quarterly 21  (2): 1 99-21 8. 
Button, James, Scott Richards, and Evelyn Bethune. 1 998. "A Look at the 
Second Generation of Black Elected Officials in Florida ." State and Local 
Government Review 30(3 ): 1 81 -1 89. 
Cameron,  Charles, David Epstein , and Sharyn O'Hal loran. 1 996. "Do Majority­
Minority Districts Maximize Substantive Black Representation in 
Congress?" American Political Science Review 90(4): 794-81 2. 
Campbel l ,  Angus, Phi l ip E. Converse, Warren E. Mil ler, and Donald E. Stokes. 
1 960. The American Voter. New York: Wiley & Sons. 
Carpenter, Allan, with Carl Provorse. 1 996. Facts About Cities. 2nd Ed. New 
York: H .W. Wilson. 
Carsey, Thomas M . ,  and Gerald C. Wright. 1 998. "State and National Factors in 
Gubernatorial and Senatorial Elections." American Journal of Political 
Science 42(3): 994-1 002. 
Cassel , Carol A. 1 985. "Social Background Characteristics of Nonpartisan City 
Council Members: A Research Note." Western Political Quarterly 38(3 ): 
495-501 . 
Clayton, Dewey M . ,  and Angela M.  Stal l ings. 2000. "Black Women in Congress: 
Striking the Balance." Journal of Black Studies 30(4): 574-603. 
Clemons, M ichael L . ,  and Charles E. Jones. 2000. "African American 
Legislative Pol itics in Virginia." Journal of Black Studies 30(6): 7 44-67. 
Clingermayer, James C., and Richard C. Feiock. 1 994. "Campaigns, Careerism, 
and Constituencies: Contacting Council Members About Economic 
Development Pol icy." American Politics Quarterly 22(4 ): 453-468. 
Cole, Leonard A. 1 976. Blacks in Power: A Comparative Study of Black and 
White Elected Officials. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 
1 95 
Combs, Michael W. , John R. Hibbing, and Susan Welch. 1984. "Black 
Constituents and Congressional Roll Call Votes." Western Political 
Quarterly 37(3): 424-434. 
Cooper, Christopher A. , and Anthony J. Nownes. 2003. "Citizen Groups in Big 
City Politics." State and Local Government Review 35(2): 102-111. 
Darcy, Robert, and Charles D. Hadley. 1988. "Black Women in Politics: The 
Puzzle of Success." Social Science Quarterly 69(3): 629-645. 
Davidson, Chandler. 1992. "The Voting Rights Act: A Brief History." I n  
Controversies in Minority Voting: The Voting Rights Act in Perspective, 
eds. Bernard Grofman and Chandler Davidson. Washington, D.C. :  The 
Brookings I nstitution, 7-51. 
Davidson, Roger H . ,  and Walter J. Oleszek. 2004. Congress and Its Members. 
9th Ed. Washington, D.C. :  CQ Press. 
Demaris, Alfred. 1992. Logit Modeling: Practical Applications. Newbury Park, 
CA: Sage. 
Dennis, Christopher. 1990. "The Election and I mpact of Black School Board 
Members: The Effect of Community Racial and Political Attitudes." State 
and Local Government Review 22( 1 ): 22-26. 
Desantis, Victor S. , and Tari Renner. 2002. "City Government Structures: An 
Attempt at Clarification."  State and Local Government Review 34(2): 95-
104. 
Dillman, Don A. 1978. Mail and Telephone Surveys: The Total Design Method. 
New York: Wiley & Sons. 
Dillman, Don A. 2000. Mail and Electronic Surveys: The Tailored Design 
Method. New York: Wiley & Sons. 
Eckstein, Harry. 1975. "Case Study and Theory in Political Science." I n  
Handbook of Political Science. Vol. 7. , eds. Fred I .  Greenstein and 
Nelson Polsby. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 79-137. 
Eisinger, Peter K. 1982. "Black Employment in Municipal Jobs: The I mpact of 
Black Political Power." American Political Science Review 76(2): 380-
392. 
196 
Eisinger, Peter K. 1983. "Black Mayors and the Politics of Racial Economic 
Advancement. " In Culture, Ethnicity, and Identify, ed. William C. 
McReady. New York: Academic, 95-109. 
Ellickson, Mark C. 1992. "Pathways to Legislative Success: A Path Analytic 
Study of the Missouri House of Representatives." Legislative Studies 
Quarterly 17(2): 285-302. 
Epstein, David, and Sharyn O'Halloran. 1999. "Measuring the Electoral and 
Policy Impact of Majority-Minority Voting Districts." American Journal of 
Political Science 43(2): 367-395. 
Ferejohn, John, Morris Fiorina, and Richard D. McKelvey. 1987. "Sophisticated 
Voting and Agenda Independence in the Distributive Politics Setting." 
American Journal of Political Science 31 (1 ): 169-193. 
Fox, Richard L., and Robert A. Schuhmann. 2000. "Gender and the Role of the 
City Manager'' Social Science Quarterly 81 (2): 604-62 1. 
Frankfort-Nachmias, Chava, and David Nachmias. 2000. Research Methods in 
the Social Sciences. 6th Ed. New York: Worth. 
Frederickson, H. George, and Gary Alan Johnson. 2001. ''The Adapted 
American City: A Study of Institutional Dynamics." Urban Affairs Review 
36(6): 872-884. 
Frederickson, H. George, Curtis Wood, and Brett Logan. 200 1. "How American 
City Governments Have Changed: The Evolution of the Model City 
Charter." National Civic Review 90(1 ): 3-18. 
Gabris, Gerald T. , Keenan Grenell, Douglas M. Ihrke, and James Kaatz. 2000. 
"Managerial Innovation at the Local Level: Some Effects of Administrative 
Leadership and Governing Board Behavior." Public Productivity and 
Management Review 23(4): 486-497. 
Gay, Claudine. 2002. "Spirals of Trust? The Effect of Descriptive 
Representation on the Relationship Between Citizens and Their 
Government." American Journal of Political Science 46( 4 ): 717-732. 
Gibbons, Robert D. , and Donald Hedeker. 1994. "Application of Random-Effects 
Prob it Regression Models." Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology 
62(2): 285-296. 
197 
Githens, Marianne, and Jewel L. Prestage. 1977. A Portrait of Marginality: The 
Political Behavior of the American Woman. New York: David McKay. 
Groseclose, Tim, and James M. Snyder. 1996. "Buying Supermajorities." 
American Political Science Review 90(2): 303-315. 
Guinier, Lani. 1994. The Tyranny of the Majority: Fundamental Fairness in 
Representative Democracy. New York: Martin Kessler. 
Haas, Peter J. 1995. "An exploratory Analysis of American City Council 
Salaries." Urban Affairs Review 31 (2): 255-265. 
Hall, Richard L. 1996. Perceptions in Congress. New Haven, CT: Yale 
University Press. 
Hamm, Keith E. , Robert Harmel, and Robert Thompson. 1983. "Ethnic and 
Partisan Minorities in Two Southern State Legislatures." Legislative 
Studies Quarterly 8(2): 177-189. 
Hanks, Lawrence J. 1987. The Struggle for Black Political Empowerment in 
Three Georgia Counties. Knoxville, TN: University of Tennessee Press. 
Harrigan, John J., and Ronald K. Vogel. 2000. Political Change in the 
Metropolis. 6th Ed. New York: Longman. 
Haynie, Kerry L. 2001. African American Legislators in the American States. 
New York: Columbia University Press. 
Hedge, David, James Button, and Mary Spear. 1 996. "Accounting for the 
Quality of Black Legislative Life: A View From the States." American 
Journal of Political Science 40(1 ): 82-98. 
Hedge, David M. , and David B. Conklin. 2002. "Black - Legislative Life in the 
American States." Presented at the Annual State Policy and Politics 
Conference, Milwaukee, WI.  
Herring, Mary. 1990. "Legislative Responsiveness to Black Constituents in 
Three Deep South States." Journal of Politics 52(3): 740-758. 
Herson, Lawrence J.R. 1957. "The Lost World of Municipal Government." 
American Political Science Review 51 (2): 330-345. 
198 
Hofferbert, Richard I . ,  and I ra Sharkansky. 1 971 . 'The Role of State and 
Community Pol itical Systems." I n  State and Urban Politics: Readings in 
Comparative Public Policy, eds. Richard I .  Hofferbert and I ra Sharkansky. 
Boston, MA: Little and Brown, 1 -8. 
Holmes, Robert A. 2000. "The Georgia Legislative Black Caucus: An Analysis 
of a Racial Legislative Subgroup." Journal of Black Studies 30(6): 768-
790. 
Hult, Karen M. ,  Charles E. Walcott, and Thomas Weko. 1 999. "Qual itative 
Research and the Study of the U.S. Presidency." Congress and the 
Presidency 26(2): 1 33-1 52. 
I hrke, Douglas, Rick Proctor, and Jerry Gabris. 2003. "Understanding 
I nnovation in Municipal Government: City Council Member Perspectives." 
Journal of Urban Affairs 25(1 ): 79-90. 
I nternational City/County Management Association. 1 996. Profile of the City 
Council, 1996. Washington , D.C. : ICMA. 
I nternational City/County Management Association. 2001 . Municipal Form of 
Government, 2001: Trends in Structure, Responsibility, and Composition. 
Washington, D.C. :  I MCA. 
I nternational City/County Management Association .  2002. The Municipal 
Yearbook. Washington, D.C. : I CMA. 
Joint Center for Pol itical and Economic Stud ies. 1 998 . "Table 2 :  Number of 
Black Elected Officials in the United States, by State and Office, January 
1 999 ." August. http://www.jointcenter.org/DB/table/graphs/98_beo.pdf 
(August 2, 2004). 
Jones, Charles E. 1 991 . "The Election of L. Douglas Wilder: The First Black 
Governor of Virginia." Western Journal of Black Studies 1 5(2): 1 05-1 1 3. 
Jones, Clinton B.  1 976. "The Impact of Local Election Systems on Black 
Political Representation." Urban Affairs Quarterly 1 1  (3): 345-356. 
Kaatz, James 8 . ,  P. Edward French , and Hazel Prentiss-Cooper. 1 999. "City 
Council Confl ict as a Cause of Psychological Burnout and Voluntary 
Turnover Among City Managers." State and Local Government Review 
31 (3): 1 62-1 72. 
1 99 
Kanter, Rosabeth Moss. 1977. "Some Effects of Proportions of Group Life: 
Skewed Sex Ratios and Responses to Token Women." American Journal 
of Sociology 82(5): 965-990. 
Kaplan, Abraham. 1998. The Conduct of Inquiry: Methodology for Behavioral 
Science. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers. 
Karlan, Pamela S. 1989. "Maps and Misreadings: The Role of Geographic 
Compactness in Racial Vote Dilution Litigation." Harvard Civil Rights­
Liberties Law Review 24(1 ) :  173-248. 
Karnig, Albert. 1979. "Black Resources and City Council Representation. ,, 
Journal of Politics 41 (1 ): 134-49. 
Karnig, Albert K. , and Susan Welch. 1979. "Sex and Ethnic Differences in 
Municipal Representation." Social Science Quarterly 60(3): 465-481. 
Karnig, Albert K. , and Susan Welch. 1980. Black Representation and Urban 
Policy. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Keller, Edmond J. 1978. "The Impact of Black Mayors on Urban Policy." The 
Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Sciences 439 
(September): 40-52. 
Kerr, Brinck, and Kenneth R. Mladenka. 1994. "Does Politics Matter? A Time­
Series Analysis of Minority Employment Patterns." American Journal of 
Political Science 38(4): 918-943. 
Kincaid, Joh n. 1 986. "Beyond the Voting Rights Act: White Responses to Black 
Political Power in Tchula, Mississippi." Publius 1 6(4): 1 55-172. 
King, David C. , and Jack L. Walker. 1992. "The Provision of Benefits by I nterest 
Groups in the United States." Journal of Politics, 54(2): 395-426. 
King, Gary, Robert 0. Keohane, and Sidney Verba. 1994. Designing Social 
I nquiry: Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research . Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press. 
Krebs, Timothy B. , and John P. Pelissero. 2003. "City Councils." I n  Cities, 
Politics, and Policy: A Comparative Analysis, ed. John P. Pelissero. 
Washington, D.C.: ca Press, 169-195. 
200 
Lascher, Edward L. ,  Jr. 1 991 . 'The Case of the Missing Democrats: 
Reexamining the "Republican Advantage" in Nonpartisan Elections." 
Western Political Quarterly 44(3): 656-675. 
Lascher, Edward L., Jr. 1 993. "Explain ing the Appeal of Local Legislative 
Office."  State and Local Government Review 25(1 ): 28-38 . 
Lawson ,  Steven F. 1 991 . Running for Freedom: Civil Rights and Black Politics 
in America Since 1941 .  Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press . 
Legette, Willie M .  2000. "The South Carolina Legislative Black Caucus, 1970 to 
1 988." Journal of Black Studies 30(6): 839-858. 
Lieske, Joel , and Jan William Hillard .  1 984. "The Racial Factor in Urban 
Elections." Western Political Quarterly 37(4 ): 545-563. 
Lineberry, Robert L., and Edmund P. Fowler. 1 967 . "Reformism and Public 
Policies in American Cities." American Political Science Review 61 (3): 
70 1 -71 6. 
Lublin ,  David . 1 997. "The Election of African Americans and Latinos to the U.S .  
House of Representatives , 1 972-1 994." American Politics Quarterly 25(3): 
269-86. 
Lyons, William. 1 978 . "Reform and Response in American Cities: Structure and 
Policy Considered ."  Social Science Quarterly 59(1 ): 1 1 8-1 32. 
Lyons, W.E. ,  and Malcolm E. Jewell . 1 988 . "Minority Representation and the 
Drawing of City Council Districts ." Urban Affairs Quarterly 23(3): 432-
447 . 
MacManus, Susan A. 1 978. "City Council Election Procedures and Minority 
Representation : Are They Related?" Social Science Quarterly 59(1 ): 
1 53-1 6 1 . 
MacManus, Susan A. 1 992. "How to Get More Women in Office: The 
Perspectives of Local Elected Officials (Mayors and City Councilors)." 
Urban Affairs Quarterly 28(1 ): 1 59-1 70. 
MacManus, Susan A. 1 999. "The Resurgent City Councils . "  I n  American State 
and Local Politics: Directions for the 21st Century, ed . Ronald E. Weber 
and Paul Brace. New York: Chathan House, 1 66-1 93. 
201 
MacManus, Susan A. , and Charles Bullock, I ll. 2003. "The Form, Structure, and 
Composition of America's Municipalities in the New Millennium." I n  The 
Municipal _Yearbook 2003. Washington, D.C. : International City/County 
Management Association. 
Maestas, Cherie, Grant W. Neeley, and Lilliard Richardson, Jr. 2003. "The State 
of Surveying Legislators: Dilemmas and Suggestions." State Politics and 
Policy Quarterly 3(1 ): 90-108. 
Mansbridge, Jane. 1999. "Should Blacks Represent Blacks and Women 
Represent Women? A Contingent 'Yes. '" Journal of Politics 61 (3): 682-
657. 
Matthews, Donald R., and James W. Prothro. 1966. Negroes and the New 
Southern Politics. Chicago: Harcourt & Brace. 
Meier, Kenneth J . ,  and Robert E. England. 1984. "Black Representation and 
Educational Policy: Are They Related?" American Political Science 
Review 78(2): 392-403. 
Menard, Scott. 2002. Applied Logistic Regression Analysis. 2nd Ed. Thousand 
Oaks, CA: Sage. 
Menifield, Charles E. 2000. "Black Political Life in the Missouri General 
Assembly." Journal of Black Studies 31 (1 ): 20-38. 
Miller v. Johnson. 1995. 115 S.Ct. 24 75. 
Mindiola, Tatcho, Jr. ,  and Armando Gutierrez. 1988. "Chicanos and the 
Legislative Process: Reality and I llusion in the Politics of Change." I n  
Latinos and the Political System, ed. F. Chris Garcia. South Bend, I N: 
University of Notre Dame Press, 349-362. 
Moe, Terry M. 1980. "A Calculus of Group Membership." American Journal of 
Political Science 24(4): 593-632. 
Moncrief, Gary, Joel Thompson, and Robert Schuhmann. 1991. "Gender, Race, 
and the State Legislature: A Research Note on the Double Disadvantage 
Hypothesis." The Social Science Journal 28(4): 481-487. 
Morgan, David R., and John P. Pelissero. 1980. "Urban Policy: Does Political 
Structure Matter?" American Political Science Review 74(4): 999-1006. 
202 
Neddenriep, Gregory. 1996. "Switching from an At-Large District Arrangement 
to a Single-Member District System and Changes in Black Voter Turnout, 
A Case Study of Springfield, I llinois." M.A. Thesis. University of Illinois at 
Springfield. 
Nelson, Albert J. 1991. Emerging Influentials in State Legislatures: Women, 
Blacks, and Hispanics. New York: Praeger. 
Nelson, William E., Jr. ,  and Philip J. Meranto. 1977. Electing Black Mayors: 
Political Action in the Black Community. Columbus, OH: Ohio State 
University Press. 
Neumayer, Eric. 2003. "Good Policy Can Lower Violent Crime: Evidence. from a 
Cross-National Panel of Homicide Rates, 1980-97 ." Journal of Peace 
Research 40(6): 619-640. 
Norton, Edward C., Gayle S. Bieler, Susan T. Ennett, and Gary A. Zarkin. 1996. 
"Analysis of Prevention Program Effectiveness With Clustered Data Using 
Generalized Estimating Equations." Journal of Consulting and Clinical 
Psychology 64(5): 919-926. 
Orey, Byron D'Andra. 2000. "Black Legislative Politics in Mississippi." Journal 
of Black Studies 30(6): 791-814. 
Orum, Anthony M. 1966. "A Reappraisal of the Social and Political Participation 
of Negroes." American Journal of Sociology 72(1 ): 32-46. 
Overby, L. Marvin, and Kenneth M. Cosgrove. 1996. "Unintended 
Consequences? Racial Redistricting and the Representation of Minority 
Interests." Journal of Politics 58(2): 540-550. 
Parker, Frank R. 1990. Black Votes Count: Political Empowerment in 
Mississippi After 1965. Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina 
Press. 
Patterson, Samuel C. 1959. "Patterns of Interpersonal Relations in a State 
Legislative Group: The Wisconsin Assembly." Public Opinion Quarterly 
23(1): 101-109. 
Pelissero, John P. 2003. "The Political Environment of Cities in the Twenty-first 
Century." In Cities, Politics, and Policy: A Comparative Analysis, ed. 
John P. Pelissero. Washington, D.C. : CQ Press, 1-34. 
203 
Pel issero, John P. , and Timothy B. Krebs. 1997. "City Council Legislative 
Committees and Pol icy-making in Large United States Cities." American 
Journal of Political Science 41 (2): 499-518. 
Perry, Robert T. 1976. Black Legislators. San Francisco, CA: R and E 
Research. 
Pomper, Gerald. 1966. "Ethnic and Group Voting in Nonpartisan Municipal 
Elections." Public Opinion Quarterly 30( 1 ): 79-97. 
Popper, Karl R. 1968. The Logic of Scientific Discovery. New York: Harper and 
Row. 
Przeworski, Adam, and Henry Teune. 1982. The Logic of Comparative Social 
Inquiry. Malabar, FL: Robert E. Krieger Publishing Company. 
Riker, Wil l iam. 1962. The Theory of Political Coalitions. New Haven, CT: Yale 
University Press. 
Robinson, Theodore P., and Thomas R. Dye. 1978. "Reformism and Black 
Representation on City Councils." Social Science Quarterly 59(1 ): 133-
141. 
Rodgers, Chester 8 . ,  and Harold D.  Arman. 1971. "Nonpartisanship and 
Election to City Office." Social Science Quarterly 51 (4 ): 941-945. 
Rodgers, Harrel l R. , Jr. 1974. "Toward Explanation of the Political Efficacy and 
Pol itical Cynicism of Black Adolescents: An Exploratory Study." American 
Journal of Political Science 1 8(2): 257-282. 
Saltzstein, Grace Hal l .  1989. "Black Mayors and Police Policies." Journal of 
Politics 51 (3): 525-544. 
Schmittroth, Linda, ed. 2001. Cities in the United States: A Compilation of 
Current Information on Economic, Cultural, Geographic, and Social 
Conditions. 4th Ed. New York: Gale Group. 
Sharpe, Christine Leveaux, and James C. Garand. 2001. "Race, Rol l Cal ls, and 
Redistricting: The I mpact of Race-Based Redistricting on Congressional 
Rol l -Call . "  Political Research Quarterly 54(1 ): 31-51. 
Shaw v. Reno. 1993. 509 U.S. 630. 
204 
Sigelman, Lee, and Susan Welch. 1 991 . Black Americans' Views of Racial 
Inequality: The Dream Deferred. New York: Cambridge University Press. 
Stein, Lana, and Stephen E. Condrey. 1 987. "Integrating Municipal Workforces: 
A Comparative Study of Six Southern Cities." Publius 1 7(2): 93-1 04. 
Stratmann, Thomas. 1 995. "Logrolling in the U.S. Congress." Economic Inquiry 
33: 44 1 -456. 
Stumm, Theodore J . ,  and Matthew T. Corrigan. 1 998. "City Managers: Do they 
Promote Fiscal Efficiency?" Journal of Urban Affairs 20(3): 343-351 . 
Sul livan, Brenda. 2000. "Even at the Turning of the Tide: An Analysis of the 
North Carolina Legislative Black Caucus." Journal of Black Studies 30(6): 
81 5-838. 
Svara, James H .  2001 . "Do We Still Need Model Charters? The Meaning and 
Relevance of Reform in the Twenty-first Century." National Civic Review 
90(1 ): 1 9-34. 
Swain, Carol M .  1 993. Black Faces, Black Interests: The Representation of 
African Americans in Congress. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
· Press. 
Taebel, Delbert. 1 978. "Minority Representation on City Councils: The Impact 
of Structure on Blacks and Hispanics." Social Science Quarterly 59( 1 ) :  
1 42-1 52.  
Thielemann, Gregory S. 1 992. "Minority Legislators and Institutional Influence."  
Social Science Journal 29(4): 41 1 -42 1 . 
Thomas, Sue. 1 99 1 . "The Impact of Women on State Legislative Policies." 
Journal of Politics 53(4) :  958-75. 
Tomaskovic-Devey, Donald, Jeffrey Leiter, and Shealy Thompson. 1 994. 
"Organizational Survey Non-Responses." Administrative Science 
Quarterly 39(3 ): 439-57 . 
Underwood, Katherine .  1 997. "Ethnicity is Not Enough: Latino-Led Multiracial 
Coalitions in Los Angeles." Urban Affairs Review 33( 1  ): 3-27. 
U.S. Bureau of the Census. 2000. Summary File 1 .  
http://www.censusfactfinder.gov ( October 7-9th, 2003 ). 
205 
October. 
Vedlitz, Arnold, and Charles A. Johnson. 1982. "Community Racial Segregation, 
Electoral Structure, and Minority Representation." Social Science 
Quarterly 63(4 ): 729-736. 
Verba, Sidney, and Norman Nie. 1972. Participation in America. Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press. 
Walters, Ronald W. , and Robert C. Smith. 1999. African American Leadership. 
Albany, NY: SUNY Press. 
Walton, Haynes, Jr. 1985. Invisible Politics: Black Political Behavior. Albany, 
NY: SUNY Press. 
Weissberg, Rqbert. 1975. "Political Efficacy and Poli tical I llusion." Journal of 
Politics 37(2): 469-487. 
Welch, Susan. 1990. "The Impact of At-Large Elections on the Representation 
of Blacks and Hispanics." Journal of Politics 52(4 ): 1050-1076. 
Welch, Susan, and Timothy Bledsoe. 1985. "Perceived Sources of Electoral 
Support for Black and White Council Members." · Journal of Urban Affairs 
7(4): 1 -1 2 . 
Whitby, Kenny J. 1997. The Color of Representation: Congressional Behavior 
and, Black Interests. Ann Arbor, Ml: University of Michigan Press. 
Wilson, James Q. 1973. Political Organizations. New York: Basic Books. 
Winch, Peter. 1958. The Idea of A Social Science and Its Relation to 
Philosophy. New York: Humanities Press. 
Wolfinger, Raymond E. , and Steven J. Rosenstone. 1980. Who Votes? New 
Haven, CT: Yale University Press. 
Zax, Jeffrey S. 1990. "Election Methods and Black and Hispanic City Council 
Membership." Social Science Quarterly 71 (2): 339-355. 
Zorn, Christopher. 2003. "Comparing GEE and 'Robust' Standard Errors, with 
an Application to Judicial Voting (Version 3)." An Earlier Version Was 
Presented at the Annual Meeting of the Southern Political Science 
Association, Atlanta, GA. 
206 
APPENDICES 
207 
APPENDIX A 
QUESTIONNAIRE FOR BLACK COUNCILORS 
A. Researchers know very l ittle about the amount of influence that 
African-American legislators have in  city councils. Therefore, 
we are very interested in your insights. 
1. I n  your opinion, how much influence do African-American legislators have in 
your city council? (Please circle one answer) 
1 A LOT 
2 SOME 
3 ONLY A LITTLE 
4 NONE AT ALL 
5 NO OPINION 
2. In  the past 10 years, have African Americans on your council become more 
influential , less influential , or have they maintained the same amount of 
influence? 
1 MORE INFLUENTIAL 
2 LESS INFLUENTIAL 
3 MAINTAINED THE SAME AMOUNT OF INFLUENCE 
4 NO OPINION 
3. Are African-American council persons more l ikely, as l ikely, or less l ikely to 
interact with the mayor in  comparison to their white counterparts? 
1 MORE LIKELY 
2 AS LIKELY 
3 LESS LIKELY 
4 NO OPINION 
4. Would you agree or disagree that you, as an African-American, have to work 
harder than your white col leagues to gain respect within your city council? 
1 STRONGLY AGREE 
2 AGREE 
3 D ISAGREE 
4 STRONGLY DISAGREE 
5 NO OPINION 
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5. In your opinion, does a council-person's race influence his/her opportunities 
to obtain leadership positions on the council? 
1 NO 
2 YES 
3 NO OPINION 
4 NOT APPLICABLE 
B. Another important purpose of this study is to understand the 
qual ity of race relations in city councils. 
6. In general, how would you describe the quality of black-white relations in your 
city council? 
1 EXCELLENT 
2 GOOD 
3 FAIR  
4 POOR 
5 NO OPI NION 
7. Have race relations improved, stayed about the same, or deteriorated since 
you were first elected to the city council? 
1 IMPROVED 
2 ST A YEO ABOUT THE SAME 
3 DETERIORATED 
4 NO OPIN ION 
8. Did anyone introduce legislation that, in your opinion, was overtly hostile to 
African-Americans in the last legislative session? 
1 NO 
2 YES lllli If "YES" please briefly describe the legislation below. 
9. Can you think of one or more instances in which you personally experienced 
some form of racial discrimination in your city council during the last 
legislative session? 
1 NO 
2 YES, SUBTLE DISCRIMINATION 1t ·ves," please 
3 YES, OVERT DISCRIMINATION---------•- ���
e�i
s
��:��:on 
4 YES, BOTH SUBTL� AND OVERT DISCRIMINATION lllli you experienced. 
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1 0. Did you observe one or more instances of racial discrimination that occurred 
against other members of your city council during the last legislative session? 
1 NO 
2 YES, SUBTLE DISCRIMINATION • It .. Yes," please 
3 YES, OVERT DISCRIMI NATION --------� ���
e
�is�����:on 
4 YES, BOTH SUBTLE AND OVERT DISCRI MI NATION -+ you experienced. 
C. Next, we would l ike to ask you about pol icy issues that may be 
important to African-Americans, the l ikel ihood that these 
policies wi ll be adopted, and the barriers you might face in  
gain ing support for your  legislation. 
1 1 .  Please indicate how important each of the following issues is to your African­
American constituents. (Please circle one answer for each issue) 
Issue VERY SOMEWHAT NOT VERY 
IMPORTANT IMPORTANT IMPORTANT 
Urban renewal 1 2 3 
Jobs & economic opportunities 1 2 3 
Housing 1 2 3 
Public education 1 2 3 
Pol ice accountability 1 2 3 
Public assistance 1 2 3 
Representation in public office 1 2 3 
1 2. I n  your opinion, is it necessary to have African-American representatives on 
city councils to ensure African-American concerns are addressed? 
1 NO 
2 YES 
3 NO OPI N ION 
21 0 
1 3 . Do you feel that people are best represented in politics by leaders from their 
own race, or do you feel that the leader's race does not make much 
difference? 
1 PEOPLE ARE BEST REPRESENTED BY LEAD ERS FROM THEIR OWN RACE 
2 THE LEADER'S RACE DOES NOT MAKE MUCH D IFFERENCE 
3 NO OPIN ION 
1 4 . Please indicate whether your city council passed a policy favorable to African­
Americans during its last legislative session for each of these different issues. 
Issue NO YES I DON'T KNOW 
Urban renewal 1 2 3 
Jobs & economic opportunities 1 2 3 
Housing 1 2 3 
Public education 1 2 3 
Police accountability 1 2 3 
Public assistance 1 2 3 
Representation in public office 1 2 . 3 
1 5 . How many ordinances did you introduce in the last legislative session? _ 
How many were passed into law? __ 
1 6. How many ordinances did you introduce that were especial ly important to 
African-Americans during the last legislative session? __ _ 
How many of these ordinances were passed into law? ___ _ 
1 7 . Overall, how difficult is it to persuade white members of the city council to do 
each of the fol lowing? 
NOT VERY SOMEWHAT VERY NO 
DIFFICULT DIFFICULT DIFFICULT OPINION 
a. Vote for leg islation that you 1 2 3 4 
favor 
b. Co-sponsor legislation that 1 2 3 4 
you would l ike to introduce 
C. Co-sponsor legislation that is 1 2 3 4 
especially important to 
African-Americans 
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1 8. How often do council members from each of the following groups support the 
policies that you advocate? 
NEVER NOT VIERY OFTEN VERY NOT Group 
OFTEN OFTEN APPLICABLE 
Liberal Whites 1 2 3 4 5 
Moderate Whites 1 2 3 4 5 
Conservative Whites 1 2 3 4 5 
Liberal African-Americans 1 2 3 4 5 
Moderate African-Americans 1 2 3 4 5 
Conservative African-Americans 1 2 3 4 5 
Liberal Hispanics 1 2 3 4 5 
Moderate Hispanics 1 2 3 4 5 
Conservative Hispanics 1 2 3 4 5 
D. Presently, researchers have l imited knowledge about the role that 
African-Americans play in legislative coal itions. Your insights 
would greatly enhance our understanding of this issue. 
1 9. Do well-defined voting blocs exist on your council? 
1 NO • (Skip to Question 32) 
.
------L2 YES 
20. How many of these voting blocs are there? __ _ 
21 . Are you a member of one of these voting blocs? 
1 NO • (Skip to Question 23) 
2 YES 
22. I n  your opinion, do you receive a fair share of the policy benefits distributed 
by your bloc? 
1 NO 
2 YES 
3 NO OPINION 
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23. In your city council, is there a dominant voting bloc that usually controls what 
policies are adopted? 
1 NO 
2 YES 
24. What is the racial composition of the dominant voting bloc? 
Number of People 
African-Americans . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  . 
Hispanics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  . 
Whites . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  __ _ 
25. In your opinion, to what extent do the following characteristics influence one's 
ability to become a member of the dominant voting bloc in your city council? 
Characteristic A GREAT SOMEWHAT NOT AT NO 
DEAL ALL OPIN ION 
A member's race 
A member's party affiliation 
A member's ideology 
The characteristics of a member's 
district or ward 
The member's policy preferences 
Personal friendships with members of 
the dominant voting bloc 
Respect by a member's colleagues 
The member's occupation outside the 
council 
26. Do you agree or disagree that this dominant voting bloc hinders the progress 
of African-Americans in your city? 
1 STRONGLY AGREE 
2 AGREE 
3 DISAGREE 
4 STRONGLY DISAGREE 
5 NO OPINION 
27. How frequently does the dominant voting bloc accommodate the needs of the 
city's African-American community? 
1 VERY FREQUENTLY 
2 FREQUENTLY 
3 NOT VERY FREQUENTLY 
4 NEVER 
5 NO OPIN ION 
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28. How willing is the dominant voting bloc to accommodate the African-American 
council-persons who are members of this bloc? 
1 VERY WILLING 
2 SOMEWHAT WILLING 
3 NOT VERY WILLING 
4 NO OPINION 
5 NOT APPLICABLE 
29. ls there another voting bloc on your city council that competes with the 
dominant bloc? 
1 NOi---�• (Skip to Question 32) !�-----2 YES 
30. Are you a member of this competing bloc? 
1 NO 
2 YES 
31. What is the racial composition of the competing voting bloc? 
Number of People 
African-Americans . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  . ---
Hispanics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  __ _ 
Whites . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  . ---
32 . Would you agree or disagree that African-Americans on your council must 
vote as a unified group to be successful? . 
1 STRONGLY AGREE 
2 AGREE 
3 DISAGREE 
4 STRONGLY DISAGREE 
5 NO OPINION 
6 NOT APPLICABLE 
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33 . ls  there a black caucus in your city council? 
1 NO·------� (Skip to Question 36) 
1
....------2 YES 
34. 
Question NO 
Does your black caucus have officers? 1 
Does your black caucus hold regular 1 
meetings? 
Does your black caucus have a list of priorities 1 
it hopes to pass into law? 
YES I DON'T KNOW 
2 3 
2 3 
2 3 
35. I n  your opinion, how much influence does your black caucus have in  the 
matters l isted below? 
NONE AT VERY SOME NO 
ALL LITTLE OPINION 
Committee assignments 1 2 3 4 
Developing legislation 1 2 3 4 
Passing legislation important to 1 2 3 4 
African-Americans 
Social izing new members 1 2 3 4 
Helping its members win 1 2 3 4 
election 
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E. Researchers know very l ittle about whether African-Americans 
face barriers in city council committees. Therefore, we would 
l ike to ask you about your committee experiences. 
36 . Does your city council have permanent committees? 
1 NO _______ ___,. {Skip to Question 43) 1------2 YES 
37. Overall , how satisfied are you with your committee assignment(s)? 
1 VERY SATISFIED 
2 SATISFI ED 
3 DISSATISFIED 
4 VERY DISSATISFIED 
5 NO OPINION 
38 . To what extent does racial discrimination prevent African-Americans from 
obtaining the committee assignments they prefer? 
1 A GREAT DEAL 
2 SOME 
3 NONE AT ALL 
4 NO OPIN ION 
39. To what extent do the following characteristics influence committee 
assignments for African-Americans serving on your city cou ncil? 
Characteristic A GREAT SOMEWHAT NOT AT NO 
DEAL ALL OPINION 
The member's party affil iation 1 2 3 4 
The member's seniority 1 2 3 4 
The member's assignment 1 2 3 4 
preferences 
The member's race 1 2 3 4 
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40. To what extent do the following characteristics influence committee 
assignments for whites serving on your council? 
Characteristic A GREAT SOMEWHAT NOT AT NO 
DEAL ALL OPINION 
The member's party affiliation 1 2 3 4 
The member's seniority 1 2 3 4 
The member's assignment 1 2 3 4 
preferences 
The member's race 1 2 3 4 
41 . What committees are most important to African-Americans on your city 
council? 
Most Important: ________________ _ 
Second Most Important: ____________ _ 
Third Most Important: _____________ _ 
42 . Please identify the committees on which you serve, how long have you 
served, and whether you are the committee chairman or ranking opposition 
· member. 
Committee Name # Of YEARS COMMITTEE RANKING 
ON THE CHAIR? OPPOSITION 
COMMITTEE MEMBER? 
YES / NO YES / NO 
YES / NO YES / NO 
YES / NO YES / NO 
YES / NO YES / NO 
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F. This section asks about your district and city. 
43. Which of the fol lowing best describes your district or ward? 
1 MAINLY URBAN 
2 MAINLY SUBURBAN 
3 MAINLY SMALL TOWN 
4 MAINLY RURAL 
44. What is the approximate average annual family income in your district or 
ward? 
1 UNDER $20,000 
2 $ 20,001 - $40,000 
3 $40,001 - $60,000 
4 $60,001 - $80,000 
5 OVER $80,000 
45. Approximately what percentage of your district or ward is comprised of 
African-American, white, and Hispanic residents? 
% in Your District or Ward 
African-Americans . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . __ _ 
Hispanics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  __ _ 
Whites . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  __ _ 
Number 
46. How many people serve on your city council? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  __ _ 
How many of these members are African-Americans? . . . . . . . . . __ _ 
How many of these members are white? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  __ _ 
How many of these members are Hispanic? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . __ _ 
47. Which statement best describes the political cl imate in your home district or 
ward? 
1 STRONGLY DEMOCRATIC 
2 TWO PARTY COMPETITIVE 
3 STRONGLY REPUBLICAN 
4 OTHER {Please Specify): ____ _ 
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48 . How would you describe the quality of race relations in your city? 
1 EXCELLENT 
2 GOOD 
3 FAI R 
4 POOR 
5 NO OPIN ION 
49 . In  your opinion, how likely are the white voters in your dty to support the 
political objectives of the city's African-American community? 
. 1 VERY LIKELY 
2 SOMEWHAT L IKELY 
3 NOT VERY LIKELY 
4 NO OPI NION 
50 . Has your city changed how it elects its council members due to a Voting 
Rights Act lawsuit? 
1 NO 
2 YES 
3 I DON'T KNOW 
G. Finally, we would l ike to ask you a few questions about yourself 
for statistical purposes. 
51 . What is your gender? 
1 MALE 
2 FEMALE 
52 . What year were you born? __ _ 
53. Please indicate your highest level of education? 
1 H IGH SCHOOL 
2 SOME COLLEGE 
3 TECHNICAL SCHOOL 
4 COLLEGE DEGREE 
5 GRADUATE OR PROFESS IONAL SCHOOL 
21 9 
54. What is your principal occupation? __________ _ 
55. About how long have you been a resident in the city in which you serve? _ 
56. How many years have you served on your city council? __ 
57. What is your political party identification? 
1 DEMOCRAT 
2 REPUBLICAN 
3 OTHER (Please Specify): _______ _ 
4 NONE 
58. How would you describe your ideology? 
1 VERY CONSERVATIVE 
2 CONSERVATIVE 
3 SLIGHTLY CONSERVATIVE 
4 MODERATE-MIDDLE OF THE ROAD 
5 SLIGHTLY LIBERAL 
6 LIBERAL 
7 VERY LIBERAL 
59. Please indicate the frequency with which you do each of the following 
activities in an average week while your city council is in session? (Check 
one for each statement) 
Activity 1 -2 3-1 0 OVER 1 0  
NEVER TIMES TIMES TIMES 
Speak on the floor 
Speak in committee or sub-committee 
Negotiate with other council members 
Meet with wh ite council members 
Meet with African-American council members 
Meet with office holders not on the council 
Meet with residents of your d istrict or ward 
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APPENDIX B 
QUESTIONNAIRE FOR WHITE CITY COUNCILORS 
A. Researchers know very little about the amount of influence that 
African-American legislators have WITHIN city councils. 
Therefore, I am very interested in your insights . 
1 .  I n  your opinion, how much influence do African-American legislators have in 
your city council? {Please circle one answer} 
1 A LOT 
2 SOME 
3 ONLY A LITTLE 
4 NONE AT ALL 
5 NO OPIN ION 
2. In the past 1 0  years, have African-Americans on your city council become 
more influential ,  less influential ,  or have they maintained the same amount of 
influence? 
1 MORE INFLUENTIAL 
2 LESS INFLUENTIAL 
3 MAINTAINED THE SAME AMOUNT OF INFLUENCE 
4 NO OPINION 
3. Are African-American council-persons more l ikely, as likely, or less likely to 
interact with the mayor in comparison to their white counterparts? 
1 MORE LIKELY 
2 AS LIKELY 
rWhat is the mayor's race 3 LESS LIKELY or ethnicity? 
4 NO OPIN ION 
--
4. In your opinion , does a council-person's race influence his/her opportunities 
to obtain leadership positions on the council? 
1 NO 
2 YES 
3 NO OPIN ION 
4 NOT APPLICABLE 
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5. Would you agree or d isagree that African-American councilmembers must 
work harder than their white counterparts to gain respect within your city 
council? 
1 STRONGLY AGREE 
2 AGREE 
3 DISAGREE 
4 STRONGLY DISAGREE 
5 NO OPIN ION 
6. Would you agree or d isagree that African-Americans on your city council 
must vote as a unified group to be successful? 
1 STRONGLY AGREE 
2 AGREE 
3 DISAGREE 
4 STRONGLY DISAGREE 
5 NO OPIN ION 
B. Another important purpose of this study is to understand the 
quality of race relations within city councils. 
7. In general, ·how would you descri_be the quality of black-white relations in your 
city council? (Please circle one answer) 
1 EXCELLENT 
2 GOOD 
3 FAIR 
4 POOR 
5 NO OPI N ION 
8. Have race relations improved , stayed about the same, or deteriorated since 
you were first elected to the city council? 
1 IMPROVED 
2 STAYED ABOUT THE SAME 
3 DETERIORATED 
4 NO OPINION 
9. To what extent does racial d iscrimination prevent African-Americans from 
obtaining the committee assignments they prefer? 
1 A GREAT DEAL 
2 SOME 
3 NONE AT ALL 
4 NO OPINION . .  (My council doesn't have committees) 
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10. Did anyone introduce legislation that, in your opinion , was overtly hostile to 
African-Americans in the last legislative session? 
1 NO 
2 YES __ �lll- If "YES," please briefly describe the 
legislation below. 
11 . Did you observe one or more instances of racial discrimination that occurred 
against an African-American councilmember during the last legislative 
session? 
1 NO 
2 YES, SUBTLE DISCRIM INATION ------� lf "YES," please 3 YES, OVERT DISCRIMINATION-------� briefly describe 
4 YES, BOTH SUBTLE & OVERT DISCRIMINATION -+ the discrimination 
you observed. 
C. Next, I would l ike to ask you about some important issues 
concerning representation. 
12. In your opinion, is it necessary to have African-American representatives on 
city councils to ensure African-American concerns are addressed? 
1 NO 
2 YES 
3 NO OPINION 
13. Do you feel that people are best represented in politics by leaders from their 
own race, or do you believe that the leader's race does not make much 
difference? 
1 PEOPLE ARE BEST REPRESENTED BY LEADERS FROM THEIR OWN RACE 
2 THE LEADER'S RACE DOES NOT MAKE MUCH DI FFERENCE 
3 NO OPIN ION 
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D. This section asks about your city and district. 
1 4 . How would you describe the quality of race relations in your city? 
1 EXCELLENT 
2 GOOD 
3 FAI R  
4 POOR 
5 NO OPI N ION 
1 5. In  your opinion, how likely are white voters in your city to support the political 
objectives of the city's African-American community? 
1 VERY LIKELY 
2 SOMEWHAT LIKELY 
3 NOT VERY LIKELY 
4 NO OPIN ION 
1 6 . Has your city changed how it elects its council members due to a Voting 
Rights Act lawsuit? 
1 NO 
2 YES 
3 I DON'T KNOW 
1 7. Which of the following best describes your district or ward? 
If elected at­
large, please 
answer using 
your city as 
your refrence 
point 1 MAI NLY URBAN 
2 MAI NLY SUBURBAN 
3 MAINLY SMALL TOWN 
4 MAINLY RURAL 
1 8. What is the approximate average annual family income in you r district or 
ward? 
1 UNDER $20,000 
2 $20,001 - $40,000 
3 $40,001 - $60,000 
4 $60,001 - $80,000 
5 OVER $80,000 
1 9. Which statement best describes the political climate in your home district or 
ward? 
1 STRONGLY DEMOCRATIC 
2 TWO PARTY COMPETATIVE 
3 STRONGLY REPUBLICAN 
4 OTHER (Please specify): _____ _ 
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20. Approximately what percentage of your district or ward is comprised of 
African-American, white, and Hispanic residents? 
% in your district or ward 
African-Americans . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  ___ % 
Hispanics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  ___ % 
Whites . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  ___ % 
Number 
21. How many people serve on your city council? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  __ _ 
How many of these members are African-Americans? . . . . . . . . .  __ _ 
How many of these members are white? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  __ _ 
How many of these members are Hispanic? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  __ _ 
E. Final ly, I would l ike to ask you a few questions about yourself 
for statistical purposes. 
22. What is your gender? 
1 MALE 
2 FEMALE 
23. What year were you born? 1 9  _ _  
24. Please indicate your highest level of education. 
1 HIGH SCHOOL 
2 SOME COLLEGE 
3 TECHNICAL SCHOOL 
4 COLLEGE DEGREE 
5 GRADUATE OR PROFESSIONAL SCHOOL 
25. What is your principal occupation? ________ _ 
26. About how long have you been a resident of the city in which you serve? 
27. How many years have you served on your city council? __ _ 
28. Were you elected by a ward/district within your city, or by the city as a whole? 
1 ELECTED BY A WARD OR DISTRICT 
2 ELECTED BY THE CITY AS A WHOLE 
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29. What is your political party identification? 
1 DEMOCRAT 
2 REPUBLICAN 
3 OTHER (Please specify): __ 
4 NONE 
30. How would you describe your ideology? 
1 VERY CONSERVATIVE 
2 CONSERVATIVE 
3 SLIGHTLY CONSERVATIVE 
4 MODERATE-MI DDLE OF THE ROAD 
5 SLIGHTLY LIBERAL 
6 LIBERAL 
7 VERY LIBERAL 
31 . How many ordinances did you introduce in the last legislative session? _ 
How many were passed into law? __ 
32. How many ordinances did you introduce that were especially important to 
African-Americans during the last legislative session? __ 
How many of these ordinances were passed into law? __ 
33. Please indicate the frequency with which you do each of the following 
activities in an average week while your city council is in session? (Check 
one for each statement} 
Activity 1 -2 3-1 0 OVER 1 0  
NEVER TIMES TIMES TIMES 
Speak on the floor 
Speak in committee or sub-committee 
Negotiate with other council members 
Meet with white council members 
Meet with African-American council members 
Meet with office holders not on the council 
Meet with residents of your d istrict or ward 
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APPENDIX C 
CITY CLERK QUESTIONNAIRE 
A. The following questions ask about the overall structure of your 
municipality's government. 
1 .  Please ind icate your current form of government as defined by your charter, 
ordinance, or state law. (Please circle one answer) 
1 Mayor-Council-An elected council serves as the legislative body. 
The ch ief elected official (e.g . ,  the mayor) is the head of government, 
holds significant administrative authority, and is usually elected 
separately from the counci l .  
2 Council-Manager-An elected council and chief elected official (e.g. ,  
Mayor) are responsible for policy making , but a professional 
admin istrator is appointed to run the government's day-to-day 
operations. 
3 Commission-Mernbers of a board of elected commissioners serve 
as the heads of specific departments and collectively sit as the 
legislative body of the government. 
4 Town Meeting-Qualified voters convene to make basic policy and to 
choose a board of selectmen . The selectmen and elected officers 
carry out the policies establ ished by the government . 
5 Representative Town Meeting-Voters select citizens to represent 
them at the town meeting. All citizens may attend and participate in 
debate, but only the representatives may vote. 
2. Does your municipal ity have a chief appointed offician (i .e. , city manager, 
city admin istrator, ch ief administrative officer, town administrator, village 
manager, or a similar title). 
1 Yes 
2 No ____ • (If "No," skip to Question 4) 
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3 .  I f  your municipality has a chief appointed official, who appoints this 
individual? 
1 The chief elected official 
2 The council 
3 Combination of the chief elected official & council 
4 Other (Please specify) ____ _ 
4 .  Who is responsible for developing and making recommendations for the 
budget submitted to the council? 
1 The chief e lected official 
2 The chief appointed official 
3 A combination of the chief elected and appointed officials 
4 The chief financial officer 
5 Other (Please specify) _____ _ 
5.  Are department heads elected or appointed? 
1 Elected .,. ( I f  "Elected," skip to Question 7) 
2 Appointed 
3 Some elected and some appointed 
6 .  I f  any of your department heads are appointed, who appoints them? 
1 The chief e lected official 
2 The chief appointed official 
3 A combination of the chief elected and appointed officials 
4 The counci l  
5 Other (Please specify) ____ _ 
B. Next, I would l ike to ask you some important questions about 
your municipality's chief elected official (this person usual ly 
holds the title "mayor," "president," or "board chair." 
7. How is your chief elected official selected? (Circle only one.) 
1 The voters elect directly 
2 The council selects from among its members 
3 Council members rotate into the position 
4 The council members with the most votes in the general 
election wins the position 
5 Other (Please specify) ___ _ 
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8. Is the chief elected official in your municipality officially full-time or part-time? 
1 Full-time 
2 Part-time 
9. Is the chief elected official a member of the city council? 
1 Yes 
2 No 
1 0. Under what circumstances does the chief elected official have the authority 
to vote in council meetings? 
1 On all issues 
2 Only to break a tie 
3 Never 
4 Other (Please specify.) ___ _ 
1 1  . Does the chief elected official have the authority to veto council-passed 
measures? 
1 Yes � 2 No � If so, can the council overturn a 
veto with a "super majority" vote? 
D Yes, D No 
1 2. Does the chief elected official have the authority to: (Circle all applicable) 
1 Assign council members to chair or serve on committees 
2 Appoint citizens to advisory boards, commissions, etc. 
3 Make an annual report to the council and citizens on the state of the community 
4 Initiate the h iring and/or involuntary termination of the chief appointed official 
5 Receive the annual budget developed by the chief appointed official and present it with 
comments and suggestions to the council for consideration 
1 3. How many staff work directly for the chief elected official? 
Full-time staff: 
Part-time staff: 
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C. Finally, I would l ike to ask you some questions about your 
municipal council (some municipal ities call it the "board of 
selectmen," "board of trustees," or "board of aldermen." 
1 4 . Does the political party affiliation of council candidates appear on the ballot 
in a local general election? 
1 Yes 
2 No 
1 5 . How many positions (or seats) are there on your council? __ (Include 
the chief elected official only if that person is an actual member of the 
council) 
1 6. How many current council members fall into the following age groups? (The 
total number _should equal the number in Question 1 5  unless there are 
vacant seats on the council) 
Under 22 30 to 39 -- --
22 to 29 40 to 49 -- --
1 7 . How many of your current council members are: 
Male: --
Female: 
50 to 59 ---
60 and over 
1 8 . How many council members are selected by the following methods? 
Elected At-Large: __ _ 
Elected by Ward or District: __ _ 
1 9 . Was _________ elected at-large or by a district or ward? 
1 Elected at-large 
2 Elected by a district or ward 
20. How many incumbents ran for reelection to the council in the last general 
election? __ How many of these incumbents were reelected? __ 
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21. How many current council members are in each of these occupational 
categories? (Count memqers only once. If any member has more than one 
occupation, include that person in the category where he/she spends the 
greatest amount of time). 
_ Lawyers Homemakers 
_ Other professionals (medicine, etc. ) 
_ Business executives/managers 
_ Business/industry employees 
_ Teachers & education personnel 
_ Clergy 
_ Service industry employees 
Farmers and ranchers 
_ Retired persons 
Other 
22. Indicate the length of term for council members? 
A. Council members elected at-large: .  
D 2 Years, D 3 Years, D 4 Years, D 6 Years, D Other: 
B. Council members elected from districts or wards: 
---
D 2 Years, D 3 Years, D 4 Years, D 6 Years, D Other: __ _ 
23. Are terms of office for the council staggered or concurrent? 
1 Staggered 
2 Concurrent 
24. Is there a legal limit to the number of terms a council member may serve? 
1 Yes 
2 No 
231 
If "Yes," what is the maximum 
number of terms a council 
member may serve? __ _ 
25. How often does the council meet in formal session? 
1 More than once a week 
2 Once a week 
3 Three times a month 
4 Twice a month 
5 Once a month 
6 Less than once a month 
7 Other (Please specify) _____ _ 
26. How many staff are employed by the council to work exclusively on council 
business? 
Full-time staff: ---
Part-time staff: 
27. Are any council members (excluding the chief elected official) paid an 
annual salary or stipend for any of their services? 
� ��s  
If "Yes," please indicate the 
approximate annual dollar amount that 
your council members receive. 
Full-time council member $ __ 
Part-time council member $ __ 
28. Does your municipality have a provision for a legislative referendum? (a 
process where the council places any question on the ballot for voter 
approval or rejection) 
1 Yes 
2 No 
29. Does your council have standing committees (permanent bodies with set 
memberships and regularly scheduled meetings) that consider specific 
policy matters? 
1 Yes
, 2 No � .--------------. 
If "Yes," approximately how many 
standing committees did the council 
have as of January 200 1 ?  _. _ 
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